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Abstract 
On 1 March 1980, the National Executive of the Australian Labor Party intervened in the 
affairs of its Queensland Branch, dissolving the existing party arrangements, seizing the 
financial statements and party assets, and creating a new administration. The conflict that 
precipitated this drastic step followed years of internal division and publicly aired disputes 
while the Queensland leadership delivered poor electoral results at both state and federal 
elections. This thesis examines the conflict in detail, its causes (including the lasting 
impact of the 1957 split), the combatants, and what the intervention reforms eventually 
delivered. 
In this thesis, I analyse the factors that led to intervention including the nature and outlook 
of the Queensland leaders, the ‘Old Guard’ often referred to as the Trades Hall Group, and 
the background and motivations of the reformers, the ‘New Guard.’ The Old Guard finally 
succumbed to reform, threatened from within by the influx of new members clamouring for 
change, and by the federal intervention from without. I examine how, over time, the party 
reformed, modernised and adapted to change and in so doing re-invented and renewed 
itself sufficiently, after 32 years in opposition, to once again win government in 
Queensland for 21 of the next 23 years.  
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Glossary 
Administrative Committee 
Following intervention, the Administrative Committee took over management of the day-to-
day running of the Queensland Branch.  It was comprised of 27 members who were 
elected every two years by State Conference using a proportional representation ballot. 
Source:  Denis Murphy, The Australian Labor Party and Its’ Leaders, Third edition, 1985, 
p12. 
 
ALP State Conference 
Following intervention, State Conference took over the role previously handled by Labor-
in-Politics-Convention. It was the highest governing body of the Queensland Branch, and 
was held biennially with 220 voting delegates drawn from: affiliated unions, delegates from 
state electorates, Young Labor, Labor Women’s Organisation, Party Officers, 
Representatives of Federal and State Parliamentarians and Municipal Councils, and the 
Union Cooperative Society. The 82 state electorate delegates were selected by a 
proportional representation ballot of all branch members in each electorate. Source: Denis 
Murphy, The Australian Labor Party and Its’ Leaders, Third edition, 1985, p11. 
 
Electoral Executive Council (EEC) 
The EEC was comprised of three delegates elected at the annual general meeting of each 
ALP branch within each state electorate. Its main function was to oversee all matters 
affecting their state electorate and organise for state elections. The EEC raised funds for 
election campaigns, arranged for speakers to address members at EEC meetings and 
communicated with party units on behalf of affiliated branches regarding 
political/party/local issues. Source: Sue Yarrow, Delegate to Oxley FDE and Sherwood 
EEC, 1970 – 1983. 
 
Factions 
Factions are amorphous groups of people and/or unions who coalesce usually: with 
mutual agreement on political ideology and collaboration on policy; because of personal 
friendships or family allegiances; or, to ‘get the numbers’ to ensure their people are elected 
in ballots. Individuals and unions change their factional allegiance from time to time. Over 
time factions may change their positions on policy and other issues and may forge lasting 
or short-term alliances with other factions. See also, Appendix 1: Factional Nomenclature. 
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Federal Divisional Executive (FDE) 
The FDE was comprised of three delegates elected at the annual general meeting of each 
ALP branch within the federal electorate/division. Its main function was to oversee all 
matters pertaining to the federal division and organise the ALP’s activities for federal 
elections. The FDE raised funds for election campaigns, arranged for speakers to address 
members at FDE meetings and communicated on behalf of affiliated branches regarding 
political/party/local issues. Source: Sue Yarrow, Delegate to Oxley FDE and Sherwood 
EEC, 1970 - 1983. 
 
Groupers and Grubs 
During the 1940s, the Catholic Church encouraged unionist and Australian Labor Party 
(ALP) parishioners to take an active role in opposing communist influence in the trade 
union movement by becoming active in the Catholic Social Studies Movement, ‘the 
Movement.’ In the initial stages unions established Industrial Group Committees to aid in 
opposing the communists so Movement members became known as ‘groupers.’ Over time 
the grouper’s influence over both unions and the ALP increased. Communists held 
leadership positions in a number of unions affiliated to both the Queensland Trades and 
Labour Council (TLC) and to the ALP, and Groupers fought vigorously against this, 
promoting their own members. Conservative forces propagated the view that the ALP, 
through its affiliated unions, was falling under communist control and the ALP itself split 
divisively around this issue in the mid-1950s. The ALP moved against the Groups at their 
1955 Hobart Federal Conference following which, particularly in Victoria and Queensland, 
the groupers were expelled, exiting to form the Democratic Labor Party (initially, the new 
party in  Queensland was called the Queensland Labor Party). The new parties drained 
voting support from the ALP for many years. In the remnant ALP, ‘groupers’ were 
considered to be anathema and the slur ‘grub or grouper’ was highly derogatory. Sources: 
books listed in the bibliography by: P.L. Reynolds, John Faulkner and Stuart Macintyre, 
Ross Fitzgerald and Harold Thornton. 
 
Inner Executive of the QCE (Inner) 
Seven members were elected triennially by the ALP’s Queensland Central Executive to 
form the Inner Executive. They handled day-to-day management of the party and served 
as Directors of ALP Enterprises (4KQ) but did not to frame policy. The Inner was 
responsible for appointment of paid Party Officers and included the President, Vice 
President, four Executive members, and the Leader of the State Parliamentary Labor 
 xiii 
Party (SPLP). It was replaced after intervention with the Administrative 
Committee. Sources: Denis Murphy (ed.), The Australian Labor Party and Its’ Leaders, 
Second edition, August 1986: and, Labor in the 70s, authorized by Tom Burns. 
 
Intervention 
The Macquarie Dictionary says intervention is defined as the act or fact of intervening, the 
interposition or interference of one state in the affairs of another. Within the ALP, the ALP 
National Executive intervenes in the affairs of one of its state branches, taking over control 
of affairs in the branch and/or imposing changes to address a problem or return the branch 
to functionality or alignment with other branches. Examples of ALP interventions: in 1970, 
in Victoria; in New South Wales 1971; in Tasmania in 1975 (limited intervention); and, 
Queensland 1980. Sources: Paul Strangio, interview with Neil Batt. 
 
Labor-in-Politics-Convention 
Convention was elected triennially comprising 146 delegates drawn from affiliated unions, 
state electorates, Young Labor, Labor Women’s Organisation, Party Officers, 
representatives of federal and state parliamentarians and municipal councils, and the Union 
Cooperative society. State electorate delegates were elected by a first-past-the-post ballot 
of all branch members and affiliated unionists living in the electorate. Following intervention, 
Convention was replaced by the ALP State Conference. Source: Fran Ross quoting Wayne 
Swan, Chapter 4 ‘Queensland Labor’s graveyard,’ in Andrew Parkin and John Warhurst, 
‘Machine Politics in the Australian Labor Party.’  
 
Labor Party / labour movement 
The labour movement is used to describe the broad movement which includes for 
example, the wide sweep of left organisations seen in the May Day marches: Labor Party 
members and branches; affiliated unions and union movement organisations; groups 
politically further left than then Labor Party such as the Communist and Socialist parties; 
members of peace movements such as Rally for Peace; the ‘red’ contingent. They are a 
much larger group than the actual ALP membership. Both ‘Labour’ and ‘Labor’ were used 
in the early years of the party although the official spelling was ‘Labour.’ The spelling 
‘Labor’ became accepted for the party’s title after World War 1. Source: The History and 
Organisation of the Australian Labor Party, second edition, August 1986.  
 xiv 
Masons / Masonic Lodge 
Masons are members of the Masonic Lodge, a widely distributed (formerly) secret society 
having for its object mutual assistance and the promotion of brotherly love amongst its 
members. In the sectarian atmosphere following World War 2, the United Grand Lodge of 
Queensland welcomed Anglican and Protestant males as members while adherents of the 
Knights of the Southern Cross tended to be Roman Catholic males. Sources: Macquarie 
Dictionary; United Grand Lodge of Queensland (Freemasons) website; Knights of the 
Southern Cross website.  
 
Mickey Spillall 
Mickey Spillall was a satirical (some say ‘scurrilous’) leaflet/newsletter published 
intermittently during the reform years, in the ALP and union movement. Its author was 
never identified and much speculation ensued as it ‘told the gossip’ about leading 
personalities in the ALP on both sides of the conflict – the Old Guard and the Reformers. 
Most editions carried the heading ‘by Mickey Spillall (The guy who knows all that goes on 
at the [Trades] Hall).’ 
 
Queensland Central Executive (QCE) 
The QCE was the main administrative body of the ALP from 1957 – 1979. It had 68 
members who met every two months representing: the affiliated unions; FDE Branch 
delegates; Australian Young Labor; Labor Women’s Conference; the SPLP; the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party (FPLP); Brisbane Municipal Labor Party; and, the Union Co-
Operative Society. Its main roles were: to ensure that the constitution and rules of the 
Labor Party were maintained; to endorse candidates for elections; and, to provide 
information to trade unions and branch members. Source: Labor in the 70s, authorised by 
Tom Burns, Labor House, printed for the 27th Labor-in-Politics Convention.  
 
Selection of candidates 
Prior to intervention candidates for federal, state and Brisbane City Council elections were 
selected by plebiscite of all ALP members and affiliated unionists living in the 
electorate/ward. The first-past-the-post voting system was used. Unions could issue 
standard certificates to their members living in the electorate for them to vote in the 
plebiscite even if they did not belong to the ALP, a practice claimed by many to be open to 
abuse. If urgent candidate selections had to be made, the QCE (or sometimes the Inner) 
undertook the selection. Sometimes the QCE reversed a local selection decision. Source: 
 xv 
Sue Yarrow, Delegate to Oxley FDE and Sherwood EEC1970-1983; and Bradley Bowden, 
Modern Labor in Queensland: Its Rise and Failings, 1978 – 1998, p7. Following 
intervention candidates for federal, state and Brisbane City Council elections were selected 
on a two-tiered basis comprising: a vote of branch members in the electorate or ward; then, 
the candidates addressed a Central Electoral College comprising 42 union and branch 
delegates elected by State Council. The two votes achieved by the candidate were then 
combined to identify the winning candidate. Source: Denis Murphy, The Australian Labor 
Party and Its Leaders, third edition, 1985, p14. 
 
State Council 
Following intervention State Council, the supreme body of the ALP between State 
Conferences, was introduced. It met quarterly and comprised 131 voting delegates drawn 
from affiliated unions, Party Officers, two delegates from each FDE, Young Labor, 
representatives of federal and state parliamentarians and municipal councils. The branch 
delegates were selected using proportional representation ballots in each federal 
electorate. Source: Denis Murphy, The Australian Labor party and Its’ Leaders, Third 
edition, 1985, p13.   
 
Trades Hall Group (THG) 
This name is given to the members of the ALP Inner Executive and their close TLC 
Executive associates who controlled the party during the years following the ‘split’ in 1957 
until intervention occurred in 1980. For most of this time, the group was headed by John 
Alfred Roy (Jack) Egerton while he was both Chair of the TLC (1957 – 1976) and 
President of the ALP (1968 – 1976). After Egerton was knighted in 1976 and left the ALP, 
Tom Burton (State Secretary, Printing and Kindred Industries Union) took over the reins of 
office. This group and their followers are sometimes referred to as the ‘Old Guard.’ After 
intervention they took the factional name ‘Labor Unity.’ The THG were all male, Australian 
born, blue collar union officials, aged about 50 – 60 years. Sources: Ross Fitzgerald and 
Harold Thornton; Bradley Bowden, Simon Blackwood, Cath Rafferty, and, Cameron Allan. 
(See also Appendix 1: Factional Nomenclature.)  
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CHAPTER 1 Introducing the thesis 
On 1 March 1980, the National Executive of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) intervened in 
the affairs of the Queensland Branch of the ALP.1 After years of turmoil with public 
disharmony and repeated election losses, the Queensland Branch ‘would have to be 
reformed.’2 For many, including a rising group of potential leaders and new members, 
intervention came as a huge relief after years of fighting for reforms. But some long term 
members were outraged, thinking that they might even split away from the main Labor 
Party.3 This had happened 23 years previously with absolutely disastrous results — the 
ALP had still not regained state parliamentary office by 1980. Another spilt might mean the 
end of the party. 
What caused this crisis? What was the background? Who were the protagonists? Could 
they salvage a political party shortly to reach its centenary? The 1980 intervention 
deserves to be examined in detail because it delivered a means for renewal and revival to 
a party wracked with divisions and conflict. While the history of the labour movement and 
the ALP in Queensland has been the subject of extensive examination from its formation 
to the 1950s, the effect of the changes through the 1960s and 1970s and how they 
impacted on the ALP deserves further study.4 This thesis shows that modernisation was 
slow to come to Queensland and the ALP was slow to respond to its impact. A comparison 
of the 1960s ALP in Queensland with other state branches throughout Australia shows 
how old fashioned the ALP was. Whereas other states and their major institutions had 
mostly moved with the times regarding societal, cultural and political attitudes, Queensland 
was resistant to change, bogged in an earlier era, reactionary, sexist and profoundly anti-
intellectual. Within the ALP the leaders resisted any movement for reform. 
It was intervention that unlocked modernisation in the ALP in Queensland, opening 
wounds between the party’s traditional but contracting union base and the expanding, 
more diversified new membership. The hard-won compromise saw a re-invigorated party 
that in 1989 went on to govern for 21 of the next 23 years. 
                                            
1 John Stubbs, Hayden, Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Mandarin, 1990, p. 208. 
2 Denis Murphy, Hayden – a political biography, Sydney, Australia: Angus and Robertson, 1980, p.164. 
3 Ross Fitzgerald and Harold Thornton, Labor in Queensland from the 1880’s to 1988, St Lucia, Queensland, 
Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1989, p. 263. 
4 Bradley, Bowden, “Modern Labour in Queensland: Its Rise and Failings, 1978 – 98,” Labour History, no. 
105, (November 2013), p. 2. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Queensland Branch of the longest 
surviving political party in Australia adapted to changes striking at the very heart of its 
traditional membership catchment. This thesis answers the question: how did the ALP in 
Queensland respond to the overwhelming changes confronting it in the 1960s and 1970s, 
to emerge renewed with the potential to win office? 
I examine the years from 1957 to 1989, placing contemporary accounts and the existing 
scholarly literature alongside 25 newly recorded oral history interviews conducted 
specifically for this thesis, and listed in Appendix 4. Eighteen of the interviews are available 
on the Queensland Speaks website5 and all have been archived. The thesis focuses 
specifically on the 1980 intervention, its background, the combatants and the major 
outcomes. 
An investigation of the literature reveals that there are now many books and journal 
articles that deal in part with the ALP in Queensland during the years covered by this 
thesis. Additionally there are records of conferences, meetings, media clippings, 
recordings and other theses that add to the already available documentation. However, as 
Bradley Bowden points out, ‘there are no major studies of Queensland Labor since 1957, 
except Fitzgerald and Thornton.’6 
Two major sources for my thesis are: D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce and Colin A. Hughes, Labor 
in Power — The Labor Party and Governments in Queensland 1915 – 19577 and, Ross 
Fitzgerald and Harold Thornton’s Labor in Queensland from the 1880’s to 1988.8 Each 
delivers a plethora of detail on people and events in the ALP in Queensland. These two 
works provide a check-point against which I analysed events and recollections gathered in 
my oral history recordings and information gleaned from other sources. Murphy et al. 
provide an understanding of the early ALP, the participants, the power struggles, the 
party’s achievements and its policy values, defining the background and setting for my 
thesis. Their book concludes at the 1957 split, the point to which this thesis turns to explain 
the origins of many subsequent Labor intervention conflicts. A more detailed analysis of 
                                            
5 Centre for the Government of Queensland, Queensland Speaks, 2011, 
http://www.queenslandspeaks.com.au. 
6 Bowden, op. cit. p. 2. 
7 D. J. Murphy, R. B. Joyce, and Colin A. Hughes (eds.), Labor in Power – The Labor Party and 
Governments in Queensland 1915 – 1957, St Lucia, Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 
1980. 
8 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit. 
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the years leading to intervention is delivered by Fitzgerald and Thornton.9 They provide 
detailed coverage of the 1980 intervention, primarily as part of the broad sweep of ALP 
history from 1880 to 1988. Their work concludes before 1989, the year in which the major 
achievement resulting from intervention occurred — the Goss Government election victory. 
While they consulted many individuals including some of the persons I interviewed, their 
work does not have the benefit of publicly available oral history recordings that add a vital 
personal interpretation to events and allow a new level of analysis. 
The most pertinent source that deals with the period is Bowden’s article ‘Modern Labor in 
Queensland: Its Rise and Failings, 1978 – 98.’10 Bowden covers the rise of the reform 
movement in Queensland pointing out that it delivered intervention which eventually saw a 
modernised ALP in Queensland return to, and remain in office from 1989 until 2012 — less 
two years of Coalition Government from 1996 to 1998.11 His focus is on the emergence of 
‘modern Labor’ in Queensland, and, the effects of diminishing unionisation and the 
changing population demographic on the ALP’s traditional membership catchment. He 
identifies an increasing role in the ALP of a ‘political class’ of self-interested university-
educated professionals, and the increasingly self-serving factions.12   
Other journal articles have provided background on details used in this thesis: regarding 
the production and use of oral history recordings; details about the 1957 split in the 
Queensland ALP; in defining societal, industrial and generational change and its impacts 
in Australia and Queensland; and, regarding the role and impact of factions within political 
parties. 
My early reading of a PhD history thesis, by RA Arrowsmith, was invaluable.13 She 
explained that: 
Oral history [has] transformed contemporary history in many countries uncovering the 
experiences and perspectives of groups of people otherwise ‘hidden from history.’ 
                                            
9 Ibid. 
10 Bowden, op. cit. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. pp. 2 and 26. 
13 Robyn Anne Arrowsmith, Australian World War II War Brides in America: Their Memories and 
Experiences, PhD 2010, Department of History, Politics & International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Macquarie 
University, 2010. 
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Conventional history is challenged and complemented by oral history. Oral history is 
about remembering and re-interpreting the past.14 
She referred to the richness of oral testimony and its variety, which strengthens the 
historical record, but equally she warned of pitfalls and difficulties potentially possible in 
successful oral history recording and use, such as the need to employ a professional 
approach and the necessity to ensure oral testimony is interpreted and set within a 
broader historical context.15  
I have been an active ALP member since 1968, participating in many conferences, elected 
to the post-intervention Administrative Committee, a 1983 Senate candidate, and serving 
on numerous party committees, and I am now a Life Member of the party, so I have an 
extensive collection of primary source ALP records and documents pertinent to the years 
of the thesis. 
The autobiographies and biographies of Bill Hayden,16 Peter Beattie,17 Wayne Goss,18 
Mike Ahern,19 Jim Cairns20 and Bob Hawke21 added substance to critiques of many 
characters mentioned in the thesis and provided detail and valuable background regarding 
events during the intervention period.  Except for the Bowden journal article and the 
Fitzgerald and Thornton book that concludes before 1989, other existing sources touch 
upon the 1980 intervention only tangentially, as part of a biographical account of the era, 
as a part of a broader history of Queensland’s politics, or as a sideline to the examination 
of another subject.  
My thesis is drawn from an examination of existing sources, and augmented by the 
testimonies of ALP activists of the time. I analyse the origins and causes of the 1970s 
                                            
14 Ibid. p. 6. 
15 Ibid. pp.7 and 11. 
16 Hon. William George Hayden (Bill) AC, Hayden – An Autobiography, Pymble, New South Wales, Australia: 
Angus and Robertson, 1996. And, Stubbs, op. cit. And also, Murphy (1980), op. cit. 
17 Peter Beattie with Angelo Loukakis, Making a Difference - Reflections on life, leadership & politics, 25 
Ryde Road, Pymble, 2073, New South Wales, Australia: Harper Collins, 2005. And also, Peter Beattie and 
Brian Stevenson (ed.), In the Arena: Memories of an A.L.P. State Secretary in Queensland, Bowen Hills, 
Brisbane, Queensland: Boolarong Publications, 1990. 
18 Jamie Walker, Goss: A Political Biography, St Lucia, Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1995. 
19 Paul Reynolds, Lock, Stock and Barrel: a Political Biography of Mike Ahern, St Lucia, Queensland, 
Australia: University of Queensland Press, 2002. 
20 Paul Strangio, keeper (sic) of the faith: a biography of Jim Cairns, Carlton South, Victoria, 3053: 
Melbourne University Press, 2002. 
21 Bob Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, 22 Salmon Street, Port Melbourne, Victoria, 3207: Mandarin, Reed 
Books Australia, 1994. 
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conflict and of the movement for reform. I identify the combatants, their separate 
motivations and grievances; and finally, I identify the short and long-term outcomes of 
intervention. The thesis, specific to the 1980 ALP National Executive intervention in the 
Queensland Branch, provides answers regarding a critical period of renewal for the ALP 
and contributes to the continuing record of the labour movement in this state. 
In preparation for the thesis 22 oral history interviews were conducted with Queenslanders 
and three with interstate members of the ALP National Executive. As the years passed 
there has been some urgency to record their accounts. Activists from all sides of the 
conflict participated: all factions are included: a mix of men and women; trade unionists 
and branch members; Brisbane based and regional party members; as well as a mix of 
Queensland members and National Executive members. Initial contacts with interviewees 
and interviews revealed that those who were once in open conflict are now able to easily 
discuss this critical period of Labor history. Their recollections are critical to my thesis, 
providing an ‘insider’ view of these political events. The list of interviewees was drawn up 
under the guidance of Manfred Cross,22 Terry Hampson23 and Anne Warner,24 all of whom 
held significant senior positions within the ALP during the years under consideration. 
A set of interview questions was prepared and submitted to receive University of 
Queensland Ethical Clearance for this thesis. The questions were semi-structured and 
cover the span of years 1957 – 1989. However, where it was possible, some interviewees 
provided background details from before the 1957 split. 
As an oral historian it is necessary to acknowledge my own past and current activities, to 
indicate any impact this might have on the interviews. I was one of the reformers involved 
in the conflict so I have an insider’s knowledge of these events. The benefit is that I 
understand discussions about party structures, the events and the jargon. All interviewees 
were known to me. Interviewees felt open to express their views. However, I needed to 
ensure that my bias, including my own perception of my role, was not allowed to impede a 
proper critical analysis and worthy record for labour history. It is a fact that I urged 
expulsion from the ALP of some Trades Hall Group25 (THG) senior officers, during the 
                                            
22 Hon. Manfred Douglas Cross AM, see Appendix 4. 
23 Terence John Hampson AM, see Appendix 4. 
24 Hon. Anne Marie Warner, see Appendix 4. 
25 See i) Glossary for explanation ii) Chapter 3 for more details about the THG, and iii) Appendix 1: Factional 
Nomenclature regarding the THG’s factional alignment.  
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years of conflict, but wiser counsel than mine prevailed: Joe Harris26 of the BWIU insisted, 
‘These people are ALP people at heart, they should not be expelled,’ so, although some 
were expelled from local branches, they were never expelled from the party. More than 30 
years later, the differences that were once so divisive have evaporated. 
  
                                            
26 W.J.H. (Joe) Harris, (1922- 2002) born Vladivostok, USSR, was an organiser with the left-wing Building 
Workers’ Industrial Union. He was a member of the Communist Party of Australia until 1963 then joined the 
ALP becoming a foundation member of the Socialist Left faction.   
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CHAPTER 2 Queensland ALP to the mid-1960s 
In Queensland, from the 1850s, unions were forming and gaining strength.27 They 
recognised that industrial action could not deliver all their goals and that it would be 
necessary for unions and the broad labour movement to have their voice heard in the 
governments of the day.28 By 1893, the first Labor Party returned sixteen members to 
colonial parliament,29 providing that voice for Queenslanders. The formation of unions 
progressed with many unions coalescing around their particular individual callings or crafts 
(e.g. seamen, railway workers, teamsters) while others, such as the Australian Workers’ 
Union (AWU) were granted wide generalised coverage of various un-related callings (e.g. 
shearers, cane cutters) through the infant Industrial Courts in the new century. The 
Shearer’s Strikes from 1890 to 1894 and the 1912 Tramways and General Strike, drew 
considerable community support.30 In those times, the majority of Queensland workers 
were employed in rural industries, delivering a very large union membership to the AWU. 
On the basis of these numbers, the AWU had majority voting strength at ALP party forums 
and exercised control over the ALP’s administrative organisations, over the conferences, 
and over the policy platform implemented by the parliamentary wing. So in Queensland 
from those beginnings, the AWU enjoyed a high degree of dominance over the ALP. 
By mid-20th-century the AWU was characterised as a non-militant union, slow to take 
strike action, and preferring to take their grievances to the Industrial Commission, whereas 
the craft unions, affiliated to the Queensland Trades and Labor Council (TLC) considered 
part of their strength lay in judicious use of strike action.31 These two warring groups 
alternately confronting each other over membership coverage or supporting each other in 
workplace disputes displayed some of the characteristics of modern-day ALP factions.32  
                                            
27 Bradley Bowden, Simon Blackwood, Cath Rafferty, Cameron Allen, (eds.), Work and Strife in Paradise – 
The History of Labour Relations in Queensland 1859 – 2009, Annandale, Sydney, New South Wales, 2038, 
Australia: Federation Press, 2009, pp. 3 - 6. 
28 D.J. Murphy (ed.), Labor in Politics – the state labor parties in Australia 1880 – 1920, St Lucia, 
Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1975, p. 131; And also, Mark Hearn and Harry 
Knowles, One Big Union: a History of the Australian Workers Union, 1886 – 1994, Stamford Road, Oakleigh, 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 2,3 and 56. 
29Colin A. Hughes, Images and Issues – the Queensland State Elections of 1963 and 1966, Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1969, p. 1. 
30 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., pp. 3 and 14. 
31 Ibid, pp. 40, 190 and 191. 
32 Nick Bos, Queensland Speaks, http://www.queenslandspeaks.com.au/nic-bos 00.18.27 – 00.19.55. 
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Following the privations of the Depression years33 and the great contribution of ordinary 
Australians during World War 2 (WW2), people were looking for a better future for their 
children. Many had been impressed by the contribution of the Russian people during the 
war and they formed the view that their best interests were to be achieved through 
communal effort.34 Workers in trade unions were attracted to socialism and communism.35 
Some Communists rose to prominent leadership positions in a number of unions and on 
the TLC’s administration.36 The Catholic Church was strongly opposed to the rising 
communist influence in Australia and urged their parishioners to become active in the 
secretive ‘Catholic Social Studies Movement’ and to participate within their workplaces, 
unions and in their local ALP branches, to oppose the communists.37  Following WW2 and 
into the 1950s, the Australian Government and its wartime allies identified and attempted 
to root out the alleged communist threat. The TLC along with the ALP was under close 
scrutiny.38 These tensions ultimately played a part in the Queensland ALP’s 1957 split. 
By the late 1940s, the ALP had been continuously in office in Queensland since 1915 
except for 1929 – 1932 the years of the Moore Government,39 and through all that time the 
AWU had continued its domination of the party. These decades of Labor government were 
to see mutually beneficial practices, sometimes imperfectly delivered, that became 
entrenched between the two wings of the labour movement: the unions offering industrial 
harmony; and Labor governments protecting workers conditions. This approach was to 
echo down the years.40  The AWU was strongly opposed to communism, whereas, the 
TLC affiliated unions were used to working with known communists. Some TLC unions 
had communist leaders.41 Within the ALP all around Australia, concerns arose regarding 
the level of influence of the communists, and their possible influence over the party. In 
Queensland by 1947 an Industrial Groups Committee chaired by the AWU’s Joseph (Joe) 
                                            
33 Brian J. Costar, Labor, Politics and Unemployment: Queensland During the Great Depression, PhD 
History thesis, University of Queensland, January 1981, Abstract p.1. In this document Costar argues 
Queensland experienced two depressions – a severe locally-induced recession in the late 1920s which was 
unrelated to the post 1929 world-wide depression,  
34 Wilfred Granville Ardill OAM, Queensland Speaks, 2011, http://www.queenslandspeaks.com.au/wilf-ardill 
00.05.27 - 00.07.48. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Bowden, et al., op. cit., p. 45. 
37 P.L. Reynolds, The Democratic Labor Party, Milton, Queensland: The Jacaranda Press, 1974, pp. 3 - 9. 
38 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., pp. 54 and 186. 
39 D.J. Murphy, (ed.) The Big Strikes – Queensland 1889 – 1965, St. Lucia, Queensland: University of 
Queensland Press, 1983, p. 255. 
40 Ross Fitzgerald, From 1915 to the Early 1980s, a History of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland: University 
of Queensland Press, 1984, p. 3.  
41 Reynolds (1974), op. cit., p. 42. And also, Bowden, et al., op. cit., p. 45. 
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Bukowski42 was established in the ALP to counter communist influence.43 The members of 
this group and the unionists they influenced leaned towards the Catholic Social Studies 
Movement and became known as ‘Groupers.’44 By the 1950s in the TLC, a new leader 
John Alfred (Jack) Egerton45 from the Boilermakers Society had recently come to 
prominence.46 He was a skilled negotiator with noted ability to find consensus around 
difficult issues and to bring warring groups together.47 
In 1949 under ALP Premier Ned Hanlon48 a new system of electoral zones favourable to 
the ALP was introduced in Queensland which Hugh Emy describes saying, ‘in 1973, 
Queensland was [still] divided into four zones, in which the quota [of electors] allocated to 
the urban regions [was] almost twice that of some country areas [zonal mal-
apportionment].49 Allan Patience50 and Craig Clothier51 both point out the joint ownership 
(by the ALP, then the Country Party who amended it to their needs and continued its use) 
of this zonal mal-apportionment, and the effect it continued to have on Queensland 
elections. Patience says ‘In 1975, Queensland stands out as the only state where 
deliberate mal-apportionment remains as a tenet of government.’52 Hanlon’s system had a 
flow-on effect favouring the AWU in those rural electorates (where the AWU had strong 
numbers) during the election of ALP delegates to conferences and other bodies. 
                                            
42 Rochus Joseph (Joe) Bukowski (1901-1960) was a canecutter then an AWU organiser who became AWU 
State President (1951-1956), AWU State Secretary (1956 – 1960), and President of the ALP (1956 – 1959). 
43 Raymond Evans, A History of Queensland, Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007, p. 201. And also, D.J. Murphy (1983), op. cit., p. 256. 
44 Brian Costar, Peter Love and Paul Strangio (eds.), The Great Labor Schism: a retrospective, Carlton 
North, Victoria: Scribe, 2005, pp. 5 and 6. Also, Reynolds (1974) op. cit., p.3. And also, John Faulkner and 
Stuart Macintyre, True Believers – The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, Alexander Street, 
Crows Nest, New South Wales, 2065: Allen & Unwin, 2001, p. x. See also Glossary. 
45 John Alfred Roy (Jack) Egerton,(1918-1998) a boilermaker who rose to Secretary of the Boilermakers 
Society (1943), President of the TLC (1957-1976), Vice President of the ALP (1966 – 1968) then President 
(1968 – 1976), member of the ACTU Executive and member of the ALP National Executive who was 
knighted in 1976. 
46 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., p. 144. 
47 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., p. 149. And also, Hon. William George Hayden (Bill) AC, Queensland 
Speaks, 2011, http://www.queenslandspeaks.com.au/bill-hayden 00.15.20 - 00.25.57.  
48 Edward Michael (Ned) Hanlon (1887-1952), was a porter then a shunter on the Queensland Railways, 
ALP MLA for Ithaca (1926-1952), and became Queensland Premier (7.3.1946-17.1.1952).   
49 Hugh V. Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy – an Introduction to Political Science, Moray Street, 
South Melbourne, 3205: The Macmillan Company of Australia, 1974, p. 323. 
50 Allan Patience, (ed.),The Bjelke-Petersen Premiership: 1968 – 1983 Issues in Public Policy, Melbourne, 
Australia: Longman Cheshire, 1985, p. 238. 
51 Craig Clothier, A history of the relationship between the Queensland branch of the AWU and the labour 
movement in Queensland from 1913 – 1957, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, School of History and Politics, 
University of Wollongong, 2005, p. 292. 
52Patience, op. cit., p. 242. 
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Like many former ALP Premiers Hanlon was considered close to the AWU and the union 
was used to a high degree of influence over the ALP Government’s policy direction as well 
as considerable closeness to government ministers.53 Following the death of Hanlon, on 
17 January 1952 Vincent Clare Gair54 became Queensland Premier.55   
Gair was a member of the Federated Clerks Union, a ‘Grouper’ aligned union56, and had 
no connection whatsoever with the AWU having ‘pointedly refused to accept membership 
of [that] union which had been a long-standing tradition for Labor Premiers in 
Queensland.’57  Gair and Bukowski (Chair of the Industrial Groups committee and by 1951, 
rising ALP personality and AWU State President) both attended the same Christian 
Brothers School in Rockhampton but at different times. According to Manfred Cross, 
Bukowski was known to be the school-yard bully.58 Whether the personal animosity they 
exhibited in later years developed in Rockhampton or subsequently when both were 
leaders in the labour movement, it was identified as a factor that contributed to the eventual 
ALP split in Queensland.59 Gair won the 1953 election strongly, and the 1953 Labor-in-
Politics convention displayed a high degree of co-operation on all sides, with Dr. Felix 
Dittmer’s60 innocuous motion regarding three weeks annual leave for workers, receiving 
unanimous support.61    
But outside Queensland, Labor was in turmoil, Dr. H.V. Evatt, the federal parliamentary 
leader, strongly opposed the Communist Party Dissolution Bill of the Menzies Government 
and pursued a successful Australia-wide fight against Menzies’ referendum to outlaw the 
Communist Party.62 Grouper forces controlled the Victorian and New South Wales 
branches; had been ousted in South Australia; had little influence in Western Australia and 
Tasmania; and, were active in local ALP branches particularly in regional Queensland 
                                            
53Murphy et al., p. 51. 
54 Vincent Clare (Vince) Gair, clerk in Queensland Railways, MLA for South Brisbane (1932 - 1960). Deputy 
Premier 1947, then Premier (1952 – 1957). Expelled from the ALP 1957, he formed the QLP. Elected to 
Senate for DLP (1964 -1974).   
55 Queensland Parliament Former Members Register, 
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/en/members/former/database. 
56 Reynolds (1974), op. cit., p. 23. 
57 Clothier, Craig op. cit., p. 293 and Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., p.154. 
58 Hon. Manfred Douglas Cross AM, Queensland Speaks, 2011, 
http://www.queenslandspeaks.com.au/manfred-cross 00.05.25 - 00.08.36. 
59 Costar et al, p. 15. 
60 Felix Cyril Sigismund (Felix) Dittmer (1904-1977), a medical practitioner, was elected to Qld Parliament for 
the ALP in Mt Gravatt electorate 1950-1957. After losing his seat he was elected to the Senate in 1958 but 
lost endorsement in 1969. 
61 Clothier, op. cit., p. 296 and 297. 
62 Ibid., p. 299. 
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(especially Rockhampton) where provincial Catholic bishops were well disposed to their 
activities.63  
On 5 October 1954 the Australian labour movement split asunder when Labor’s Federal 
leader, Dr Evatt, denounced the Catholic Social Studies Movement as a ‘secret and 
disloyal organisation,’64 and said he was taking the matter to the ALP National Executive.65 
The 1955 ALP National Conference in Hobart formalised the split and over the next two 
years it happened in all states.66 
Some of the ALP’s Queensland Grouper sympathisers, amongst them Bukowski, re-
aligned their loyalties.67 The ALP in Victoria split apart through 1955 as states moved to 
expel Groupers and members of the (Catholic Social Studies) Movement.68 In all other 
states except Queensland, the Groupers split away to form the Democratic Labor Party 
(DLP) and, in some states, they had the numbers to take the property and resources 
formerly belonging to the ALP. In Queensland the Catholic Church was wracked with 
divisions, some favouring the Groupers and others aligned to the ALP.69   
Against this background, many challenging issues began to stack up for Gair only some of 
which were: a poor result from the Queensland Industrial Commission following the 1956 
Shearer’s Strike (the AWU had taken the surprising step of affiliating with the TLC  
following the TLC’s strong support during the strike); Gair’s preparedness to declare a 
state of emergency, making possible the use of non-union labour to move the wool;70 
Gair’s refusal to accept membership of the AWU while holding a ticket from the Grouper 
controlled Clerk’s Union;71 while the previous AWU accessibility to the Premier’s office 
markedly waned.72  
Underpinning these issues was the religious sectarian division between Catholics and 
Protestants that threaded all walks of life - the public service, retail traders, Police Force, 
                                            
63 Reynolds (1974), pp. 9 – 14. And also, Robert Murray, The Split – Australian Labor in the Fifties, St Kilda 
Road, Melbourne: Cheshire, 1970, p.51. 
64 Bowden, et al., op. cit., p. 46. 
65 Reynolds (1974), op. cit., p. 12. 
66 Ibid, p.14. 
67 Costar et al., op. cit., Chapter 4, pp. 66 and 67. And also Bowden et al., op. cit., p. 46. 
68 Ibid, pp. 60 and 61. And also, Reynolds (1974), op. cit., p. 14. 
69 Gregory Stephen Moran (Greg), Queensland Speaks, 2011, http://www.queenslandspeaks.com.au/greg-
moran, 00.18.32 – 00.20.01 
70 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., p. 146. And also, Murphy et al., op. cit., pp. 508 and 509. 
71 Ibid., p. 492. 
72 Ibid., p. 490. 
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the (Protestant) Masonic Lodge vs. (Catholic) Knights of the Southern Cross, families and, 
the ALP.73 
Within the party, staunchly Catholic Gair looked to his parliamentary colleagues for his 
major support.74 He lacked any allegiance with either the AWU or the TLC groupings. The 
AWU’s influence over the SPLP had clearly diminished under Gair. By 1956 Bukowski had 
become State Secretary of the AWU and President of the ALP,75 and he now aligned with 
Egerton, soon to be TLC President.76 The Premier was expected by the ALP Conference 
to move on introducing three weeks annual leave for Queensland blue-collar workers, but 
refused to do so.77 State Government white collar workers, who were members of 
‘grouper-aligned unions,’78 already enjoyed this working condition. Both the AWU and the 
TLC were strongly committed to this issue for their blue-collar members. It became the 
publicly justifiable reason for the 1957 split and the issue around which the AWU and TLC 
forces united against their leader and Premier. 
After months of haggling, through which both groups refused to budge, Gair was expelled 
by the party on 24 April 1957.79 He formed the new Queensland Labor Party (QLP), taking 
with him 25 MPs including all members of the Cabinet except Duggan80 who along with 23 
backbench MPs remained loyal to the ALP.81 In the August 1957 election, Labor lost office 
in Queensland. 82 
The next year, following Bukowski’s insulting remarks to Alderman Jean Howie (about her 
recently deceased husband) at the Trades Hall Christmas party, the Queensland Central 
Executive (QCE) Inner Executive moved to suspend him83 at its meeting on 18 December 
1958. On 23 February 1959, Bukowski responded by ensuring the AWU disaffiliated from 
the ALP Queensland Branch and also from the TLC.84 Bukowski was a member of the 
                                            
73 Evans, op. cit., p. 184. 
74 Costar et al., op. cit., Chapter 4, p. 73. 
75 Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol.13, 1993 Bukowski, RJJ (Joe)  
76 Bowden et al., p. 275. 
77 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., p 147. 
78 Reynolds (1974), op. cit., p. 23. 
79 Ibid, p. 148. 
80 John Edmund (Jack) Duggan, Secretary of Toowoomba TLC 1932, MLA for Toowoomba 1935 – 1966. 
Deputy Premier and Minister under Premier Gair, after 1957 Opposition Leader. 
81 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., p.149. 
82 See Appendix 3: Queensland Election Results 
83 Hon. Manfred Douglas Cross AM, Queensland Speaks, 2011, 
http://www.queenslandspeaks.com.au/manfred-cross, 00.30.32 - 00.33.50. And also Fitzgerald and 
Thornton, op. cit., p. 174. 
84 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., p. 175. 
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Oxley Branch of the ALP. Contrary to reports in the Brisbane Telegraph at that time, 
Bukowski did not allow his ALP membership to lapse, the QCE forbade Oxley Branch to 
issue him with a ticket.85 
It was a time of turmoil in the ALP. In a period of less than two years: the Premier was 
expelled for (among other things) not implementing party policy; the Labor Party in 
Queensland split86 having been in government for 39 of the past 42 years (it was to be out 
of office for the next 32 years); and, the AWU disaffiliated from the ALP leaving the THG to 
inherit leadership of the party.  
This commenced the ascendancy of the THG. This group of leaders concurrently serving 
on the ALP Inner Executive and the TLC Executive came to be called the Trades Hall 
Group (THG).87 Whereas previously the ALP President came from the AWU leaders, it 
now moved to the TLC leaders to fill the position. George Whiteside assumed ALP 
leadership after Bukowski in 1958, followed in 1963 by Bert Milliner who resigned from that 
position in 1968 to enter the Senate.88 Both men had been serving concurrently on the 
TLC and ALP Executives. Fitzgerald and Thornton first used the term ‘Trades Hall Group’ 
when they described Egerton and his close associates: ‘Following the 1963 election the 
Trades Hall Group led by TLC President Jack Egerton, was firmly entrenched in all organs 
of ALP internal government.’89 
Egerton became President of the TLC (1957 – 76) then served concurrently in ALP and 
TLC presidential roles from 1968. Other THG members also served concurrently on both 
the TLC Executive and the ALP Inner Executive. THG members also represented their 
unions on the QCE and other party forums. In later years the THG and their wider group of 
followers were referred to as the Old Guard, alluding to their early leadership of the 
Queensland ALP, when compared to the ‘New Guard’ — a disparate group of people who 
came to the ALP through the 1960s and 1970s bringing new expectations and ideas and 
ultimately seeking reform of the Queensland Branch. 
                                            
85 Minutes of the Monthly Meetings of the Oxley Branch of the ALP held on i) 24 March 1959, and ii) 28 April 
1959. 
86 Ibid, pp. 148 and 151. 
87 Denis Murphy, (ed.), The Australian Labor Party and Its Leaders, Brisbane, Queensland: Aspley Branch of 
the Australian Labor Party, 2nd edition, 1977, p. 6 states George Whiteside, State Secretary of the Federated 
Engine Drivers and Firemen’s Association was ALP President from 1958 - 1963; Bert Milliner, State 
Secretary of the Printing and Kindred Industries Union was ALP President from 1963 – 1968; Jack Egerton 
then took over the ALP Presidency.   
88 Ibid. And also, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol 15 (MUP), 2000. 
89 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., p. 186. 
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In the 1970s, the ALP Inner Executive included:90 
• John Alfred Roy (Jack) Egerton, President of the TLC and President of the ALP;  
• Jack Houston, Member for Bulimba (1957 - 1980 Leader of the SPLP (1966 – 1974);  
• Neal Kane,91 Secretary of the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) and Senior ALP Vice-
President;  
• Tom Burton, Secretary of the Printing and Kindred Industries Union (PKIU) and ALP 
State President (1976 – 80);  
• Arch Bevis, Transport Workers’ Union (TWU) State Secretary (1970s -1980s); 
• Tom Burns,92 MP, ALP Secretary, Federal ALP President and former ETU official;  
• Tom Chard, Secretary of the Building Workers’ Industrial Union. 
But others served on the Inner Executive at different times or were close THG associates: 
• Fred Whitby,93 TLC Secretary, former ETU official;  
• Harry Hauenschild,94 former boilermaker, Amalgamated Metal Workers and 
Shipwrights Union (AMWSU) President and later ALP Vice President;  
• Ernie Adsett, State Secretary of the Storemen and Packers’ Union (SPU) to 1982;  
• Clem Jones, ALP Mayor of Brisbane (1961 – 1975);  
• Gerry Jones,95 Senator, ALP State Secretary and former ETU Organizer;  
• Nick Bos, ALP Organiser and former ETU Organiser who became the ALP State 
Secretary during the reform years. 
TLC affiliates were mostly craft based unions centred on rising manufacturing industries 
in metropolitan areas of Queensland. Each of these union officials was a leader of their 
own union in Queensland. They were used to leading their members through difficult, 
                                            
90 The list is taken from Labor in the 70’s, authorised by Tom Burns, Labor House, Edward Street, Brisbane 
and printed for the 27th Labor-in-Politics Convention. 
91 Neal Kane was State Secretary of the ETU from 1960s – 1987. Served on the TLC and was also Senior 
Vice-President of the ALP, serving on the QCE and the Inner Executive. 
92 Thomas James (Tom) Burns (1931-2007), was an ETU member, ALP Organiser (1960-1965), ALP State 
Secretary(1965-1972), ALP Federal President (1970-1973), Queensland Branch President (1980), elected 
as MLA for Lytton (1972-1996), Opposition Leader (1974-1978) and Deputy Premier (1989-1996). 
93 Fred Whitby was an ETU Organiser before becoming Secretary to the TLC (1969-1984). Elected in 1966 
to the ALP Inner Executive and Chaired the first Disputes Tribunal. 
94 Harry Hauenschild AO (1933 – 2011) joined Queensland Railways as a lad porter, soon apprenticed as a 
boilermaker. Joined the Boilermakers Society of Australia (later the AMWSU) became a paid official of the 
union. President of the TLC (1976-1990), ALP member from 1960, served on the ALP Inner Executive and 
the QCE, ALP Senior Vice President (1977-1981). 
95 Norman Francis (Gerry) Jones (1932- ) was a research assistant before becoming ALP State Organiser in 
1967. Elected as MLA for Everton (1972-74), then ALP Executive Officer (1976-1977) ALP State Secretary 
(1977 – 1980), then to Senate (1980-1996).    
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often complex industrial disputes and negotiations or strikes that affected multiple 
unions and ran for many months. All had won elections to arrive at their position of 
leadership and all were used to working closely with other unions on a daily basis to 
achieve positive industrial outcomes for their members. The group displayed absolute 
loyalty within the THG and an abiding loyalty to the union movement generally.96 They 
likely owed much of their style to the pre-1957 unionists’ approach which saw ALP 
union/government collaboration as far back as Theodore and Forgan-Smith.97  
 
From 1958, the THG stepped into the role previously played by the AWU of dominating all 
aspects of ALP activity. The ALP state parliamentary members of those days, having just 
watched their former Premier expelled for disobeying the party conference and the 
executive, would have been a very compliant group when confronted with the demands of 
the emerging THG.98 The MLAs had watched the 1972 attempted purges, when seven 
sitting ALP members were challenged to defend their positions by the QCE.99 Fitzgerald 
and Thornton refer to Egerton ‘publicly rebuking [SPLP] Leader Duggan at the 1961 Trade 
Union Congress’ and go on to say the SPLP ‘member’s (previously) long and jealously 
guarded autonomy was diminished.’100 
As the leader of the labour movement in Queensland, Egerton wielded great power. From 
the beginning he showed he was profoundly flexible in seeking support for his own 
advancement. Brian Costar states that ‘prominent left-winger Jack Egerton [had] Grouper 
support when he ran unsuccessfully for federal secretary of the Boilermakers’ Union in 
1949.’101 The end of his days in the labour movement was similarly marked by 
contradictory actions, when he accepted a knighthood, prompting rejection amongst many 
ALP adherents. Egerton was a clever operator. From a leadership position within a quite 
small union, using the careful planning and judicious alliances, for which he was noted,102 
Egerton first positioned himself to take the leadership of the TLC, then he joined forces 
with the AWU to oust Premier Gair. Knowing Bukowski’s reputation as a bully who would 
never back down from an argument, drunk or sober,103 it was probably no surprise when 
                                            
96 Henricks, Robert John (Bob), Queensland Speaks, 2011, http://www.queenslandspeaks.com.au/bob-
henricks.  01.12.26  – 01.14.03. 
97 Fitzgerald, op. cit. p. 3.  
98 Barbara Cross, Queensland Speaks, 2011, http://www.queenslandspeaks.com.au/barbara-cross.   
00.07.45 – 00.10.10. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., pp. 183 and 187. 
101 Costar et al., p.64. 
102 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., p. 150. 
103 Ibid., p.174. 
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the Christmas party ructions provided Egerton with the opportunity to move against 
Bukowski, the State President of the AWU and of the ALP, who like Gair was well loathed 
on all sides.104  When, as a consequence, the AWU disaffiliated from the ALP in February 
1959, it left the field and the power to Egerton and the THG. Dr Felix Dittmer,105 Clem 
Jones106 and Jack Egerton, referenced in Fitzgerald and Thornton, suggest that Egerton 
commenced planning to oust the AWU from the ALP in September or October 1958.107 
Many sources refer to Egerton’s ‘iron-fisted control’ of the party.108 He was a strong, 
forceful and domineering leader who used a mix of sarcasm, bombast and humour to 
control meetings. Bill Hayden refers to Egerton’s ‘knockabout working class style’109 which 
served him well in the then strongly male-dominated ALP. 
Egerton built his constituency through carefully uniting diverse craft unions into a unified 
force.110 He managed meetings well and was used to finding consensus on issues.111 He 
was well respected as a strong leader. As head of the ALP he led the QCE and the Inner 
Executive that managed day-to-day party administration. The Inner Executive was 
comprised of seven white, male, Anglo-Saxon origin, blue collar union officials — ‘real 
workers’ in Jack’s terms.112 This group ensured that ‘their type’ of people were selected to 
stand for vacant seats or enjoy offered appointments.113 Then, as now, to become an 
elected MP was often a huge step up in terms of security of employment, a regular income 
and generous retirement benefits, so aspiring politicians, given support from the party 
controllers to win a safe seat, would take the right line on issues and show continuing 
loyalty to the group. 
Having emerged in the 1950s through the conflicts of association with communists, 
Egerton and the THG saw themselves as the authentic representatives of the militant 
                                            
104 Ibid. 
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working class,114 as ‘left’ on the political spectrum, with their militant industrial stance. At a 
national level the THG aligned with the left leaning unions.115 Their definition of ‘left’ 
related to industrial strength and preparedness to take militant industrial action but gave 
little recognition to then, newly emerging ‘left’ social issues such as provision of childcare 
or abortion.116 At the 1963 Labor in Politics Convention the THG’s style was evident. The 
convention was ‘dominated by the self-professed left THG… who were seen as more 
concerned about exercising their numbers in [internal party] elections than to transform the 
party platform into a socialist tract.’117  
There were no formalised factions, in the sense that they now exist within the ALP.118 The 
AWU was clearly a united force in the years it dominated the ALP, and at that time the 
Trades Hall unions were clearly un-aligned with the AWU for much of the time, so these 
two groups: ‘left’ (THG), and ‘right’ (AWU) displayed many characteristics of modern 
factions.119 Through their dominating personalities, the leaders of the different groups 
maintained absolute loyalty and discipline within their ranks. Fitzgerald and Thornton state: 
..the Trades Hall grouping which triumphed at the 1963 convention was ruthless in 
smashing opposition and in denying opportunities for other groups to express their 
views in party policy and to secure nomination for winnable parliamentary seats.120  
They took the view that the perks of office could be distributed to those who showed 
loyalty to their cause — Senate seats, safe state and federal seats, were all prized and to 
be distributed to THG preferred candidates.121 Gough Whitlam122 in his inaugural T.J. 
Ryan Memorial Address delivered at the University of Queensland in April 1978, said 
about the Queensland branch’s leaders: 
Selection as a Labor candidate should not primarily be the reward for past services to 
the Party but an opportunity for future services to the Party. Those who see 
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themselves as the power brokers give frequently more attention to selection than 
elections… they believe picking a candidate for how he will vote in Caucus — beget 
a candidate in their own image — clones can turn out clowns.123 
Duggan,124 when Leader of the Opposition in Queensland was understood to suggest that 
some of the ALP leaders ‘couldn’t care less if the Labor Party is in power or Opposition.’125 
Having survived and brought the ALP through the turbulent 1950s struggles with 
communists, anti-communists, the DLP, and Social Studies Movement ‘groupers,’ the THG 
unionists were mistrustful of people who did not fit their mould. They were constantly 
watchful for anyone trying to infiltrate their stronghold. Fitzgerald and Thornton state: 
‘The Breakfast Creek drinking fraternity of the mid-1970s had so isolated itself from 
the party rank-and-file that they were able to convince themselves the Reformists 
were allied with the DLP.’126 
Following the split and the disaffiliation of the AWU, the state electoral fortunes delivered 
under the leadership of the THG plummeted.127 The ALP no longer had the rural 
organisation, the affiliated union workers, the rural votes or the financial support of the 
AWU to depend upon. ALP parliamentary numbers fell from: 49 MPs in 1956, to 20 in 
1957, only rising a little to 26 in 1963.128 During this time, Egerton’s tolerance of 
Communists was used against the party in Liberal advertisements in which Duggan was 
depicted as the puppet (played by Egerton the puppeteer), who in turn was controlled by 
Gerry Dawson129 ‘the well-known Communist and TLC President’.130 
Queensland’s electoral system added to Labor’s problems because it suffered from both 
zonal mal-apportionment and a gerrymander, a system of ‘fiddling the boundaries’ to suit 
the party in office.131 Premier Johannes Bjelke-Petersen amended the system a number of 
                                            
123 Whitlam, Gough, Reform During Recession: The Way Ahead - Inaugural T.J. Ryan Memorial Lecture 
presented on April 28, 1978 (Toowong, Queensland: University of Queensland ALP Club, 1978) p 21. 
124 John Edmund (Jack) Duggan (1910-1993) Secretary of the Towoomba TLC in 1932, elected MLA for 
Toowoomba  (1935- 1968). Deputy Premier in Gair Government. The only Cabinet member who remained 
loyal to the ALP after the split. 
125 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op. cit., p. 185 
126 Ibid., p. 371, 
127 Ibid., p. 180. 
128 See Appendix 3: Queensland Election Results. 
129 Gerald Macadam (Gerry) Dawson (1905-1979) carpenter and union delegate in the BWIU. Joined the 
ALP, then the Communist Party of Australia (CPA). He was State Secretary of the BWIU and TLC Vice-
President and President (1943-1957). 
130 Hughes (1969), p. 43 - 46. 
131 Evan Whitton, The Hillbilly Dictator, Crows Nest, New South Wales: ABC Enterprises, 1989, p.5. 
 19 
times132 during his term of office improving these features for his party. In the 1969 
elections the Country Party won 25 seats with 22% of the vote and the ALP won 31 seats 
with 40% of the vote — it took a third fewer country votes to win a seat than it took in city 
votes.133 So the ALP, whose predominant support now came from city and urban voters, 
was disadvantaged.   
The best result was achieved in 1972 when 33 state Members of Parliament (MPs) were 
elected for the ALP but this fell away dramatically in 1974.134 Denis Murphy claimed that 
the Queensland Branch had passed the death sentence on the Whitlam (federal) 
Government by delivering only four of ten senate seats in the May 1974 double 
dissolution, which meant that only 29 of 60 senate positions went to the ALP,135 making 
possible the rejection of the supply bill, a key element in the Whitlam Government’s 
subsequent dismissal. Peter Beattie points out that ‘if Queensland had matched the efforts 
of every other state, the [Whitlam] Labor Government could not have been sacked.’136 
Peter Charlton says the Queensland Branch spent little on the campaign and also did little 
work, as a consequence Labor failed to win sufficient senate seats, a failure that is now 
part of bitterly recalled political history.137 When the state election was held in December 
1974, the number of ALP members was reduced to from 33 to 11.138 The THG and Burns, 
who took over as parliamentary leader, considered it was Gough Whitlam’s Government to 
blame for the reversal, not them.139  
Underpinning many of the other challenges confronting the THG in Queensland through 
the 1960s and 1970s was change in the very fabric of society and work. A constantly 
changing factor, employment in Queensland in 1901 showed 30.6% employed in rural 
industry that had dropped to 17.3% in 1961.140 Queensland’s demographic and industrial 
profile had shown for years that both employment and population were moving from rural 
industry (favouring AWU numbers) to a growth area in metropolitan manufacturing industry 
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(TLC numbers) as factory employment grew to 1966.141 However, by 1976 factory jobs 
were fewer in number and rural industry was experiencing massive losses.142 This trend 
was to continue into the 1980s. Paralleling this, union membership figures showed that in 
1961, 78% of Queensland workers were union members but by 1989 this figure had 
halved to 39%.143 While at a national level the ALP anticipated and counteracted the 
reduction in unionisation as the century passed by expanding its membership catchment 
and modernising to include new members from non-union backgrounds, in Queensland 
their entry to the ALP served to establish yet another basis for conflict within the party.  
Through the 60s and 70s, ‘real power in the ALP was ruthlessly concentrated in the hands 
of a trusted few.’144 The THG strongly mistrusted people who did not fit their mould: 
academics (Ernie Adsett had no time for ‘academic dickheads,’145 and ‘Neal Kane told a 
Toowong ALP Branch meeting in 1977, that professional people such as doctors, lawyers 
etc have no right to be in the ALP’);146 environmentalists (bloody greenies); women (bloody 
women);147 and, (Brisbane) western suburbs ALP members and residents (bloody 
silvertails). The THG were all fairly typical Aussie, hard drinking types (Graham 
Richardson148 said ‘they were on it all the time: always pissed’)149 who were glad when the 
party offices moved in with 4KQ the radio station at Newstead, because the Breakfast 
Creek Hotel was just a short walk over the bridge. Gleeson says, in Queensland country 
areas major social policy issues were considered too radical at first in some ALP branches 
but ‘were eventually [accepted] once they were in the ALP platform.’150 
Through the ascendancy of Whitlam to the federal leadership of the party, and with the 
influence of people like his deputy, Jim Cairns,151 the ALP in the southern states was 
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opening up to new generations and new ideas. Cairns led the anti-Vietnam war movement, 
environmentalists were listened to, new ideas about personal freedom and social issues 
were encouraged. Proponents of many of these new ideas were joining in Queensland as 
well.152 But the Queensland ALP leadership gave little support to the new recruits, referring 
to them in the most derogatory terms they could find, as ‘grubs and groupers’153 or ‘single 
issue people.’  
Egerton accepted an imperial knighthood recommended by Bjelke-Petersen in June 1976 
and left the party.154 Hauenschild summed it up for everyone, when he said in his interview 
he could never understand what prompted Egerton to accept that knighthood,155 as the 
Whitlam Government had already instituted the replacement ‘Order of Australia’156 at that 
time. The Queensland Government Cabinet Minutes reveal that in 1976 ‘the Government 
managed to manufacture problems within Labor ranks by giving a knighthood to Sir Jack 
Egerton.’157 Once he received the knighthood, Egerton exited quickly. Tom Burton became 
the ALP President after Egerton.158 Burton was a vastly less aggressive character than 
Egerton, but the same style of leadership persisted.  
When the Menzies Coalition Government committed Australia to the Vietnam War in 1962, 
demonstrations escalated.159 An anti-war moratorium movement built strength with many 
THG members and supporters, alongside many soon-to-be reformers and large numbers 
of labour movement members participating in both anti-war and anti-conscription 
demonstrations and also in later demonstrations against the South African Springbok 
rugby team in 1971.160 By that time, under Bjelke-Petersen’s Country Party-Liberal 
leadership, the state government used the police force to deliver beat-ups of 
demonstrators, and continue threats against unions and alternate lifestyle groups (hippies, 
gays and environmentalists), accompanied by periodic declarations of a ‘State of 
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Emergency’ which paved the way for police confrontations with demonstrators and people 
who spoke out against the Premier.161  
In 1967 Queensland’s Civil Liberties Coordinating Committee formed to watch over issues 
arising from the right to demonstrate.162 The next decade was marked by continuing 
demonstrations, protests and clashes with police over a myriad of issues. By 1977, when 
Premier Bjelke-Petersen declared there would be no more street marches, some 
Queenslanders were outraged because, in their view, it was their democratic right to 
protest. Anne Warner said in her interview, that the protestors in taking to the streets 
provided the most visible, tangible opposition to the government of the day, in contrast to 
the ALP Opposition.163 Marches were held throughout Queensland. Patience claims that 
‘the march bans provoked displays of non-violent protest un-paralleled in Australian 
history.’164 Some of the protesters turned to the ALP expecting support on their issues. 
Some THG supporters did participate in the marches,165 but by the late 1970s the THG 
and the leaders of the SPLP were opposed to street marches.166 In 1978 the ALP were left 
open to ridicule when the SPLP leader Burns organised a (QCE approved) protest march 
for which a permit was sought (disgusting the protestors who disagreed with the permit 
system).167 The government called Burns’ bluff and issued a permit, whereupon, Burns 
cancelled the march, saying it was a ‘ploy.’ The Courier Mail said the ALP ‘looked 
idiotic.’168 The QCE leadership and the SPLP had turned away from the issue. When Joy 
Ardill, delegate from McPherson federal electorate, asked a QCE meeting why the SPLP 
was not supporting the street marches, she was told to ‘mind her own business.’169 The 
THG and the SPLP failed to grasp the importance of the street march issue, and in doing 
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so, failed to lead the broad labour movement in opposing the Bjelke-Petersen 
Government’s continuing attempts to stifle protest.  
The Whitlam Government lost office at the December 1975 election after the dramatic 
dismissal by the Governor General, and that brought a further wave of sympathisers and 
future parliamentarians into the ALP (Anne Warner, David Hamill and Wayne Goss all 
joined around this time).170 All these new people were seeking changes in the ALP: more 
say for branch members; better representation for women; better administration of the 
party. But the THG dug in and refused repeated requests to share power with the new 
voices.171  
The exposure of major corruption172 within the Coalition Government became general 
knowledge over time, aided by media attention,173 and this also contributed to an 
increasing percentage of the population feeling alienated from and distrustful of, their 
government. But they still were not yet ready to make the change to the ALP at the polls 
(see Appendix 3). 
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CHAPTER 3 A virtual tsunami of change 
This chapter sets the scene against which the Queensland ALP reformers arose and 
challenged the old order. To do this, I identify and examine three elements of change that 
impacted both Old and New Guards of the ALP:  the broad sweep of international and 
national changes, some were social changes, which affected all states; changes that 
manifested within Queensland, particularly those arising under the political leadership of 
Premier Bjelke-Petersen;174 and, I identify that generational change also contributed to the 
conflict. Interviewee data is compared and interviewee responses are examined to identify 
similarities and differences between the old and new ALP activists. 
To identify if generational change contributed to the ALP’s conflict, I compare the 
backgrounds of senior members of the ALP with those of their counterparts in the 
Queensland Cabinet of the day, then a comparison of the styles of Premier Bjelke-
Petersen in his treatment of the young Mike Ahern is contrasted against Jack Egerton and 
Tom Burton’s175 responses to Dr Denis Murphy, to identify if the leaders show similarities 
of generational style in responding to their younger challengers. 
It is impossible to consider the movement for reform within the ALP in Queensland without 
acknowledging the impact of societal and generational change. Indeed all around the 
world, the 1960s and 1970s were decades of upheaval following the aftermath of WW2, 
when the ‘cold war’ between the United States, its allies and the USSR manifested in the 
McCarthy era in the United States.176 In Australia, Prime Minister Robert Menzies tried 
unsuccessfully to outlaw the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and lost the anti-
communist referendum campaign of September 1951.177 Through the years of his Liberal 
federal government, Menzies was constant in his vigilance against perceived or imagined 
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‘communist’ and left wing influence in the ALP.178 Whether it was a genuine concern or a 
useful political ploy, or both, it certainly helped win the elections for him. 
On the Australian streets, the development of a ‘teenage’ culture after WW2 bore 
reminders of the presence of United States troops and the culture they brought to these 
shores. Australia discovered that it too, had teenagers in its midst. Never before had this 
age group had a culture specifically focussed on their interests.179 Bodgies and widgies 180 
were frowned upon in polite Queensland society, considered to be wild children who 
played a new game called ‘chicken’ or listened and danced to loud music devised for their 
pleasure. Johnny O’Keefe, a Sydney rock and roll singer, who attracted a large following of 
young people to his Queensland performance, complained to the Courier-Mail that 
‘Queensland is the only square state in Australia, man.’181 
The contraceptive ‘pill’ became available in the 1960s, precipitating a degree of sexual 
liberation previously unheard of for Australian women and men. Accompanied by the 
‘hippie’ slogan ‘Make love, not war’ (a dual focussed message that also opposed the war 
in Vietnam) the pill provided a huge change in what had been one of life’s major 
uncertainties — birth control. The provision of safe contraception contributed a great deal to 
the liberation of women.  The women’s movement encouraged women to stand up and 
speak out to control their bodies, their lives and their communities. Women’s Liberation 
groups and Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL) advocated a more vocal participatory political 
role for women and, in Queensland and other states, demanded free safe abortions 
(through Children by Choice) and proper sex education in schools.182 
Around Australia all types of drugs from marijuana to LSD were becoming readily available 
by the late 1960s and student movements supported a variety of issues including: anti-war 
campaigns in which hippy/flower people participated; civil liberties; opposing uranium 
mining; and green bans. The student movements were often the first to recognise and act 
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on emerging issues. The fight for change in Australia showed in various ways, some 
movements were Australia-wide, while other struggles were solely Queensland based. 
Up until the 1960s, Queenslanders had been used to the ‘authoritarian, rough and rural’183 
political style of their governments, to the ‘all-pervasive rural conservatism and populist 
agrarian tradition’184 and ‘a preoccupation with material progress and development as well 
as gerrymanders, authoritarianism and anti-intellectualism’.185 Life was predictable, 
extremely conservative and staid. But now, under the influences mentioned above, 
Queensland was changing. Raymond Evans has this to say about Queensland in the 
1960s and 1970s: 
As the tectonic plates of cultural normality shifted, new movements and causes broke 
suddenly across old landscapes: generational rebellion; massive anti-war, anti-
nuclear and anti-conscription mobilizations; struggles for personal liberation and 
sexual experimentation; anti-censorship campaigns, radical creativities fuelled by a 
flourishing drug culture; the growth of anti-racism, multiculturalism and Indigenous 
rights; the surge of second-wave feminism and an emerging gay subculture; a 
militant expansion of ecological consciousness, incorporating environmental 
conservation and animal rights activism. All such movements were anathema to 
mainstream local practice and Queenslanders, predictably enough, adopted a mainly 
reactionary bearing towards them...they were officially interpreted as ‘communism’ or 
‘lawlessness’ and rigorously resisted.186  
The Vietnam War was the subject of ongoing and increasing opposition. It led to the 
development of an Australia-wide moratorium movement with accompanying draft-card 
burnings, anti-conscription debates and large protest marches.187 By 1964 Queenslanders 
were involved in protests and street marches188 and these escalated to include anti-
conscription protests by 1966.189   
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By the year Bjelke-Petersen commenced his Premiership 1968,190 civil unrest was already 
mounting and Brisbane experienced further anti-war protests.191 The Queensland 
Government cracked down using the police to confront and arrest demonstrators in these 
and subsequent demonstrations and rallies.192  
Defence of the environment manifested around Australia in various ways including: 
opposition to uranium mining which became a continually festering sore and subject of 
many street marches through these years; and ‘green bans’ in support of heritage 
buildings. In Queensland, environmental concerns emerged in the opposition to the 
Iwasaki development at Yeppoon,193 the push to stop mining on Fraser Island, and the 
struggle to ban oil drilling on the Barrier Reef.194 All drew committed supporters from 
Queensland society — people who were prepared to publicly demonstrate their views.195 
The re-opening of the Mary Kathleen uranium mine in 1973 drew wild and continuing 
clashes from many groups and individuals.196 In April 1979, ‘a major political crisis was 
caused by the state government’s decision to proceed with demolition of the historic 
Bellevue Hotel.’197 Many Brisbane residents including National Trust representatives, 
architects, church and community leaders and a substantial section of the Liberal Party 
backbench, opposed its destruction, but the bulldozers went in after midnight at the behest 
of the Cabinet,198 leaving yet another large group of appalled Queenslander voters. 
There were early signs of unrest amongst some Queenslanders when in 1963 the Mapoon 
Aboriginal community was woken at midnight and rounded up by Queensland police and 
the entire population shipped out, while watching their homes burned to the ground, to 
make way for mining companies (Alcan and Comalco) to tap the rich bauxite deposits.199 
This type of treatment of Indigenous Queensland communities was to re-occur for decades 
breeding long-lasting resentment. 
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Black Power emerged as a world-wide movement, which fed into Australian Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples continuing push for equality and land rights. A wave of anti-
apartheid actions around the arrival of the South African Springbok Rugby Team in 1971 
also prompted Australians to look more closely at the situation of Australia’s own 
Indigenous people.200 An example of Bjelke-Petersen’s approach to law and order issues 
occurred when the Springboks came to Brisbane. Protestors rallied outside the 
Springbok’s accommodation in the Tower Mill. The police charged protestors, chasing 
them and forcing some over an incline over Turbot Street where some were injured.201 
Others marched to the Exhibition grounds where the game was to happen. The Premier 
had declared a state of emergency and police were shipped in to Brisbane to handle the 
demonstrators. These police were granted an extra week’s leave as a gesture of thanks 
from the Bjelke-Petersen Government202 Police Commissioner Ray Whitrod’s advice to his 
officers regarding their handling of the protestors was ‘openly disobeyed’ and violent 
attacks on protestors resulted.203 Rae Wear writes that Bjelke-Petersen’s response to the 
Springbok Tour set the pattern for a premiership marked by confrontation between him 
and dissenting groups, it was the sort of conflict he found politically rewarding and 
personally satisfying of which he himself said ‘you can campaign on anything you like, but 
nothing is more effective than communism.’204 
Gough Whitlam’s education reforms which in 1975 set up the Technical and Further 
Education Commission (TAFE) and abolished tuition fees for Australian students,205 
opened universities to a wider group of people. Young people had an opportunity to 
pursue more than formal education as campuses across Australia engaged in debates and 
demonstrations about the issues affecting them closely, for example conscription and the 
anti-Vietnam war moratorium. They were of an age to be sent to fight in Vietnam but at this 
time did not have the right to vote until age 21. 
In 1976, during a student march (without permit) from the University of Queensland 
regarding student allowances, the chief of the police traffic branch bashed a female 
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student on the head, all of which was recorded on film.206 The then Vice Chancellor, 
Zelman Cowan asked Police Commissioner Whitrod for an inquiry and the Commissioner 
agreed.207 Cabinet met the following day and the Police Minister explained to the media 
that there would be no inquiry.208  
Not all conflict between the Bjelke-Petersen Government and Queenslanders emanated 
from street march actions. Opposition to the government’s social conservatism was 
widespread — in 1977/78, there was controversy concerning the content of social studies 
courses to be used in Queensland schools. The courses were entitled SEMP (Social 
Education Materials Project) and MACOS (Man a Course of Study).209  Both were the 
subject of ‘vicious criticism by a collection of conservative educators, fundamentalist 
Christians and moral campaigners.’210 The influence of these extreme conservative 
opponents of these works, directed to the Premier and Minister for Education, saw the 
documents withdrawn from use in Queensland. The views of the Queensland Teachers’ 
Union, the Queensland Council of Parents and Citizens, members of staff of the University 
of Queensland Education Department, the Curriculum Development Centre from Canberra 
(who developed SEMP), public servants, teachers, parents, and religious groups — were 
all swept aside.211 The opposition to the Coalition’s actions on this matter served to 
deepen resentment of a new section of the community. 
In August 1976, a peaceful commune in Cedar Bay north of Cairns suffered a military-style 
invasion by Queensland police,212 causing public pressure to mount around civil liberties 
issues after the matter attracted Australia-wide condemnation.213 Commissioner Whitrod 
investigated the Cedar Bay raid, which resulted in four summonses with charges being laid 
against four members of the raiding party but on the day the summonses were issued, he 
resigned stating he ‘could no longer accept the political interference of the premier and the 
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police minister.’214 Of the four police summonsed, only one went to trial and he was 
acquitted.215 
All through these years, other demonstrations were held and other protests staged, but 
these examples show the on-going legalised suppression of its citizens by a government, 
which prompted Derek Fielding, President of the Queensland Civil Liberties Council to say: 
We are getting very close to a situation where the Government sees the State being 
divided into two classes — humans and non-humans. Non-humans would be anyone 
who does something the Government does not approve of.216 
In the previous chapter the impact on the ALP of the ‘right to march’ demonstrations was 
covered. The conflicts between demonstrators and the police spanned about 20 years. 
Premier Bjelke-Petersen’s declaration in 1977 of ‘no more street marches’ unleashed 
further anger from protestors, who continued on regardless. By late 1978, demonstrations 
were still being held across Queensland — Rockhampton, Toowoomba, Mackay, 
Townsville, Bundaberg, Gladstone, and Surfers Paradise. At Collinsville, most of the adult 
population marched.217 Ray Evans wrote, 
After almost 2,000 people (were) arrested in 26 separate confrontations, then fined or 
imprisoned at enormous administrative cost, the struggle arrived at an exhausted 
truce rather than a decisive victory for either side.218 
The Country Party-Liberal Cabinet lurched from outrage to outrage. Professor Hugh Emy 
observed that the Premier saw nothing wrong with his wife, six of his Cabinet ministers, 
senior public servants and others receiving preferential treatment during the 1970s in 
‘ t h e  G r e a t  Comalco Share I ssue Scandal’219 they stood to make a considerable 
personal profit.220 Comalco, a company that had direct dealings with the government, 
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offered to those and other people, shares for $2.75 that within minutes of the market 
opening on 11 June 1970, delivered a 105% capital gain to recipients of Comalco’s 
generosity. The offer and acceptance was described variously as ‘bribery,’ ‘highly 
improper,’ and ‘grossly indecent’ and prompted a British journalist to observe ‘In Europe 
or U.S. the sale of shares at par by a foreign company to politicians and civil servants 
would cause a furor and bring down a government.’221 Each outrage delivered more 
angry disgruntled electors, wanting an end to this governance. Some were joining the 
ALP.222 
Within the ALP, membership protest against the Bjelke-Petersen Government was building 
but the THG and their parliamentary wing showed themselves to be unable or un-willing to 
respond to the new crises and marshal the new members sufficiently to mount a creditable 
campaign.223 The THG was being challenged from without (international, national and 
Queensland impacts) and within (new members pushing for party reform). Another                   
part of the challenge confronting it looked like the change between generations – an old 
order making way for new. All political parties have to handle this challenge. It can cause 
division but it is also about renewal.  
Did Generational Change contribute to the THG’s problems? 
Julie McLeod and Rachel Thomson have provided a sound basis for the consideration of 
generational change.224 Their examples of the ‘sociology of generations are all concerned 
with capturing and understanding how social changes and continuities are secured by 
collectives, and the resulting form of their cultural and political expression.’225 They quote 
B. Geisen, saying: 
The conflict between classes has been increasingly replaced by the turnover of 
generations as the prime mover of history. This temporalization of social structure is 
reflected by a new public sensitivity for generational differences.226 
Geisen, drawing on Maurice Halbwachs, argues that generations are structured by 
different temporal horizons and ‘the unity of a generation and of its collective memory is 
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constructed by a fundamental common experience that devalues the experience of a 
previous generation.’227 
McLeod and Thomson refer back to Karl Mannheim’s essay on generations,228 saying: 
Mannheim begins with the idea of a generation as simply and descriptively 
constituted ‘by a similarity of location of a number of individuals within a social whole. 
As such, the transition from generation to generation is a continuous process with the 
emergence of new participants and the continuous withdrawal of previous 
participants.’ 
Members of any one generation can only participate in a temporally limited selection 
of historical flow. And depending upon the speed and intensity of historical change, 
the form in which transmission takes place may have to change. Periods of slow 
social change may be characterised by a kind of ‘piety’ where young people look to 
their elders, possibly adopting their dress and values.229 
Mannheim is quoted as saying: 
The up-to-datedness of youth... consists of their being closer to the present 
problems... and in the fact that they are dramatically aware of a process of 
destabilisation and take sides on it. All this while the older generation cling to the re-
orientation that had been the drama of their youth... not only does the teacher 
educate his pupil, but his pupils educate the teacher too.230 
So McLeod and Thomson provide these guidelines which I use for my search for 
generational change amongst the political players in Queensland — within the ALP 
between the Old Guard and New Guard (reformers) and in both ALP and Coalition — 
during the 1960s and 1970s to see if generational/cohort orientation exists across political 
boundaries in response to the new generation. Relying on these definitions, I will be 
particularly looking for: a) ‘the unity of a generation and (that) its collective memory is 
constructed by a fundamental common experience that devalues the experience of a 
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previous generation’:231 b) ‘the up-to-datedness of youth (which) consists of their being 
closer to the present problems... and in the fact that they are dramatically aware of a 
process of destabilisation and take sides on it’:232 and c) ‘all this while the older generation 
cling to the re-orientation that had been the drama of their youth.’233 
Whether generational change played a part in the standoff between the THG and the 
Reformers can be examined in two ways: by looking at the relationships within the ALP; 
and, outside the ALP, by contrasting the style and workings of the senior power groupings 
inside the ALP with the then Coalition (Liberal/Country Party) Queensland Cabinet, to 
identify any similarities and any common behavioural charasteristics. 
Looking first at relationships within the ALP required an analysis of the thesis interviewee 
data (see Appendices 1 and 2.) When conducting the interviews, and in some cases as a 
follow up, interviewees were asked to provide data regarding their place of birth, their 
father’s and mother’s employment, their educational levels and other information. Criteria 
used were based on Tim Phillips’ seven aspects of social background as possible 
determinants of views about Australian identity.234 As outlined in Chapter 3, while the 
THG/Inner Executive was comprised of over 50 year-old, white, male, blue-collar unionists 
who had limited educational backgrounds, members of their entire faction included people 
of all ages, sexes, employment backgrounds and educational levels. 
The comparative data drawn from persons interviewed for this thesis was constrained by: 
availability (only two serving members of the Inner from those days were available for 
interview and one of them has now passed away); and, the number of interviewees (22 
Queenslanders). The size of the sample makes it impossible to conclusively contrast the 
Old Guard with the Reformers. The data shows that the Centre Caucus faction (see  
Appendix 1) had more interviewees with a university degree before they took their first 
paid employment than other factions, but across all factions, interviewees’ tertiary 
education was fairly evenly scattered. 
It is also clear that across all factions, interviewees mostly attended state primary schools. 
Similarly, all factions had a high level of interviewees who professed ‘Nil’ for religion. In 
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fact this criterion and others such as place of residence at the time of intervention were 
similar across all factions (there were no clear examples of interviewees living in wealthy 
or ‘upper class’ suburbs). The data suggests that interviewees probably had more in 
common with each other against these criteria, than they would have had if data had been 
generated for comparison with members of another political party or the wider Queensland 
population. The comparative data is insufficient to support a claim that generational 
change was a base factor in the conflict in the ALP at that time, but that is clearly because 
the actual leadership group were not available for interview (the vast majority being 
deceased). The main source of support for the generational change claim comes from 
comments by the interviewees. 
Manfred Cross was the first interviewee to point to the underlying societal changes that 
contributed to the conflict in the ALP through the intervention period.235 When interviewed 
about the factors that contributed to the push for reform, Hayden, who was at the time the 
leader of the FPLP, referred to the changed educational opportunities available to young 
Queenslanders once the state government commenced building state high schools in rural 
areas.236 This point is corroborated in Wear’s book where she refers to the fact that no 
new high schools had been built between 1924 and 1952.237 Hayden said the new young 
people coming into the ALP in the 1970s had better educational opportunities than the 
previous THG generation and were therefore more ready to question, challenge and 
pursue new ideas.238  
Manfred Cross referred to the THG ‘not mirroring the new ideas of the society, they were 
out of touch with the changing electorate.’239 He referred to the wave of new social issues 
and agendas sweeping Australia, and indeed the world, in the 1960s and 1970s. He spoke 
in his second interview about his years of working to turn a former ‘White Australia’ ALP to 
support the rights of Australia’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, with the 
support of the AWU’s Northern District Secretary, George Pont.240  Peter Beattie said 
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regarding the THG, ‘they didn’t know who they represented’241 alluding to the changing 
nature of ALP membership through the 1960s and ‘70s, and the THG’s lack of support for 
new people and issues. Norma Jones pointed out that the THG were always looking 
backwards to the (1957 ALP) split years,242 in contrast to the new ALP recruits who looked 
forwards, towards a future ALP re-gaining government’.243 
Each of these interviewees was pointing, in different manners, to a conflict in views 
between the Old Guard and the New Guard but also they were alluding to the changes 
that were shaking wider Queensland society at that time, to which the THG were slow to 
respond. The interviewee arguments suggest that indeed, generational change played an 
important part in the internal ALP conflict. 
These views of so many of the interviewees fit closely with the generational change 
definitions of Halbwachs and Mannheim, above. Interviewees express that the THG clung 
on to the events of their youth244 (the fights against the Groupers during the 1957 split) 
seeing themselves threatened by the newcomers, who they identified as challenging their 
value system. So, generational change does appear to have played a part in the ALP’s 
internal conflict surrounding reform. 
I then looked outside the ALP, to compare the leadership of the ALP Inner Executive with 
that of the Queensland Coalition Cabinet during the same years, to highlight any 
consistency of attitudes and ideas across these two widely politically opposed bodies. This 
was to examine if there was generational cohesion of approach across the political divide. 
Next, I compared the styles of ALP leaders Jack Egerton and Tom Burton in their dealings 
with (younger challenger) Murphy to that of Bjelke-Peterson thwarting (younger challenger) 
Ahern to see if generational change was a factor in each case. These comparisons taken 
from across the ALP/CP245 political divide, show that the behaviours of the same 
generation/cohort exhibit cohesion and similarities.  
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I examined the characteristics of the THG members through the 1960s and 70s. Within the 
ALP power was tightly held in a few trusted hands of THG officials.246 They were largely 
mistrustful of newcomers, reserving derision for academics, women, and environmentalists 
— anyone not in their image. Their drinking capacity was legendry.247 Wayne Swan is 
quoted by Beattie as referring to the Inner Executive as a ‘small clique of ageing union 
bosses.’248 The split left this group strongly anti-Catholic but they were also pro-Masonic 
Lodge, as explained in the Greg Moran249 and Lindsay Jones250 interviews. The vast 
majority of reformers were looking forward to a better future but the THG were constantly 
referring back to the 1950s. Norma Jones described the THG leaders in this way:  
Well, initially they [the Inner Executive of the QCE] were, in my view, sort of old men 
out of touch with what was happening in the real world, that's how we saw them. I 
don't think any of us (reformers) at that time, were too caught up in some of the 
ideological battles of the past. I think that's the difference. They were all caught up. 
All their decisions were based on things that happened 20 years prior but for us, it 
was about what we could do to make things better in the future and we didn't have 
that baggage really, not to that extent. Some of us may have had some history of 
knowing what happened. But we weren't making judgements of people's character on 
the basis that somehow they were on [one] side or on the other, 20 years ago. This 
just wasn't in our agenda at all and so it became obvious that these people were 
living in another world to what we were living in.251 
Egerton was not averse to the occasional ‘cunning deal,’ for example, he arranged a 
preference deal to advantage Russell Hinze in 1969, which saw Hinze (Country Party) win 
a traditionally Liberal held seat with ALP preferences.252 Clearly both were keen to lock out 
the Liberals. Nor was Egerton opposed to enjoying the perks of office, for example his 
board memberships of Mary Kathleen Mine253 and QANTAS.254 Similarly, when Bjelke-
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Petersen’s wife and Cabinet members were offered and accepted the inducement of 
Comalco shares, as mentioned previously, Tom Burns (for his father) and Egerton (for radio 
station 4KQ) were also willing share recipients,255 showing that key Labor figures accepted  
this ‘grossly indecent’ collusion. Political parties at that time did not have ‘conflict of 
interest’ protocols. 
The senior members of the THG as described in Chapter 3, mostly derived from the same 
generation and all had similar life experiences. They can be characterised as: white, male, 
blue-collar unionists, educated to about Queensland Scholarship standard, mostly in the 
middle years of their life. They had all risen to leadership positions in their respective 
unions. Bob Henricks explained in his interview they were all in their 60s.256  Lindsay 
Jones and Beattie both pointed to the fact that the THG were ‘out of step’ with incoming 
new ALP members.257 
In the southern states, through the 1970s, real structural change occurred258 as Whitlam, 
chastened by almost losing his FPLP leadership fight,259 recognised he needed to move to 
a more accommodating position on progressive issues such as the Vietnam Moratorium260 
and to bring the big social movement members into the ALP fold. But in Queensland, the 
THG leaders were slow to accept, let alone champion, more progressive social issues.261 
I examined the characteristics of Bjelke-Petersen who inherited leadership of the Country 
Party/Liberal Coalition Government in August 1968.262 He led a government characterised 
by longevity of parliamentary service, comprised entirely of older males, used to informal 
procedures and with a strong masculine ethos and camaraderie.263 The Country Party was 
overwhelmingly Protestant with strong Masonic overtones264 and seen to ‘frequently define 
themselves by what they opposed, not by visions they may espouse.’265  
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Peter Charlton described 1980s Queensland as: 
A state still providing its own censorship, with no formal sex education syllabus, 
where the Westminster system was mauled and perverted to the point where it is a 
national scandal, where a high percentage of the population are engaged in rural 
pursuits, and are distrustful of professionals, the arty and the intellectual elite. The 
people in power in the state were then aged between 35 and 60, mostly self-
educated with chips on their shoulders about their lack of higher education.’266 
It was a time when virtually all politicians’ education went no further than the Junior 
Certificate.267 Wear writes that the Police Union Secretary ‘produced survey figures 
showing that Queensland State Cabinet Ministers had no better education than the 
average policeman’.268 This was underlined when Commissioner Whitrod attempted to 
introduce basic educational requirements for police officers, ‘the then Premier Bjelke-
Petersen said “Queensland does not need its policemen to be Rhodes Scholars.” 
Universities were often viewed as sources of trouble, presumably because they fostered 
independent thinking.’269 Like Hinze, most of the Cabinet had been educated in the 
‘university of life’270 and therefore placed limited value on higher education. 
Wear also says ‘that Bjelke-Petersen pushed Cabinet to support his confrontationist 
methods during the 1982 teacher rolling stoppages on class sizes, but the Solicitor 
General said they had no legal right to sack or dismiss striking teachers, as the Premier 
advocated.’271 Bjelke-Petersen was clearly prepared to overrule the advice of his public 
servants when it suited his immediate political agenda however he paid a lot of attention to 
advice from trusted senior public servants, most notably Sir Leo Heilscher.272 Bjelke-
Petersen led the government from 1968 to 1987 and until the end, enjoyed enduring 
popularity among many Queenslanders.273 Professor Colin Hughes considered the 1977 
data for the Queensland Parliament and writes that ‘the Legislative Assembly was typical 
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of middle aged males (but) failed to represent to any significant extent the half of the 
population who were women or the 13% of the state population born outside Australia.’274  
Women were under-represented in Queensland’s Parliament on both sides of the house. 
John McCulloch’s figures show that the Legislative Assembly had only one female MP in 
1966, which grew to two in 1974, five in 1986 and by 1989 there were nine female MLA’s 
of whom eight were ALP members.275 No doubt the ALP’s 1980 imposition of Affirmative 
Action (AA) targets, introduced in the intervention package influenced the last figure.  
The comparison of the characteristics of these two groups (THG/Inner Executive and 
Queensland Cabinet) displayed many similarities. They: were comprised entirely of non-
Indigenous Australian males276 born around the same decades; included many who were 
self-made men, dominating in their own sphere of influence and un-constrained by 
considerations of ethical standards; were conservative on social issues and reluctant to 
listen to new views not of their own devising; ensured a trusted few held major power and 
mistrusted and mistreated younger challengers;  held lower educational levels and were 
strongly anti-intellectual; were anti-Catholic and pro-Masonic Lodge. There is a clear 
generational cohesion277 in how they dealt with people and issues, their outlook on life 
and, their less exacting approach to the ethical dimensions of government largesse. 
I then compared the styles of the senior party leaders in relation to their respective 
younger challengers (Bjelke-Petersen/Mike Ahern) and (Egerton and Burton/Denis 
Murphy.)  
Egerton was a boilermaker, who rose to become secretary of the Boilermakers’ Society 
before it amalgamated with other metals unions as the Amalgamated Metalworkers and 
Shipwrights Union (AMWSU).278 Similarly, Burton came to the ALP Inner Executive as the 
State Secretary of the PKIU. Both completed apprenticeships but showed contempt for 
academics.279 Murphy, who came from a working class family with a father who worked as 
a bridge builder for the Railways, gained his degree after studying at night and working by 
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day for 14 years. He did various unskilled jobs then taught at primary and later at 
secondary schools before finally becoming a university lecturer. But this gave him no credit 
in the eyes of the THG.280 Manfred Cross explained that when Murphy received his 
doctorate in 1972, former ALP President and Senator, Milliner was congratulating him, but 
Egerton and his THG associates were openly derisive.281 
Murphy joined the Aspley Branch of the ALP in 1963, was a delegate to the Petrie FDE, 
served as President of Young Labor and became a delegate to the QCE from 1968 before 
unsuccessfully contesting the federal seat of Petrie in 1972 and 1974.282 It was when he 
stood in the plebiscite for Griffith that the THG stepped in to crush his progress.    
Hayden remembered Egerton’s ‘iron fisted control’ of the ALP in all its structures 
conferences and activities, saying Egerton oversaw selection of candidates ‘of the THG 
persuasion and branded opponents right-wing groupers’283 thus blocking new ideas and 
views. Ross Fitzgerald wrote: 
It was not uncommon for the endorsement of Labor candidates for safe seats to be 
seen by the [Old Guard] junta as a sort of retirement scheme for party faithfuls (sic). 
‘Old Guard’ QCE officials also ensured that nominees who challenged their 
‘authority’ did not win pre-selections for state seats.284  
Whitlam corroborated this, referring to ‘power brokers who believe in picking a candidate in 
their own image, who deliver seats as a reward or hand out perks for past services to the 
party.’285  
When Murphy stood and won the 1977 plebiscite to stand for the ALP in Griffith,286 the 
Inner Executive (under Burton) overruled this. ‘They put Bennie Humphreys in, as a result 
of which there was outrage amongst branch members, and this was a catalyst [for reform 
to commence],’ Barbara Cross states, ‘I had a hard time keeping the lid on things until 
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immediately after the election, when the reformers met for the first time.’287 THG 
interference in plebiscites and other party ballots was not unusual, and had developed 
over the years since the Split using the excuse that persons aligned to the DLP (‘grubs’ 
and ‘groupers’) were seeking positions.288 According to Errol Hodder ‘that was the same 
reason why the AWU fell out with Egerton — because they couldn’t get a fair go.’289   
The THG style, under Egerton then Burton, was to completely refuse to share power with 
people not of their persuasion. Murphy was recognised by both the THG and the 
membership as being a voice for change that differed from the old style. The THG refused 
Hayden’s offer to vacate his Inner Executive position in favour of Murphy290 who had 
joined the ALP in 1964.291 Murphy was pushing for change, sending to ALP Members a 
confidential document advocating improving the party structures and pointing out ALP 
inadequacies in recent elections.292 The THG were incensed and subsequently pursued 
Murphy and his ever-increasing number of supporters. They also defeated the reform 
proposals Burns and Hayden tried to introduce at the 1977 Crest State Conference.293 
Both Egerton and Burton kept younger challengers out of their power groupings. 
Bjelke-Petersen was born in 1911 and raised in a strongly religious Lutheran home294 
outside Kingaroy. Either through poor health or lack of interest, Bjelke-Petersen failed the 
scholarship examination that marked entry to high school.295 A self-made man, he placed 
little value on education. 
It is unsurprising that when Ahern took his seat in parliament on 20 March 1968, just a few 
months before Bjelke-Petersen became Premier, Ahern was not readily accepted by all 
sections of his party.296 Paul Reynolds has identified Ahern’s: youth (generations younger 
than his parliamentary colleagues at 25 years of age); his educational standard (he was 
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the Country Party’s only graduate holding a degree from Queensland University); and, his 
religion (Ahern was a Catholic in the strongly Protestant Country Party that had Masonic 
overtones) as the reasons for this conflict.297 The two were antipathetic from the beginning, 
rivals from the day Ahern was elected.298 He was out-of-step with the ethos governing the 
Cabinet and the parliamentary Country Party at that time, describing himself as holding 
small ‘n’ National party ideals299 such as the honesty and integrity displayed by former 
Premier Frank Nicklin, whom Ahern intensely admired.300 He was mistrusted by many 
Country Party members and blocked by Bjelke-Petersen from progressing into a ministry 
for twelve years.301  
Terry White said of Bjelke-Petersen’s religious beliefs in relation to Ahern: 
Bjelke-Petersen had a pathological hatred of Ahern and Ahern’s Roman Catholicism 
was a major contributing factor in that hatred. Anti-Catholicism was rampant through 
the senior ranks of the National Party.302  
Ahern himself said ‘certainly Bjelke-Petersen was really big into anti-intellectualism’303 but 
this was not surprising because at that time virtually all politicians progressed no further 
than the Junior Certificate.304 
Such was Bjelke-Petersen’s antipathy, it took Ahern 12 years and he virtually had ‘to force 
his way’ into Cabinet by nominating to stand for Deputy Premier but being sidelined into a 
Ministry instead by Bjelke-Petersen, who had passed him over on previous occasions.305  
Ahern came from an ‘old money’ family with longstanding links to the traditional Country 
Party ethos.306 This compared with the self-made ‘new money’ of Bjelke-Petersen who 
was prepared to exceed the guidelines in rewarding those who supported him (extra leave 
for police involved in the Springbok demonstrations and appointment of Terry Lewis as 
Police Commissioner over more senior, better qualified police officers). It was common 
knowledge that Bjelke-Petersen and some of his Cabinet were open to kickbacks and the 
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perks of office. The acceptance of Comalco shares (by Cabinet members and Bjelke-
Petersen’s wife, Florence) occurred in 1970.307 The delivery to Bjelke-Petersen of a brown-
paper bag containing $300,000 by Singapore businessman, Robert Sng308 was later raised 
during the Fitzgerald Inquiry. When asked what Sir Joh said when given this large sum, 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry Investigator John Huey says that Sng responded, ‘all he [Joh] said 
was, thank you, thank you, thank you.’309 However, ‘being perceived as dictatorial and 
dishonest had no immediate negative impact on his party’s electoral performance.’310 
Bjelke-Petersen’s domineering populist style was particularly evident in events covered 
earlier in this thesis: in the handling of the Police; when he constantly insisted on his own 
way, against the wishes of his Ministers or against the advice of his public servants; 
shutting down the investigation of the batoning of a University of Queensland student; the 
Cedar Bay raid; the handling of the Springbok demonstrations; and, the demolition of the 
Bellevue.311 Whereas Bjelke-Petersen was populist in his appeal to the electorate, Ahern 
placed strong emphasis on personal probity in political life.312  
By comparing the dysfunctional Egerton/Burton/Murphy and Bjelke-Petersen/Ahern 
political relationships, it is evident that these senior players shared many characteristics in 
their behaviour and attitudes. All three worked from an all-male powerbase, supported by 
other senior aged men who were politically committed to a shared goal. They had limited 
levels of education and carried an anti-intellectual chip on their shoulders. They treated 
their younger, better educated, articulate colleagues with contempt and blocked their 
progress. Unlike Bjelke-Petersen, neither Egerton nor Burton were known to hold strong 
religious values, but both of the political parties shared affiliations to Protestant religions 
and the Masonic Lodge and a strong antipathy towards Catholics. While Egerton and 
Burton referred back to their youthful 1950s experiences, fighting ‘groupers’, Bjelke-
Petersen remained vulnerable to pseudo-scientific and technological schemes, 
remembering the then revolutionary and new treatment by Sister Elizabeth Kenny of his 
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polio as a child.313 These examples show that, in terms of generational change, these men 
were ‘clinging to the re-orientation that had been the drama of their youth.’314 
They were in their own different ways ‘self-made men’ rising through the ranks of their 
peers, and they not only kept close those sycophants who supported them and never 
challenged their leads, but they also ensured that the sycophants received benefits and 
perks. Egerton and Bjelke-Petersen were both prepared to countenance cunning, 
advantageous deals. Their value systems were flexible, accommodating kickbacks and 
perks of office. Neither was much limited by consideration of ethical standards and both 
were very used to getting their own way on issues. 
These reflect the shared characteristics of a generation that has had a fairly hard life — 
lived through depression and war years and generally dealt with hard knocks along the 
way (‘the unity of a generation and of its collective memory, constructed by a fundamental 
common experience’).315 That they were part of a cohort having more in common with 
each other in behavioural terms, than with their upcoming political heirs, points to the 
relevance of generational change characteristics. 
Major societal change was impacting at international, national and state levels, and 
divisive political change swept Queensland, but generational change also played a part in 
the leadership challenges of these political entities. The generational similarities and 
comparable styles of leadership of Egerton/Burton and Bjelke-Petersen are evident, as 
they are between the governing bodies on which those men served. 
Queensland was being washed by many changes, as summed up by Hugh Mackay: 
Since the early 1970s, there is hardly an institution or a convention of Australian life 
which has not been subject either to serious challenge or to radical change. The 
social, cultural, political and economic landmarks which we have traditionally used as 
reference points for defining the Australian way of life have either, vanished, been 
eroded, or shifted. Between the early seventies and the early nineties is the story of a 
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society which has been trying to cope with too much change, too quickly, and on too 
many fronts.316 
Within the ALP in Queensland, these changes were impacting at every turn. There is 
some dispute regarding the date of the first call for intervention into the affairs of 
the Queensland Branch. Manfred Cross cites a request from the Indooroopilly-Kenmore 
Branch of the ALP in October 1976,317 Fitzgerald and Thornton claim the date was in July 
1978, while others suggest an even earlier call in late 1974 from the Brisbane FDE 318 
Suffice to say the Queensland Branch was showing signs of revolt by the mid-1970s. 
Similarly, the seeds of decay that in 1989 would bring down the National/Liberal 
Government were beginning to be revealed to Queenslanders. However the electors were 
not yet prepared to vote for the ALP, not least because it remained obviously, and publicly, 
a divided party. 
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Chapter 4 Reformers want the ALP to win 
Through the 1960s and 1970s there was an influx of new members coming to the ALP 
many of whom were seeking change. These reformers were an amorphous group of 
people who often had little in common except their ALP membership and their growing 
objection to the ‘iron fisted’ Old Guard/THG control of the party.319 
The previous chapter examined the environment in which the imperative for reform 
developed. This chapter aims to provide a thorough understanding of the reformers as 
they emerged around the early 1970s to achieve federal intervention in 1980. It closely 
examines what issues and events precipitated reform, the identity of the reformers, what 
motivated them, and how they went about it. The chapter outlines the critical steps and 
tipping points on the way to reform before finally discussing the emergence of factions and 
posing answers to the question ‘Why did it take so long?’ The chapter charts the gradual 
recognition amongst reformers that they would need federal assistance to achieve the 
change they sought. 
With the Bjelke-Petersen led government in office in Queensland from 1968, there were a 
bevy of issues inflaming some Queenslanders, which the ALP could have handled more 
effectively: environmental issues; the attacks on civil liberties issues such as the ‘right to 
march’; the evolving revelations pointing to corruption in the government’s actions. But 
probably the most frustrating issues confronting the reformers were: the lack of electoral 
success; the refusal to share power; the continuing failure of anyone not a THG supporter, 
to win party endorsement for anything.  
Since the 1959 disaffiliation of the AWU, the THG had held absolute power. The group 
grew into a fiercely controlling body, ‘inwardly focussed and paranoid about criticism,’320 
overseeing every election, all policy, all plebiscites and candidate selections, and 
thoroughly dominating the party.321 By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the membership 
was changing but the THG resisted rather than adapted to the changes. Whereas in the 
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southern states, the party had opened up to embrace new recruits, in Queensland the ALP 
leadership gave them little support, fearfully watching for ‘grubs and groupers.’322   
Egerton’s attitude towards Whitlam, positive in 1966 when he ensured the Queensland 
National Executive delegates voted for Whitlam (about to be expelled because of his 
stance on state aid for non-government schools),323 soured over the years.324 Combe 
claims that by December 1974 Egerton and State Secretary Bart Lourigan attacked the 
Labor federal government.325 As new reforms were rolled out by the Labor federal 
government, Queenslanders looked askance at some of the Whitlam initiatives, and the 
ALP leaders in Queensland shunned the Whitlam federal government.326 This offended the 
new wave of ALP members, some of whom had joined when Whitlam was dismissed327 
and most of whom saw Whitlam as an inspirational leader, well able to cope with emerging 
issues in society.328  
These new members argued that the ALP should move in step with its community and 
develop a platform and policies that provided an ALP interpretation of the best way forward 
for the nation and the state. However, the ALP in Queensland was strong on left leaning 
industrial policy, but considered the party did not need policies on current social issues.329 
This was not how the reformers saw it. 
Attempts to bring change to the party were thwarted. Joy Ardill was elected as a delegate 
to the QCE330, but in her interview expressed her frustration at the refusal of that body to 
support or even discuss important issues of the day.331 An attempt by Burns and Hayden 
to bring in reforms at the Crest State Conference in 1977 was soundly defeated.332 The 
only people who were successful in pre-selections were those supported by the THG 
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because the THG stacked plebiscites for their candidates. Jim Fouras provided an 
example of this ‘when Burns as SPLP Leader tried to field 11 new-blood candidates in the 
1977 election, it was referred to as the Burns kiss of death,’ and Fouras explained that his 
was the only successful plebiscite, as he was elected while the other ten were all defeated 
by THG candidates.333 These thwarted new members were not yet seeing themselves as 
‘a group of reformers,’ rather these were isolated individual attempts to bring about change 
that were stamped on by the THG, causing resentment and frustration.  
Hayden met informally with Dr Denis Murphy well before the reform movement 
commenced and at that meeting Murphy stressed the absolute need for a better 
performance from the Queensland Branch, if the ALP was to win back the federal Treasury 
benches.334 As early as March 1977, Hayden met with Bob Hawke and David Combe 
explaining there was ‘no chance of achieving (federal) power without reform in 
Queensland’, however the matter was not progressed at that time.335 Hayden could see 
the ALP’s newly joined Queensland members were enthusiastic, bringing in new ideas and 
new policies but being silenced when they challenged the ruling THG Inner Executive.336  
There developed an atmosphere of frustration, with the regular blocking of new ideas and 
new initiatives and this drove individuals to seek support from each other at party forums. 
Party rules even precluded branches corresponding with each other.337 But likely the main 
reason why such a variegated group of people finally came together to fight for change 
was the election results. The electoral achievements at both state and federal levels have 
been dealt with in detail in previous chapters and also in Appendix 3. With the exception of 
the 1961 federal election results (the ALP won 11/18 House of Representatives seats), 
and that of 1972 (the ALP won 8/18 House of Representatives seats including Dawson, 
picked up by the ALP in the 1966 by-election),338 Queensland’s election results were 
consistently poor for the ALP and one of the most critical reasons why the reform 
movement arose. The ALP in Victoria (also affected by the 1950s split) performed badly 
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for some years and it is interesting to note that they did not regain state government in 
Victoria until 1982, just seven years before the ALP regained office in Queensland.339 
Other states including New South Wales did not experience such huge hurdles to win 
government. The charge against the THG that they were more interested in putting their 
like-minded people into seats than achieving government was made by many people.340 
By the mid to late 1970s, many ALP members were becoming frustrated at the lack of 
change. They began to organise and unite in expressing their anger. 
The most telling event that motivated ALP members to seek reform was the blatant 
reversal of a plebiscite result that occurred in the run up to the 1977 federal election in 
Griffith, where Murphy won the local plebiscite but the result was immediately overturned 
by the QCE. Barbara Cross explained ‘this was the catalyst for reform to seriously 
commence as soon as the election was over.’341 Lindsay Jones said of Griffith, ‘Clem 
[Jones] wanted it, Murphy won the ballot, and the QCE gave it to Humphreys.’342 The 
message branch members took from these events was that even when they won the 
plebiscite, the ruling THG would step in to negate their efforts. In their view the ALP 
leaders were un-democratic and breaching party rules.     
The early reformers held their first meeting the night after the December 1977 federal 
election in Pat Comben’s house in Brisbane’s western suburbs.343 The core people 
amongst them were: Manfred and Barbara Cross, Rob Whiddon, Terry Hampson, Alice 
Cavanagh, Pat Comben, Di Fingleton, Kevin Hooper, Lyn Gasteen, Judith Bell, Billie 
Watts, Hamish Linacre, Peter Beattie and Madeline McPherson.344  
Murphy was not involved at first, but joined the reformers in time for the first Bardon RSL 
Hall meeting.345 Other reformers, including myself, were: Senator George Georges, Ray 
Bush, Wilf and Joy Ardill; Joe Harris; Anne Warner, David Hamill, Mike Reynolds, Norma 
and Lindsay Jones, Ian McLean, and many others as the group expanded swiftly when 
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meetings took place and plans for change were developed.346 At this stage the reformers 
did not see themselves as a faction, but a group of union and branch ALP members 
motivated to change the party who later found their milieu in either the Socialist Left (SL) 
or Centre Caucus factions. 
After the 1977 election, Hayden became the leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor 
Party (FPLP). He clearly agreed that if the ALP was to win back office after the massive 
defeat at the election following the 1975 Whitlam dismissal, the ALP in Queensland must 
improve its performance.347 He commenced his steady push for reform. It is clear that at 
this stage he and the reformers believed it would be possible to achieve the necessary 
reforms in Queensland without federal involvement. 
The reformers had a range of motivations. Murphy had long championed structural reform 
of the ALP culminating around the end of 1977, in his release ‘in confidence’ to ALP 
members of a document entitled Can we improve the organisation of the Labor Party in 
Queensland?348 Barbara Cross advocated a much greater role for branch members and 
women in the party.349 Union officials Wilf Ardill (FMWU) and Harris (BWIU) were both 
from strong left aligned unions. They were the first union officials to join the call for reform 
and had the support of their unions to do this. Their unions wanted to see the ALP back in 
government at all levels and believed reform was a necessary precursor. At this time, 
other unions were either completely rejecting reform or sitting on the fence waiting to see 
how events developed. All reformers wanted to see better power sharing, a stronger role 
for branch members, the inclusion of more women members and the development of 
policies responsive to current day issues. Clearly some reformers (Beattie, Murphy) 
believed they could better represent the ALP in public office than some existing MPs,350 
but Beattie summed up the motivation of others, saying ‘the majority of reformers came to 
reform not looking for a seat but looking for ‘their party’.’ They were committed to the ALP 
but considered it had lost its way, or was yet to address the issues they believed were 
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vital.351 The interviews show that almost all newcomers came to the reform movement 
wanting their party to be more democratic and progressive, to see improved electoral 
performance and effective power sharing because, in Joy Ardill’s opinion, ‘it was a 
dictatorship.’352  
Other major drivers for reform, the claims the reformers were fighting for were: more 
branch member involvement; a say at all levels of the party for women; better party 
administration and management of the party’s assets including radio station 4KQ353; that 
the leadership should share power and listen to new ideas; and, that the party should 
stand up on the civil liberties and other issues troubling many Queenslanders. 
Individuals came to the reform movement from among existing ALP members: 
disenchanted with the THG leadership; disappointed with the party’s performance; and 
new people coming in with new agendas and new policy issues. Many in this group were: 
younger (but not exclusively so); a mix of working-class origins and more middle-class; 
some having higher standards of education (matriculation or university standards) than the 
THG; considerably more female members; and, they included white collar unionists. Even 
the names used informally to describe the opposing ALP groups — Old Guard (the THG 
followers) and New Guard (the reformers) — summed up this division. 
For a party proudly based on its union affiliations and traditions, it was vital for the 
reformers to include unionists in their midst and to be clearly seen as union supporters. 
Many reformers would have been members of their appropriate union, but it was key union 
officials who really gave the reform movement some clout. The early involvement of BWIU 
Organiser Joe Harris, Wilf Ardill (State Secretary elect of the FMWU) and Ian McLean 
(State Secretary of the ATEA) and the close relationship Georges enjoyed with the unions, 
gave the reformers credibility and a base from which to expand the unions support for 
reform. McLean and Wilf Ardill said their main motivation in joining the reformers, was their 
unions’ long-standing desire to see ALP governments at both state and federal levels.354 
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The strong push to modernise ALP policy to meet the needs of a changing society also 
underpinned much of the reform initiative. According to Hamill, whereas the THG/Old 
Guard were seen as left-leaning (especially when contrasted with the AWU) and known to 
be so on industrial matters, they were far more conservative on social issues.355 They 
clearly believed demands such as free safe abortion on demand, were not politically viable 
issues to include into ALP policy. Nick Bos explained that they did not necessarily oppose 
abortion, but considered it unsuitable for inclusion in the party’s policy statement.356 The 
reformers came to the ALP from diverse backgrounds, raising many of the 1970s protest 
movement issues: uranium mining; legal aid; abortion; sex education in schools; green 
environmental agenda issues; and, also seeking internal party rules reform. Reformers 
became adept at policy development and developed strong understandings of party rules. 
However, in a party where the leadership stated openly ‘If you’ve got the numbers, who 
needs the rules,’357 and where first-past-the-post ballots ensured the THG adherents 
always ‘had the numbers’ to get elected, the reformers had an uphill battle. 
The reformers used various tactics to achieve their desired goals. They arranged a series 
of meetings — the Bardon RSL Hall meetings,358 which were attended by hundreds. These 
meetings were really the first branch-member organised attempts to ‘get the numbers’ to 
challenge the ‘iron-fisted control’ of the THG. At the first meeting in early 1978, some of 
the reformers focussed upon the need for administrative change within the party, while 
others stressed the need to provide a positive left voice in relation to current policy 
issues.359 The distinctions between the (much later developed) factions — Centre Caucus 
and SL were apparent even then, with the Centre looking more to party administration and 
the Left leaning to policy issues. However, at that early stage, and on these matters, they 
shared the same concerns. The first Bardon meeting was chaired by Beattie 360 and the 
main motion was moved by Murphy who had previously distributed his paper regarding 
structural reform within the ALP. His motion was seconded by Townsville Deputy Mayor, 
Mike Reynolds, because it was considered important that the ALP see clearly that the 
movement for reform was a state-wide push, not just centred in the western suburbs of 
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Brisbane.361 Georges and Warner stressed the meeting’s continuing strong commitment to 
the ALP’s affiliated union movement.362 
Reformers left the meeting to commence their assault. They spoke up at party forums, 
they harried local ALP MPs, both state and federal. They wrote letters to the National 
Executive seeking intervention; some spoke to the media363. They arranged that reformer 
branch members would attend all QCE meetings as observers, which according to 
Barbara Cross ‘really threw them [the Inner Executive].’364 Reynolds discussed how the 
reformers used a combination of ‘bottom-up’ (in the early stages) and ‘social action’ 
elements of a social change approach, stating that he and others certainly understood the 
theory behind achieving political change.365 He went straight back to Townsville, where he 
talked to the Townsville Bulletin (receiving front page coverage) and to local members 
explaining about reform proposals and encouraging members’ support.366 Many reformers 
were already active in their branches, holding various offices, so they used these positions 
to spread the word of reform and initiate debates. Many of the interviewees remembered 
the funny, satirical, newsletter published intermittently during the reform years, entitled 
‘Mickey Spillall — the guy who knows all that goes on at the (Trades) Hall.’367 The author 
of the newsletter has never been identified.  
Hayden was at first cautious about the reformers, likely wanting to watch and see how they 
went about their campaign.368 Although he did not attend the meetings, his role in pressing 
for reform (especially on the Federal Executive) became known, and his messages were 
usually delivered through Manfred Cross or Murphy.369 When Neal Kane attacked Hayden 
publicly, suggesting that workers did not support his (Hayden’s) leadership of the FPLP, 
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there was fury370 amongst the reformers. Kane attacked Hayden publicly three times371 
and Hayden eventually resigned his (Inner Executive) position to push for intervention.372  
There were many circumstances that prompted people to the ALP and reform. The Bjelke-
Petersen Government was becoming more and more authoritarian. Georges emerged as a 
leader in the opposition to the Bjelke-Petersen Government, supporting those who 
believed all people had a democratic, in-alienable right-to-march. People thrown together 
in police cells after street marching, people who had joined the civil liberties groups 
established to counteract the Bjelke-Petersen Government’s crackdown, people wanting to 
demonstrate their opposition to uranium mining — were joining the ALP and bringing their 
issues to the reform group.373 Reformers identified with the ALP as their party but were 
shocked by the anti-democratic leadership they encountered. They were activists in the 
abovementioned organisations and expected to use the ALP as a vehicle for the changes 
sought by these various groups. Although, by the late 1970s, the Australian Democrats 
had formed, reformers did not identify with that party or its objectives.374 The sacking of 
Whitlam delivered a further influx of people into the ALP, shocked by the dismissal. 
Following the impact of the large attendances at the Bardon Reform Group meetings, the 
National Executive conducted an inquiry into the Queensland Branch during July 1977 at 
the Brisbane Crest Hotel.375 Hayden had been pressing the National Executive to take an 
interest376 and they set up the Committee of Inquiry, visiting Brisbane to meet with the 
disputing parties. Clearly the sheer weight of numbers of people aligning with reform, 
raising issues around the state, as well as the continuing publicly-aired friction and dissent, 
needed to be addressed. 
The outcome of the Inquiry was delivered to a packed meeting held in the old Trades Hall 
on Wickham Terrace in September 1978. The National Executive imposed a form of 
‘Limited Intervention’ upon the Queensland Branch. The main changes they required were 
to the structure of the party, and the THG were advised that a state conference should be 
held as a matter of priority. The National Executive’s requirements fell short of demanding 
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the implementation of proportional representation (PR) so many reformers immediately 
despaired, believing the changes were doomed to fail — Warner recalled Norma Jones 
bursting into tears and throwing her papers out the second floor window of the TLC 
meeting room, because she foresaw power sharing would not happen without imposed 
PR.377 At this time the ALP used first-past-the-post in all its ballots, which meant that no 
voice was given to differing points of view. Some reformers could see that power sharing 
would have to be imposed on the ALP in Queensland, and it would only be achieved 
through introducing PR as the voting system for ballots. However, both Hayden and 
Murphy held out hopes that the Old Guard would heed the National Executive 
requirements and distanced themselves from an unsigned public statement issued on 2 
October 1978 (but which included contact details for Beattie, Linacre, Whiddon, Hamill and 
Mary Alexander) which was highly critical of the limited intervention proposal calling it ‘an 
ineffectual betrayal of reform and demanding immediate federal takeover to salvage the 
Queensland Branch.’378  
The Rockhampton State Conference in 1979 was one of the critical events at which the 
THG caused great anger amongst the union and branch delegates supporting reform. The 
THG were on ‘limited intervention’ orders from the National Executive379 and were 
supposed to be opening up the conference and party structures. As the ballots were cast 
and the results came out, it became evident that nothing had changed; the same old THG 
supporters were controlling all the positions.380 At this time the THG supporters were 
gleefully shouting ‘the Ticket got up,’381 making it patently clear that without PR (which 
would impose power sharing) nothing would change. When Hayden was elected to the 
governing Inner Executive, Georges let it be known that Hayden was appointing him to be 
proxy at all their meetings.382 Georges was a leader in the fledgling SL faction and a real 
thorn in the side of the THG. The next morning they changed the rules that they had 
endorsed only the day before, to preclude Hayden appointing his proxy.383 They were 
heard to shout, ‘when you’ve got the numbers, who needs the rules,’ meaning that the 
THG had the numbers on the conference floor to change the rules to whatever suited their 
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ends.384 The conference was in uproar and became a constant battle between the 
THG/Old Guard and the reformers. 
Following the conference the National Executive was deluged with letters from individual 
conference attendees, branch and union members, and from various committees within 
the ALP, all calling for intervention into the Queensland Branch.385 The minutes of the 
Oxley/Darra Branch meeting on 14 March 1979 record the call of that Branch for federal 
intervention.386 Reformers had gone back to their party units and unions with reports of the 
conference and those bodies now recognised there was no hope of instituting change to 
support power sharing in the Queensland Branch without the intervention of the National 
Executive. But the National Executive ‘overwhelmingly rejected the new moves for Federal 
intervention,’387 clearly Hayden did not yet ‘have the numbers.’ 
After the treatment received at Rockhampton, some reformers were keen to expel THG 
members. Both Nick Bos and Harry Hauenschild were members of branches in which the 
reformers ‘had the numbers’ and these two THG leaders were expelled from their 
branches, but not from the party. Murphy explained it was the radical feminists in the SL 
who wanted all the THG expelled,388 but Murphy remembered the 1957 split and the 
ensuing wilderness years, and moved against expulsions. Neither did everyone in the SL 
agree with the expulsions of the Old Guarders. Harris said of the expulsion of Bos from 
Oxley Branch: ‘You can’t expel him he’s a Labor man at heart.’389 Murphy, Harris and 
others wisely wanted to avoid another split.390  
In Toowoomba, members in branches were fighting amongst themselves, some supporting 
the THG Old Guard controllers of the party, others supporting reform. The troubles started 
with a plebiscite and selection of an Old Guard supporter for Toowoomba South electorate 
in late 1978391 but the situation was no better in Toowoomba North where Alderman 
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Lindsay Jones (reformer) opposed former MP, Peter Wood (Old Guard).392 The 
Toowoomba North plebiscite was placed on hold after the returning officer reported 
plebiscite rule breaches and an inquiry was scheduled for October 1978.393 In the 
intervening period the confrontations between warring members festered and in 
September 1978, Norma and Lindsay Jones were each given notice of motion of their 
expulsion, the grounds including that both had made public statements critical of the 
party.394 Georges attended the meeting set down to discuss this matter and counselled 
sending it to the ALP Disputes Tribunal. The motion was lost, but the conflict continued 
and charges were laid with the Disputes Tribunal where both Lindsay and Norma Jones 
were reprimanded.395 
Further angst resulted from an inquiry conducted by Bos into both Toowoomba North and 
South Branches on behalf of the Administration Committee.396 Along the way, the inquiry 
was expanded to include a third branch (Rangeville Centenary Heights). When they 
accepted the Bos Inquiry Report, the Administrative Committee disbanded the three 
branches in November 1979.397 This caused further conflict amongst the branch members 
but when, in early 1980, the ALP administration decided to re-form two new Toowoomba 
branches, requiring everyone to re-apply for membership, they were even more 
incensed.398 It was seen as a way to get rid of troublemakers and a mass meeting voted 
not to recognise the new branches but to ask the ALP National Executive to inquire into 
the Queensland Branch.399  
Two points give further clarity to the Toowoomba situation. The branches were holders of 
considerable funds raised at their Saturday morning football canteen, but because party 
funds were running dry, branch members were concerned their hard earned monies might 
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get swallowed into Old Guard head-office coffers.400 Also the Toowoomba reformers were 
extremely adept at using the local, state and national media in their campaign.401 The long-
running saga was accompanied by letter writing campaigns, a constant stream of press 
releases, interviews in the Toowoomba Chronicle, speaking out on local talk back radio 
sessions, coverage from Queensland newspapers and TV stations including ABC Four 
Corners; all of which every week delivered another publicly-aired Toowoomba scandal.402 
The credibility of the THG controlled ALP was being eroded daily. 
Reformers began to speak out publicly. Reg Henry charged Ed Casey, the State 
Parliamentary Labor Party (SPLP) Leader, at the Disputes Tribunal with: breaching ALP 
policy in his proposal to redistribute state electoral boundaries; failing to oppose the 
Justices Act Amendment Act 1979; and, unauthorised and unlawful use of airline 
credits.403  
Harris was suspected of allegedly leaking information regarding an ALP run ‘Pensioners 
League scam fundraiser’ that was aired by a Liberal MP in Queensland Parliament.404 
Harris was very ready to defend this action.405 Georges, who often goaded the THG,406 
added fuel to the fire in his press statement which attacked Casey and other State Labor 
members for their support of the Criminal Law Amendment Bill which, according to the 
Chief Justice of Queensland and other senior Queenslanders, ‘removed a citizen’s ancient 
right of access to the courts.’407 Beattie was interviewed on ABC television’s Nationwide 
program describing some ALP state members as ‘inept’ and ‘dead wood’ in relation to their 
lack of response to the Bjelke-Petersen Government’s midnight demolition of the historic 
Bellevue Hotel.408 Georges, Harris and Beattie were notified that disciplinary charges had 
been filed against them and a growing number of unions and ALP members began to 
protest in their support.409  
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Following a meeting called by McLean, the ALP Defence Committee was established to 
provide assistance and support in defending those ALP members who were the vanguard 
of the reform movement, who had fallen foul of the Old Guard/THG administration, such as 
Georges, Harris and Beattie410. Meetings were called, funds were raised to assist in 
providing legal advice and national unions were contacted to lend support to this campaign 
by lobbying the ALP National Executive. The Committee was an amalgam of affiliated 
unions and individual members from the SL and Centre Caucus.411 
The first hearing was of Beattie’s charge, and he was suspended.412 The Defence 
Committee rallied in his support.  The Disputes Tribunal heard the charges against Casey, 
Georges and Harris: they suspended Georges for six months, Harris was found guilty of 
disloyalty to the party and expelled, but the Tribunal found ‘no case to answer’ against 
Casey.413 Following the hearings for Harris and Georges, over 400 people attended the 
ALP Defence Committee meeting.414 Reformers were furious and a group of about 16 
unions commenced a push for the reduction of the sentences.415 The national bodies of 
unions such as the ATEA, sent letters to the ALP National Executive calling for ‘the 
National Executive to give consideration to the use of its plenary powers, to restore public 
trust in the integrity of the Queensland Branch and give party members some confidence 
in the future of the party.’416 
Joy Ardill explained that it was difficult getting the SL’s interstate ALP leaders to 
understand what was happening in Queensland. They had always seen the Old Guard 
union leaders (Egerton, Hauenschild, Kane) as being left wing, strong supporters in 
industrial terms, but now the Queensland SL were fighting against them.417  
Georges, Harris and Beattie appealed to the State Council but that was equally 
unsuccessful, so they then turned to the Federal Executive of the ALP.418 A delegation of 
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Queensland members travelled to Canberra to lobby the National Executive in late 
1979.419 The Beattie and Georges sentences were reduced by the National Executive but 
Harris was left to wait until the next Queensland Conference,420 however, before it 
convened, intervention had taken place. In December 1979, the ALP Defence Committee 
called for federal intervention in the Queensland Branch.421 
One of the elements of this campaign that must have given the ALP National Executive 
almost daily concern was the volume of negative media coverage generated by the fight in 
Queensland. The media and their cartoonists had been laughing at the Queensland ALP 
for years, but these levels of bitter internal dispute gave the media a whole new angle to 
deride the party. With each attack the warring parties made on the other, the media proved 
to the public that the ALP was not fit to govern. The party in Queensland was lurching from 
public disaster to public scorn. 
The emergence of modern factions in Queensland 
Vere Gordon Childe in his influential study How Labor Governs, makes clear that the ALP 
and labour movement have always had factions.422 His experience of the party is from the 
early 20th century, but the divisions he outlines mirror the more recent and endless ALP 
factional conflicts (see also Appendix 1). 
Before the AWU’s disaffiliation from the ALP in Queensland in 1959, there were two 
factions, the AWU (right wing and conservative on policy) and Trades Hall (left wing and 
more progressive). These differences drew in part, from the two grouping’s industrial 
stance in which the AWU rarely took industrial action, preferring arbitrated solutions 
whereas the Trades Hall unions were known for the militant industrial actions. Following 
the exit from the ALP of the AWU, the THG assumed complete control of the ALP in 
Queensland. For many years that control was apparently acceptable and members were 
prepared to work within its parameters.  
There is some evidence of only modest divisions through to the early 1970s. Hayden was 
supported by the Egerton group to stand for Oxley in 1961,423 and it was only after years of 
working with them that he finally moved to oppose them. As pointed out in Chapter 4, 
                                            
419 Ibid., p. 256. I was a member of this delegation. 
420 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op cit., pp. 256 and 257. 
421 Cross, Hon. Manfred Douglas AM, op. cit. timeline document 
422 Vere Gordon Childe, How Labour Governs, Parkville, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1964.   
423 Murphy (1980), op. cit., p. 170. 
 61 
‘Whitlam’s political career was saved’ by Egerton and the Queensland delegates in a 1966 
National Executive meeting,’ and Whitlam later appointed Egerton to the QANTAS board.   
424 However, as the years progressed, Whitlam spoke against them. Burns was quite vocal 
and made a number of attempts (see previous mention of the ‘Burns kiss of death’) to 
deliver change but with scant success because Burns did not have the numbers. It is clear 
that individuals occasionally tried to move against the ruling THG line, but a formalised 
opposition had not emerged. As explained previously, Hayden offered his place on the 
Inner Executive in the late-1970s in favour of Murphy,425 saying Murphy’s one voice 
amongst their number would at least allow the Inner to hear what he was proposing and 
they would clearly have the numbers to over-rule Murphy. They rejected Hayden’s offer. 
So through all these years, opposition to the THG came from individuals who were 
aggrieved by the way the THG ran the ALP, but they were not formalised into a faction. 
Georges played a pivotal role in the civil liberties arena in the late 1970s, championing 
individuals and encouraging his federal parliamentary colleagues to support 
Queenslanders embroiled in the street march demonstrations.426 He built lasting 
allegiances with unions, unionists and ALP branch members and provided unparalleled 
support to the broader labour movement and their protest groups. In about July 1978, a 
group of unionists gathered in the Brisbane Trades Hall at the first meetings of the infant 
SL faction. It was an initiative of Harris and included Ken Kempshed, Wilf Ardill, Terry 
Hampson, and Senator Arthur Gietzelt, a leader of the Left in New South Wales.427 Wilf 
Ardill says the unions involved included the BWIU, AMWSU and later the ATEA.428 In 
about August of that year, Georges wrote to ALP members whom he knew to be active in 
various protest groups, inviting them to a meeting to discuss the formation of a group that 
merged with the unionists and started to think of themselves as the SL. By 3 September 
1978, the SL attendance/minute book records attendees at their first meeting.429 This 
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group had Georges as a de-facto leader and he drove a mini bus with about 15 people to 
the 1979 Conference in Rockhampton.430  
This conference made obvious a clear division between the Old Guard and the New Guard 
played out daily in almost every vote, whether on policy or for the elections of office 
holders. The conference was acrimonious, violence was threatened (Senator Jim Keefe 
had to be provided with a body guard of burly metal workers), the hatred of women 
delegates was evident.431 The THG broke their own newly amended rule by excluding 
Hayden’s appointment of Georges as his proxy, so conflict ensued. 
Each night the people aligned to the left met for dinner and drinks at another hotel away 
from the main conference venue, and lasting friendships were formed. It was at this time 
that reformers first became aware that they were aligning with the ‘left’ or the ‘centre’ and 
the realisation dawned that not all reformers would ultimately be in the same faction. 
Following Rockhampton, reformers of all persuasions went back to their branches and 
unions and petitioned the National Executive for federal intervention. 
Whiddon recalls it was after the SL formed, and at the urging of Georges that the Centre 
Caucus emerged believing that there were many ALP members not attracted to a SL 
position.432 Fitzgerald and Thornton state that the Centre Caucus formed secretly in late 
1978 but announced their existence in August 1979.433 It took a middle-of-the-road stance, 
hoping to ultimately hold power by sharing their numbers with either left or right, depending 
upon the issue. Murphy, McPherson, Whiddon, Manfred and Barbara Cross all supported 
this group. 
As the months passed, leading up to intervention in March 1980, the Reform Group 
worked together maintaining its push for intervention, and fighting for members of both the 
SL and Centre Caucus. At that time, the Old Guard were not seen as a faction, but rather 
as the long term controllers of the ALP. It was not until the Old Guard rejoined the post-
intervention ALP that they identified as a faction, and took the name Labor Unity. In 1981 
the AWU voted to return to the ALP. When they aligned with the Centre Caucus in 1983 
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the combined group took the name Centre Majority but the AWU shortly later dropped that 
alignment, however retaining the name Centre Majority for some time.  
It was only following intervention, which included imposing PR for all internal elections that 
the factions really went their separate ways and the Reform Group ceased to exist.  Even 
on quite controversial policy, the reformers at that time were mostly united, but when 
elections commenced using PR, the factions asserted their different positions and teams. 
The reformers ended up in either the SL or the Centre Caucus. The details of the early 
development of defined factions such as exist today are set out in Appendix 1: Factional 
Nomenclature. 
There are a number of factors that help explain why it took so long to achieve intervention. 
Through the years leading to intervention, there existed a residual ALP culture of 
acceptance of strong domineering leadership. When the AWU dominated the party, this 
was the norm, so when the THG assumed the same stance after the 1950s split, it was 
considered quite acceptable. In a party like the ALP, to have a strong leader (Egerton) was 
seen as a positive factor until over time, it was recognised this dominating leader excluded 
the views of others, and may not be popular with the electorate. 
Into the 1960s, there was the very real pain suffered by the remaining ALP as the DLP and 
its ‘grouper’ affiliates stripped the old party of its resources and, in standing DLP 
candidates across the country, diminished the ALP’s electoral chances. This hang-over 
from the split saw new members greeted with suspicion their credentials carefully 
scrutinised, so as to weed out groupers and persons holding pro-DLP views. 
At different times, aggrieved ALP members opposed those in control of the party but did 
not have ‘the numbers’ to make an effective challenge. In large part, the use of first-past-
the-post ballots and plebiscite stacking with union votes played into the hands of the THG 
by ensuring only THG sympathisers came through the ranks of plebiscites and party 
elections. 
The ALP had a rule precluding branches from corresponding with each other.434 Today this 
seems ridiculous, but at that time, such was the fear of DLP influence, that it was written 
into the rule book. 
                                            
434 Australian Labor Party - State of Queensland, Constitution and General Rules, Amended 1971, p. 38, 
Rule 74. (also, ALP Rules, 1974, p. 35, Rule 74.) 
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It took some years for members to admit that the party was consistently failing to win 
elections and to identify the reasons why this was the case. 
Even after the reformers first came together and moved for change, many believed they 
could achieve this change within Queensland, so National Executive intervention would 
not be necessary. Rockhampton changed all that. It became blatantly clear the THG would 
never countenance power sharing, so resorting to the National Executive to impose federal 
intervention was the only solution. 
Reformers came from all walks of life. They saw the ALP to be ‘their party’ but they saw it 
needed change — it needed democratising. They argued, they persuaded, they fought to 
give a voice to groups of people from every, and from any persuasion, provided they fitted 
under the umbrella of the ALP. That they could achieve this reform speaks about the 
nature of the party. Senator John Faulkner has pointed out much more recently:  
The broad church of the ALP has always been a testing and proving ground for our 
ideas and policies. Our greatest politicians were trained and sometimes humbled in 
branch and league debates, on conference floor, in lounge rooms and back yards. 
Our members questioned and they argued, and in those discussions sometimes 
minds were changed and sometimes policies were... In a healthy democracy or a 
healthy political party, all voices are heard. Labor knows that unity is strength, but 
debate is not disunity. Debate is diversity and diversity is Labor’s wealth...There is 
nothing wrong with people who have the same goals working together (through 
factions) to achieve their goals. Factions are older than political parties — they were 
founded in the Roman Senate and the court of Queen Elizabeth the First.435 
  
                                            
435 Senator John Faulkner, The Wran Lecture, delivered by Senator John Faulkner on June 9, 2011, pp 3 
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Chapter 5 National Executive intervention  
From a National Executive perspective, the Queensland ALP Branch was in disarray and 
by 1 March 1980, they were ready to take action. Using interviews with three National ALP 
Officials, Neil Batt436, David Combe437 and Bob McMullan,438 and those of the Queensland 
interviewees, this chapter looks from the perspective of the National Executive, outlining 
the reasons for their decision to intervene and how it was received in Queensland.  
On 1 March 1980, the ALP National Executive took the decision to intervene into the 
affairs of the Queensland Branch. Precedents for this intervention had occurred in New 
South Wales and Victoria in 1970 and in Tasmania in 1975.439 Gough Whitlam was a key 
figure in the Victorian intervention, when the left-leaning Trades Hall unionists had their 
power over the Victorian Branch ALP curtailed by the National Executive.440   
By 1980, the situation in Queensland had become so confrontational, that the party was 
disintegrating and had become a laughing stock in the media. Some Queensland 
interviewees stated that they knew at the time that in other states, PR and factional 
arrangements allowed power sharing, in which all perspectives were heard and 
collaboration achieved.441 A major factor prompting the push for reform in Queensland was 
the lack of power sharing, and reformers strongly believed it must be an outcome of 
intervention. 
All (state and federal) ALP election results in Queensland (see Appendix 3), under the 
leadership of the THG/Inner Executive had been dismal for years. The Age editorial on 2 
August 1978 supporting Hayden’s push for a National Executive Inquiry into the 
Queensland Branch, stated: ‘If election results are a partial index of a branch’s health, then 
Queensland is a near terminal case.’442 Even the Queensland 1972 result (when the 
Whitlam Government was elected) was not impressive. The Queensland Senate results in 
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1974 directly contributed to the Whitlam Government’s dismissal.443 Batt stated: ‘The 
National Executive were all aware of the Queensland Branch’s appalling election results, 
their incompetence at getting votes.’444 
The Whitlam Government was devastated at the 1975 election, following Whitlam’s 
dismissal by the Governor-General Sir John Kerr.445 Combe says that the morning after 
the 1975 election, Whitlam phoned saying ‘Tell Bob (Hawke)446 if he wants to be leader, he 
should get a seat.’447 Hawke was angling to enter federal Parliament but did not take the 
seat of Wills until October 1980. After the 1975 election, Bill Hayden was the only ALP 
member returned in Queensland. Whitlam continued as the FPLP leader through to the 
unsuccessful December 1977 election, but then stepped down in favour of Hayden.448 It 
was blatantly clear to Hayden that, after the devastation of 1975, without a stronger 
election result in Queensland, no one could lead the ALP to victory. 
The National Executive of the ALP includes delegates from all states and territories, some 
of whom would have been tentative about any move for intervention worrying if it is 
intervention in Queensland this month will it be my state/territory next month?449 According 
to Batt, John Ducker and Graham Richardson (New South Wales right-wing delegates) 
shared these concerns.450 Also at this time, left-right numbers-games tended to underpin 
decisions, although Batt insisted that during his presidential term he sought consensus on 
the Executive through discussion rather than allowing factional alliances to overlay 
decisions, saying that usually, no vote was taken.451 McMullan explained that the National 
Executive at that time was ‘more fluid than today’ because a number of delegates 
regarded themselves as ‘independents’, including himself.452  
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In March 1977, Hayden tried to gain support from Combe and Hawke to ‘take an interest in 
Queensland’ but it was not forthcoming.453 Batt explains this, saying:  
Hawke was ALP National President (and President of the ACTU) at the time and was 
probably consulting the THG/Old Guard in Queensland. Hawke had an allegiance to 
the THG and was always undermining Queensland intervention. Hawke created a 
conflict always with an eye to him being a future Prime Minister, therefore he was 
never loyal to Hayden.454  
Clearly, Hawke held considerable sway, especially amongst the union-based Executive 
members. There was no support for Hayden amongst the Old Guard leaders in 
Queensland. Jim Fouras explained that the Old Guard Inner Executive and their SPLP 
Caucus members were unbelievably pro-Hawke and anti-Hayden;455 while Bob Gleeson 
confirmed that the THG and AWU supported Lionel Bowen for FPLP leader over 
Hayden.456 These groups all saw Hayden as aligned with Queensland reform. Batt 
summed it up saying: 
If Hawke was not in favour, there would be no numbers for Hayden to move on 
intervention because the party (National Executive) followed Hawke’s views.457  
The balance of power moved around and ‘getting the numbers’ on the National Executive 
to support federal intervention in the Queensland Branch was no easy matter for Hayden.  
By late 1977 the push for reform commenced in earnest amongst the ALP members in 
Queensland. There was great angst from reformers regarding the reversal by the 
THG/Inner Executive of Murphy’s winning plebiscite result in Griffith, and as soon as they 
could practically do so, the day after the December 1977 federal election, enough angry 
members met at Pat Comben’s home at Indooroopilly, to form a steering group to work for 
reform in the Queensland Branch of the ALP. 
Over the following months of 1978, three meetings were held at the Bardon RSL Hall at 
which motions expressed no confidence in the ALP leadership under the THG. By late July 
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1978, following the persistence of Hayden, the National Executive set up an Inquiry 
accepting submissions from members and unions.458 The report back (regarded as ‘limited 
intervention’) was delivered to a packed meeting of ALP members by Batt and others in 
September 1978, but the proposed reforms were structural only, and did not satisfy the 
reformers’ clamour for power sharing.459  
Early 1979 saw the divisive ALP State Conference in Rockhampton where the THG/Old 
Guard would not countenance power sharing in any form. There followed a flood of 
correspondence that unleashed demands for National Executive intervention in the 
Queensland Branch.460 Through all these months, the whole debacle was washed through 
the media with the result that charges were laid by the QCE against those who spoke out. 
Suspensions and expulsions were imposed by the QCE, all of which was laid at the 
National Executive’s door. The closure of three Toowoomba Branches delivered further 
calls for intervention, and further media attention. A mix of SL and Centre Caucus 
reformers formed a deputation to discuss matters with members of the National Executive 
and in February 1980, a rally was held in Brisbane in support of Hayden.461  
Around this time, speaking about the Toowoomba dispute, Hayden made it clear in the 
media that ‘he would not make a judgement call on whether it [intervention] was 
necessary, but it did not help the party to be lurching from one problem to another.’462 The 
possibility of a break-away group (an autonomous Queensland Branch) was canvassed in 
the media when Ben Humphreys confirmed that ‘plans for such a move had already been 
discussed and would be implemented if (Queensland) Labor officials find the terms of 
intervention unacceptable. The proposal reportedly had the backing of a senior Trades 
Hall official.’463 Similarly Senator Ron McAuliffe reportedly ‘canvassed the possibility of 
taking the State branch out of the federal ALP’ along with State Opposition Leader Ed 
Casey.464   
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By the end of February 1980, the National Executive asked Hayden to work with Combe 
and John Button to draw up a proposal for intervention for their meeting to be held on 29 
February and 1 March 1980.465  
The National Executive decision changed the nature of the Queensland Branch. It showed 
the Queensland Branch leaders that they too answered to a higher authority in the ALP. It 
restructured the administration of the branch, investigating the finances and assets. It 
changed the rules enforcing PR (power sharing) and affirmative action. The decision 
stated: 
The National Executive is of the opinion that the general welfare of the Labor 
Movement is affected by the following matters in the Queensland Branch of the Labor 
Party (described as the Australian Labor Party, State of Queensland) (hereinafter 
called ‘the Branch’): 
• the ineffectiveness of the Branch as shown by the level of representation in the 
Federal and State Parliaments; 
• the fact that since July 1978 the National Executive has conducted various and 
lengthy inquiries into the affairs of the Branch and made recommendations as a 
result; 
• the dissention in the Branch, which is widespread and notorious; 
• the public controversy surrounding the disbanding of the Toowoomba Branches 
of the ALP, the purported sale of Radio 4KQ and the financial situation of the 
branch; 
• the failure of the Branch to carry out promptly and in good faith the previous 
decisions of the National Executive... 466 
The ruling stated that pursuant to its authority, the National Executive declared the existing 
party administrative bodies no longer existed and set in their place an Interim 
Administrative Committee, comprising 29 (named) members. The rules were suspended. It 
stated that existing sitting members at all levels of governance would be re-endorsed for 
the next elections and appointed accountants to conduct an audit of the books. The rules 
were to be re-drafted to use PR as the method of selection for elections of more than one 
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position, plebiscites for Branch members only467 and to have regard to the National 
Committee of Inquiry regarding the representation of women.468 
After two days of heated debate, the intervention motion was agreed by eleven votes to 
seven. Those opposing intervention included Lionel Bowen, Graham Richardson, Mick 
Young, Simon Crean (proxy for Hawke),469 and John Ducker (right wing New South Wales 
unionist).470  
The National President and the National Secretary were instructed to go to Brisbane on 3 
March 1980, to confer with the parties.471 Batt explained that he and Combe went to 
Queensland and held a press conference at the airport, to which they invited Burns, then 
the SPLP leader, who had been involved in the Victorian intervention. Burns declined to 
attend. When they visited Breakfast Creek ALP headquarters in Queensland, saying they 
wanted the books of finance and administration, they were asked ‘Would you like the 
books or a smack in the face?’ He and Combe went ahead and installed an Interim 
Administration and sacked the previous officers. The next morning, Batt, Combe and 
Hawke were to have breakfast with the Queensland Senior Vice President Hauenschild, 
but he fell off his chair drunk. The fight about intervention continued for two years.472  
Responses to the National Executive decision fell into two groups: the THG/Old Guard 
infuriated by the decision, determined to hold out in Breakfast Creek and not give an inch 
to the ‘New Guard/Reformers’ whom the THG considered had caused the troubles. The 
Old Guard administration continued to hold all the ALP assets and run the administration 
as they had previously; and the Reformers/New Guard who, like the National Executive, 
had expected the new Interim Administrative Committee and other party organs would 
have a mix of Old and New Guards, now found they were the only ones to deliver the 
federal reform package. The vast majority of ALP members aligned with one group or the 
other, either because of personal involvement or because their branch or union adhered to 
one group. 
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An alternate office was located in Charlotte Street, Brisbane and furnished with whatever 
the good will of members and reform supporting unions could provide. The Interim 
Administrative Committee was formed and Manfred Cross took on the role of Interim 
Secretary. Burns was initially appointed as the new Interim President, but his years of 
loyalty to the THG were too much for him, and he defected back to his Old Guard 
comrades so the position went to Murphy. At this stage, the intervention had happened but 
only the reformers were participating in the new arrangements. 
The SPLP initially responded with anger to the intervention announcement.473 Fouras 
explained that ‘he [Fouras], Bob Gibbs, Terry Mackenroth, and Kev Hooper — the Gang of 
Four — were the only State Caucus members who were pro-reform through all the years 
leading to intervention.’  He also states that: 
Ed Casey, the Leader of the SPLP, unexpectedly called a meeting of Caucus to 
which he [Casey] brought a motion saying Caucus were totally opposed to a 
temporary Administrative Committee being set up by the National Executive.474 
It was only when Fouras jumped to his feet and told them ‘they were a disgrace, they were 
the Gairs of today,’475 and his impassioned threat to take it straight to the media, that the 
SPLP did not proceed.476  Casey and the others must have speedily reviewed their stance 
because on 4 March 1980, Casey wrote to Gerry Jones, State Secretary under the Old 
Guard administration, stating ‘we (SPLP) believe that our role in the present dispute must 
be to take the necessary steps to bring those in disagreement into a situation of 
meaningful negotiation.’477  
A letter to the ALP’s Federal Secretary, Combe was sent on 11 March 1980, signed by 
thirteen (Old Guard) unions which completely rejected intervention and stated that the 
undersigned unions would withdraw support from the National Executive and continue 
their affiliation with the ‘legitimate State Branch of the ALP’.478 At the same time, other 
                                            
473Demetrios	  Fouras	  (Jim)	  AM, Queensland Speaks, 2011, www.queenslandspeaks.com.au/jim-fouras,   
00.30.00 – 00.32.22. This interview has been archived. 
474 Ibid. 
475 A reference to Vince Gair who was expelled from the ALP in 1957, following which the ALP split, with Gair 
establishing the Queensland Labor Party. 
476 Demetrios Fouras (Jim) AM, Queensland Speaks, 2011, www.queenslandspeaks.com.au/jim-fouras,   
00.30.00 – 00.32.22. This interview has been archived. 
477 Copy of letter dated 4 March 1980 to Gerry Jones, State Secretary of the ALP, signed by Leader of the 
Opposition, Edmund Casey. Provided by Terence John Hampson AM. 
478 Letter dated 11 March 1980 to ALP Federal Secretary signed by Queensland State Secretaries of 13 
unions, copy provided by Hon. Manfred Douglas Cross AM. 
 72 
unions (HEF, ATEA, United Firefighters Union, BWIU, and AMWSU) were supportive of 
reform and intervention.479 The union movement was completely divided on this matter. 
The Old Guard ALP leaders then moved to take Supreme Court action, believing that the 
National Executive did not have authority to intervene in the affairs of the Queensland 
Branch. Their action commenced on 30 May 1980.480 All around Queensland, ALP 
branches were deciding which side they were on. The affiliated unions were in the same 
predicament. Many had already established their allegiance over the previous years, but 
for some like the Federated Miscellaneous Workers’ Union, whose incumbent State 
Secretary was Old Guard, while the incoming new State Secretary was an SL (reform 
supporting) member. They resolved the problem by disaffiliating from the ALP for a period, 
while it became clear what the result would be.481 Errol Hodder explained the AWU was 
not affiliated at this time. They decided to wait to see which ways things were resolved so 
as not to pay affiliation fees to one side, only to find they had to be paid again if that side 
didn’t win.482 
The anger at intervention was coupled amongst Old Guard members with genuine 
disbelief that the National Executive483 had any right to intervene in the Queensland 
Branch of the party484. Nick Bos explained that when the Inner Executive sought the legal 
opinion of Cedric Hampson QC, he supported Old Guard views that the Queensland party 
had its origins in the late 1800s, concurrently with the emergence of the Queensland union 
movement, while the federal body was set up years later to formulate federal policy.485  
Added to this, Bos related that Burns had played an important role in the ALP’s 1970 
Victorian intervention and gave his opinion that in intervening, the National Executive was 
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on ‘shaky ground.’486 Ultimately these views were not upheld in the judgement or in the 
appeal. 
The Old Guard’s first legal challenge was heard before Justice Lucas SP. The plaintiffs 
were all senior unionists except their legal advisor Terry Mellifont, the accountant John 
Bird, and Bos a former ETU official, now the State Secretary of the (Old Guard) ALP 
Branch.487 The defendants included many members of the new Interim Administration.488 
The plaintiffs claimed that the rules of the national body ‘have at no material time been 
binding upon the Queensland body.’489 Justice Lucas held that ‘the rules of Federal ALP 
were binding upon Queensland ALP, that the National Executive was acting within its 
powers in making the resolution of March 1, 1980 and gave judgement for the 
defendants.’490 The Lucas decision was handed down at the time that the Interim 
Administration of the party was holding its first State Conference in July 1981. 
However, the Old Guard leadership were not satisfied with the decision, and Clem Jones 
took an appeal to the Full Bench which was heard from 13 – 15 October and 23 November 
1981 and all three judges upheld the Justice Lucas decision.491  
Through the months that followed the intervention decision, the Old Guard administration 
continued on at Breakfast Creek with security provided by the Ships Painters and Dockers 
Union.492 Down at the Charlotte Street offices of the new administration, the same 
activities were being duplicated by the new (Reformers) administration. Murphy had been 
appointed as Interim President, supported by Cross (at that time between terms of office 
as Member for Brisbane), as Interim Secretary and Terry Hampson provided 
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administrative support. The office was largely staffed by volunteers and office equipment 
and materials were similarly scrounged from donors.   
If party members and affiliated unions had hard decisions regarding with which group to 
align, traditional ALP voters in Queensland must have despaired. The media followed 
every move of the two combatant groups with alacrity, well captured by the cartoonists. 
Immediately following the announcement of intervention the possibility of another ‘ALP 
split’ threatened. All commentators agreed the chance of another split was extremely 
likely.493 It was at the time of the lock out (by the Old Guard) that the split threat festered, 
with calls by Fred Nicol, Secretary of the Federated Storemen and Packers Union to form 
a separate party, however senior Old Guard supporters rejected this.494 Things were not 
helped when Bos and Hauenschild were expelled from their ALP (reform supporting) 
branches. The (New Guard) Interim Administration Committee quickly moved to have 
these matters referred to the Disputes Tribunal and wrote to all branches asking them not 
to ‘carry out severe disciplinary actions’ of this nature.495 Although some of their supporters 
advocated a split, Bos said ‘At the back of the Old Guards minds was the spectre of the 
1950s split — the last thing they wanted was another split and another 30 years in the 
wilderness.’496  
Murphy spoke to Peter Charlton saying he:  
tried [by] every means to avoid expulsions and to negotiate with the Old Guard, 
realising that a split would have been catastrophic, not just for the party’s election 
chances that year but also for the foreseeable future... The major achievement of the 
period, which he [Murphy] hoped a future historian would recognise, was that the 
party in fact avoided a split.497  
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Interviewees from all factions spoke about the possibility of a split and some named the 
possible ‘splitters.’ Hauenschild said though, that there was never consideration given to 
the formation of another party.498 
The enforced working together on the elections in late 1980 likely aided reconciliation. 
Hampson speaks of working constantly on these elections with Bos.499 The federal 
election was held in October 1980 and saw a small increase (from 3 to 5) in the number of 
Queensland ALP members returned. However, the state election in November 1980, saw 
two ALP candidates standing in Caboolture (one Old Guard and one New Guard), neither 
of whom was elected. 
State President Murphy sent out a communiqué to the party on 2 February 1981 regarding 
1981 ALP membership tickets.500 He pointed out that for the purposes of ALP continuity 
branch members had until the end of March to renew their tickets with the new 
administration. This of course meant that people aligned with the Old Guard administration 
would not have valid continuity of membership. Similarly, unions were reminded to pay 
their affiliation fees to the new administration. The National Executive was proposing to 
hold a State Conference in late June 1981 and invited Old Guarders Neville Warburton 
and Hauenschild to their Executive meeting in March to discuss arrangements for inclusion 
of their supporters.501 At this time, the legal action was still underway so participation by 
the Old Guard at the Conference did not eventuate. During the conference the Justice 
Lucas decision was handed down endorsing the National Executive’s role and their right to 
intervene.502  
After Clem Jones, on behalf of the Old Guard administration, appealed the Lucas decision, 
the New Administration sought restraining orders to recover shares and property being 
withheld by the Old Guard, but this was set aside pending the appeal decision of the Full 
Bench, expected in October 1981. 503 
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In September 1981, the Interim Administrative Committee decided to re-admit the Old 
Guard unions and the AWU, provided all assets were returned504 and the books handed 
over. Continuity of membership was offered ‘even to those involved in the Supreme Court 
writ, provided Clem Jones withdrew his appeal against the Lucas decision.’505 Clem Jones 
did not withdraw, but it was of no consequence because his appeal was unanimously 
dismissed by the Full Bench in November 1981.506 Also in September 1981, Cross was re-
elected in the seat of Brisbane and his position as Secretary was soon filled by the 
Secretary of the Station Officers Union, Peter Beattie.507    
Errol Hodder came to Brisbane in March 1981, as the Branch Secretary elect of the AWU 
in Queensland.508 He was to take up the position in 1982. He was confronted with what 
was happening in the ALP and advised by Bill Ludwig, that ‘the Old Guard were so on the 
nose, it’s not funny. If the ALP is not careful there will be another split and they could even 
have two offices.’509 Shortly after this the AWU was approached by both Old Guard and 
New Guard, seeking the AWU’s ALP re-affiliation, accompanying which would be a large 
affiliation fee.510 At that time, the AWU wanted to wait and see before committing. 
It became clear to Old Guard appellants that they may personally have to contribute to the 
legal fees that were accumulating.511 Hodder says he consulted with John Black and 
together they came up with a proposal for Hodder to take to the National Executive after 
seeking the approval of the outgoing AWU Branch Secretary, Edgar Williams: the AWU 
was to pay its re-affiliation fee based on its full membership; the National Executive were 
to meet the full costs of the Queensland legal actions; the ceiling was to be lifted on union 
voting rights (voting was pegged at 30,000 whereas the AWU had 50,000 members); 
ensured continuity of membership for the Old Guard supporters; and, the return of the 
party assets.512 
Hodder and Williams outlined the proposal to the Old Guard leaders, and they wished 
Hodder luck. He took his plan to the National Executive, making it clear that his long-term 
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aims were to see both state and federal ALP governments, but stating his concerns of a 
split in Queensland if resolution was not found regarding the intervention impasse.513 At a 
meeting in Sydney, the National Executive accepted the terms of Hodder’s proposal 
except for the lifting of the union voting right quota, but a message from Williams advised 
that the AWU should affiliate on its federal membership (32,000), so Hodder considered he 
had ‘not a bad victory.’514 
The dispute between the Old Guard and the New Guard was formally discontinued on 27 
March 1982. When the ALP held its State Council meeting that month the New Guard and 
the Old Guard, along with the newly affiliated AWU, all took their places. In the end some 
people left the ALP but all the major combatants, all the known and recognisable party 
officials on both sides stayed under the umbrella of the ALP. Gleeson said it was a credit 
to the Old Guard (but also to the New Guard leaders) that the divided party came together 
again without splitting.515 ‘They were all Labor people at heart.’516 
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CHAPTER 6  Focussing on victory  
By 1982 most of the worst feuding and the court cases were over, but the scars remained 
and factional divisions now underpinned many activities.517 Under the leadership of the 
THG, the ALP had been in the (state) electoral wilderness for 25 years. Now the reformed 
Queensland Branch needed to implement change on many fronts. PR provided power 
sharing but it would be delivered through the establishment of many and various factional 
flirtations and alliances, and it took time before the factions settled down to an agreed 
focus on winning government in Queensland. The party’s internal administrative positions 
were selected using PR, but this did not extend to external (public office) positions, and the 
existing SPLP was choked with Old Guard MPs, so new blood would need to be 
introduced and new seats won. But overarching all these issues, the party would have to 
convince electors that it could provide a viable alternate government. 
From outside the ALP other factors were at play: the Coalition, and later the National 
governments had held office since 1957 and the effect of this long term in office gradually 
became evident as the Fitzgerald Inquiry and the media exposed their arrogance, 
corruption, and blissful or deliberate ignorance of Westminster protocols. The Inquiry 
added immeasurably to the possibility of an ALP return to government. This chapter 
investigates why it took so long (from 1980 to 1989) for the ALP to re-group and win 
government. 
The political theorist Robert Michel has observed that the adherents of over-thrown 
oligarchies do not completely disappear, but are absorbed and continue on in an 
amalgamated form.518 This was certainly true for the THG. By early 1982, the reformed 
party was back in the Breakfast Creek headquarters.519 The fruits of reform and 
intervention were being delivered following the 1982 ALP State Conference at the Greek 
Community Centre in South Brisbane. The task of modernising the culture of the ALP 
commenced. At last all factions and warring parties were back in attendance and under 
one roof. The ballot results at that conference saw power sharing and affirmative action in 
internal party ballots for the first time. To deliver these results, members from branches 
and unions had aligned into their new factional groupings (see Appendix 1, Factional 
Nomenclature.) A combined ballot for the four presidential positions saw Dr Denis Murphy 
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(Centre Caucus) elected as ALP President and Jean Davis (Labor Unity), Errol Hodder 
(AWU) and Hughie Williams (SL) took the Vice-Presidential positions.520 Formalised 
factions had moved into full swing, with horse trading and deals aplenty. The SL combined 
their strength at that conference with the Centre Caucus to support Murphy, while the 
returned AWU aligned with the returning Old Guard members. But by the 1983 
conference, the AWU had moved to align with the Centre Caucus. They must have hoped 
this faction would endure because the combined group took the name Centre Majority. 
While the changes in party administrative bodies included affirmative action and PR, it did 
not extend to the selection of candidates for parliamentary or Brisbane City Council office. 
In 1982 the ALP had 25 MLAs from a total of 89 in the Queensland Parliament. Keith 
Wright became SPLP Leader in October that year,521 leading a team including Opposition 
front benchers: Jim Fouras; Bob Gibbs; Terry Mackenroth; Nev Warburton (Deputy 
Leader); Ken Vaughan; Geoff Smith.522 However, the SPLP still needed further injections 
of new blood, and in the years following intervention this slowly took place. 
Early on the same day Malcolm Fraser called the 5 March 1983 federal election, the FPLP 
Caucus dropped Bill Hayden as its leader in favour of Bob Hawke, which pleased 
Queensland’s Old Guard and AWU leaders as both groups were pro-Hawke, blaming 
Hayden as the instigator of the reforms and federal intervention.523 As part of a five per 
cent Australia-wide swing to the Hawke led ALP,524 Queensland’s election results 
improved in the House of Representatives from five in 1980, to ten and in the Senate from 
two to four seats.525 
Queensland electoral arrangements under the Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen Government 
were still weighted heavily in favour of National Party seats. The ALP fielded a formidable 
team of new candidates to stand for the November 1983 state election, many of whom 
stood in Brisbane metropolitan seats (more winnable for the ALP), including Stafford 
(Denis Murphy), Salisbury (Wayne Goss), Windsor (Pat Comben), Kurilpa (Anne Warner), 
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and Ashgrove (Tom Vievers).526 All of these candidates were successful, most were 
reformers, and they took the Opposition front bench positions. The new blood injected 
higher standards of education into the Caucus and commenced delivering the factional 
diversification promised by the reforms. Many saw Murphy as a future leader of the SPLP. 
Without his vision of a reformed party and his steady hand during the conflicts immediately 
following intervention, the ALP may never have forded the chasm. But it was not to 
eventuate as, after winning the election in Stafford, Murphy became gravely ill and during 
the June 1984 ALP State Conference in Townsville, his death from cancer was 
announced. Peter Beattie later described him as ‘the noblest of us all,’ and Terry 
Hampson, speaking to conference as Murphy’s close personal but not factional friend, 
expressed the party’s grief at the loss of one who had fought so hard, for so long to bring 
the party he loved back to government.527  
Also at the 1984 conference, Ian McLean became ALP President using the combined vote 
of the Labor Unity (Old Guard) and SL factions.528 The conference heard a report on 
progress regarding the affirmative action program for women: that 32 per cent of its 
members were women, an improvement in the last four years of five per cent.529 SPLP 
Leader Wright moved to the federal arena in August 1984, leaving his deputy Warburton to 
assume the leadership.530 The Old Guard (Labor Unity) still ‘had the numbers’ to elect one 
of their own.  
The union wing of the labour movement became embroiled in industrial action in February 
1985,531 when the ETU was refused a wage rise for SEQEB electricians, prompting a 
strike. Premier Bjelke-Petersen had been ‘talking tough on industrial relations’ for years 
and seized the opportunity to declare a ‘state of emergency’ on 7 February 1985, sacking 
1100 union electricians and linesmen, and replacing them with non-union contractors.532 
Other unions (including the Municipal Officers Association who covered the station 
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operators) acted in support of the ETU as the strike escalated.533 Many ALP members 
were highly supportive of the ETU and its actions and participated along with the unionists 
in demonstrations and protests around Queensland, but the ALP leaders, particularly 
Warburton, were seen to take an ‘ineffectual two-bob-each-way’ stance,534 backing 
arbitration system resolution.535 This response to the strike brought little credit to the ALP. 
There was outrage from unionists and many workers when Premier Bjelke-Petersen 
stripped the sacked unionists of their superannuation entitlements. The strike collapsed on 
21 February with many sacked workers never returning to their jobs and it was not until 
1990 that Premier Goss announced following the first Labour Day march536 after his 
government’s election that their superannuation entitlements would be returned to the 
SEQEB workers.537 Continuing unity within the Centre Majority was too good to last. Its 
two powerful leaders were Hodder and Beattie. Hodder says that their combined voting 
strength was not delivering the expected results so it was clear that the other part of the 
faction was not holding to their end of the bargain.538 By about February 1985 the faction 
split, but this was formalised in 1986.539 The AWU continued using the factional title Centre 
Majority and the Beattie forces took the factional name Centre Left. 540 The competition for 
supremacy in the centre of the ALP was thick on the ground.541 The SL however, 
continued to stand on the left of all these groups. 
During the Redlands by-election held on 2 November 1985.542 State Secretary Beattie 
stood in the very acrimonious plebiscite against Con Sciacca who won preselection 
allegedly with help from Warburton.543 However, the seat was retained by Paul Clauson for 
the National Party.544 By 1986, Queensland’s electoral redistribution saw the seat 
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boundaries of Kurilpa (Anne Warner) and South Brisbane (Jim Fouras) re-drawn providing 
only one predominantly ALP electorate named South Brisbane.545 The branch stacking 
and other tactics used by some persons in the resulting plebiscite were later examined in 
2000-01 by the Honourable Tom Farquhar Shepherdson, QC in his investigation regarding 
electoral fraud, although it was clear that neither Warner nor Fouras were involved in any 
impropriety.546 Warner won the day and Fouras went quietly into private employment.547 
These ongoing factional disputes aired in the media during plebiscites gave 
Queenslanders little reason to see the ALP as ready to govern.  The sale of 4KQ radio 
station in 1986 ensured that the ALP’s electoral coffers were full548 at a time when there 
was no government funding of a political party’s advertising campaign. 
Once out of the embrace of the Centre Caucus/Centre Left faction, it did not take long for 
the AWU to leap into the welcoming clutches of the SL in mid-1986 in what was called the 
‘unholy alliance’. Hodder, Joy Ardill and McLean were the instigators of the 
arrangement.549 The determination between the two factions was that both sides 
committed to winning back an ALP state government and the deal included that the SL 
Caucus members would support a push by Goss for the SPLP leadership. The agreement 
did not encompass any policy issues and was solely based upon support in electorates 
and in ballots, so the SL was able to maintain its left stance on policy.550 Hodder stated 
that ‘the various leadership groups had been trying for [30] years to get the ALP to office, 
and it was about time for someone else to have a try.’551 
The party had hoped for a change of fortunes at the 1 November 1986 state election, but 
support slumped from 32 to 30 seats. The reasons for this were identified as a huge 
Nationals advertising campaign in the closing days of the election and552 the ‘five-star mal-
apportioned electoral boundaries,’553 added to which the continuing factional in-fighting 
likely caused many Queenslanders to decide that the ALP did not look like an alternative 
government. Following this election defeat yet another ‘deal’ was stitched up amongst 
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some Caucus members to push for a unity ticket to deliver new faces onto the 
predominantly Labor Unity (Old Guard) front bench.554 An indicator of the toxic quality of 
factional dealings caused the National Executive to again intervene in a limited manner to 
address the plebiscite in the federal seat of Bowman in which sitting MP Len Keogh was 
ousted in favour of Con Sciacca, however the compromise deal collapsed.555 It was taking 
time for the ALP factions to settle down to develop harmonious relationships. 
Still State Secretary at this time, Beattie was gagged along with Hodder when the party 
took the view that Beattie consistently grabbed the media limelight making it difficult for the 
SPLP Caucus members to get a hearing.556 Beattie brought no credit to himself from party 
members for his bizarre secret meetings with the failing Premier, Bjelke-Petersen.557 After 
a first unsuccessful challenge to Warburton in October 1987, Goss became leader of the 
SPLP on 2 March 1988, welding his team into a winning force, as Anne Jones wrote 
‘Labor began to look like a real alternative government.’558 Results for Queensland in the 
1987 federal election were strong, with four new seats gained,559 probably the first 
indicator that things had turned a corner for the ALP.  Party office holders now focussed on 
providing good administration, developing new policies and all factions and segments of 
the ALP united around the concept of winning government.  
By July 1988 Beattie was intent on winning a seat in parliament and the State Secretary 
position went to Hampson560 with Wayne Swan as his deputy.561 Lindsay Jones explains 
that, for the first time, the ALP Policy Committees produced policy documents for every 
possible area of government and organised a special Women’s Policy launch.562 They also 
approached extra parliamentary organisations such as the Wilderness Society for support 
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in the coming election.563 The ALP had re-written its rules, participation in candidate 
plebiscites was for ALP members only, candidates were better qualified than in previous 
years, and the party was employing modern electoral techniques. A well devised campaign 
was under way. 
In fact, at last the ALP phoenix, left for dead after the 1957 split, was showing signs of life. 
The ALP was aided hugely in this revival when Fitzgerald’s report on the ‘Commission of 
Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct’ identified 
widespread corruption and was tabled in parliament in July 1989 making over 100 
recommendations regarding electoral and criminal justice, and Queensland Police Force 
reforms.564  
But there were further forces at work. The Country Party/Liberal Coalition, then the 
Nationals governing alone, had held office in Queensland for 30 years and as with most 
long-term governments, by the mid-1980s, the decay was blatantly obvious. The Coalition 
became unstable when, in August 1983, Terry White and six Liberal back-benchers 
crossed the floor to support a vote regarding the establishment of a parliamentary public 
accounts committee, which prompted White’s sacking from his Ministerial position by Llew 
Edwards.565  White successfully challenged Edwards for the leadership of the Liberals, 
following which Edwards announced he would not stand at the next election.566 Bjelke-
Petersen then formed a minority government because he refused to work in coalition with 
the Liberals under White’s leadership.567 After the October 1983 election, coalition was no 
longer necessary when Bjelke-Petersen included two defecting Liberals in the Nationals 
Ministry to govern alone.568 The responses of the Cabinet and the Premier had become 
more confronting and strident through the 1980s, and evidence of corruption was leaking 
out on many sides. Wanna and Arklay say that ‘during 1987 the Bjelke-Petersen 
government began to implode.’569 The Premier ‘succumbed to a kind of manic grandiosity 
that climaxed in the delusory and self-destructive “Joh for Canberra” push [that ultimately] 
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disintegrated.’570 Matters were not helped with widely publicised brawling between the 
National Party President Sir Robert Sparkes and the Premier in late 1987.571  
Allegations of corruption were rife, both in relation to the police force and on a wider scale. 
The ABC ran a Four Corners program in May 1987, produced by Chris Masters, entitled 
‘The Moonlight State’ which alleged serious corruption existed in the Queensland Police 
Force involving payments from brothel owners to corrupt police.’572  At the time, the 
Premier was travelling the state, pursuing his Canberra dream and Deputy Premier Bill 
Gunn, after failing to secure the services of a number of right-of-centre lawyers, appointed 
Tony Fitzgerald QC to head an inquiry, expected to take some few weeks to examine the 
allegations.573 It ‘morphed into a Royal Commission’ which saw MPs jailed,574 brought 
down a corrupt police commissioner, exposed the dishonest network of graft run by the so-
called ‘rat pack’ senior police officers and eventually led to the adoption of a raft of 
administrative laws and a substantial change in the electoral laws of the Queensland.’575 
The report was tabled in Parliament in July 1989.576 
Amid rumours of growing National Party disunity,577 Premier Bjelke-Petersen was refusing 
to meet with his ministers, pursuing steps to sack Ministers he no longer trusted and when 
that did not eventuate, demanding the resignations of these men who refused to budge. 
Towards the end, when confronted with advice that ‘the National Party won’t be happy with 
this process,’ he responded ‘I am the National Party.’578 He had ‘become convinced that 
he alone was responsible for the (Nationals) electoral successes.’579  
The National Party’s Management Committee pushed its Parliamentary National Party into 
meeting on 26 November 1987 to resolve the leadership issue.580 Bjelke-Petersen fought 
against resigning the Premiership to the very end, but finally signed a letter of resignation 
dated 1 December 1987.581 As a condition before swearing in the new Premier Ahern, the 
Governor required a vote of confidence from the Queensland Parliament, which was 
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delivered on 2 December 1987.582 Ahern then led the Nationals through turbulent times,583 
promoting a strong reform agenda but receiving diminishing support from his own team, as 
Paul Reynolds describes ‘[Ahern’s] entire parliamentary career was underscored by 
constant battles with hostile forces within the National Party.’584 The delivery of the 
Fitzgerald Report in July 1989 added to the disquiet surrounding the government and in 
September 1989, Russell Cooper ousted Ahern to become Premier, but his term in that 
office concluded with the December election.585  
The extent to which the events within the National Party and the Fitzgerald Inquiry, aided 
and abetted the election of the Goss Labor Government are difficult to measure, suffice to 
say their impact awoke some Queenslanders who had been content for years to 
countenance the questionable behaviour and governance meted out by Premier Bjelke-
Petersen and his government. These matters gave the Labor Party a cause around which 
to mount their election campaign and it provided a basis for comparison of the contenders 
— the Nationals depicted as in disarray, feuding, tired, past their use-by date, with the ALP 
promoting its younger, better educated contenders. That Ahern, probably the brightest light 
the Nationals had to offer, had been quickly passed over as Premier by his less-educated 
parliamentary colleagues, could only enhance the credit of Labor’s young lawyer leader, 
Goss. 
The ALP’s campaign director in the 1989 state election, Wayne Swan was later 
interviewed by Anne Jones who quotes Swan saying ‘the issue was establishing the Goss 
team as a credible alternative. The May 1989 Merthyr by-election was a watershed — the 
ALP won with an eight per cent swing.’ She writes that in the weeks prior to the general 
(December 1989) election, a fax circulated around Brisbane’s conservative law firms 
saying ‘No pain, no gain — vote for Goss and Labor.’586 Possibly this tactic was to take 
advantage of Goss’ legal connections or to court a new constituency, but certainly the ALP 
campaign was leaving no stone unturned. 
On 2 December 1989 the election results came in and after 32 years in the wilderness, 
contending against electoral mal-apportionment and gerrymandering, the ALP won a 
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convincing majority. From a total of 89 seats: 54 went to the ALP; 27 to the Country Party; 
and, eight to the Liberal Party. At the victory party at the Wellers Hill Bowls Club, the 
Combined Unions Choir sang the favourite ‘Jack the Bagman’ and ‘Solidarity Forever’ 
followed by ‘The Red Flag.’ The whole room broke into long, sustained applause when the 
new Premier Wayne Goss and his wife Roisin, entered the room. 
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CHAPTER 7 A blueprint for political renewal 
I have examined the 1980 intervention of the ALP National Executive in the Queensland 
Branch, specifically covering the causes of intervention, the combatants, and the major 
changes following intervention. Previous chapters have dealt in detail with all three. This 
chapter identifies what intervention and the reform years within the ALP finally delivered. It 
points to some conclusions regarding the functioning of the ALP that became clear during 
the intervention years that continue to have relevance today. Also, the chapter sums up 
the contribution of this thesis, including the new interview evidence, to our understanding 
of the ALP in Queensland from 1957 to 1989. 
The study of the Queensland ALP published in 1989 by Fitzgerald and Thornton587 has 
been a significant source for this thesis. At the end of their long and substantial work these 
authors badly misjudged the state of the party and its capacity to return to power. They 
acknowledged that the result for the Queensland ALP in the 1987 federal election which 
saw both Nationals and Liberals lose seats when four new ALP MPs were elected (see 
Appendix 3) was ‘a triumph’588 compared with other states. They should have recognised 
the eight percent swing to the ALP in the Merthyr by-election in May 1989589 indicated that 
Queenslanders’ attitudes to the ALP were changing. But they bleakly conclude in their final 
chapters:  
the electoral system remains a major factor [in the task confronting the ALP]… [The 
ALP is] in no shape to take advantage of the growing National Party disarray and the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry [made] little impact on the Labor vote… [The ALP in Queensland] 
has become the epitome of destructive factionalism and irresponsible machine 
politics and the failure to reform the [state] parliamentary party [is] the chief failure of 
reform… In 1988, Labor faces being in opposition for the foreseeable future.590 
Fitzgerald and Thornton appear oblivious to the degree of change that had taken place 
within the ALP administration and the SPLP which saw a new, strong, united 
administration delivering policies across all areas of interest, collaborations with extra 
parliamentary organisations which produced strong new policies and ensured policy 
launches attractive to both ALP members and a wider span of interested electors, the 
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promotion of articulate well educated younger candidates, a sense of unity and purpose 
amongst ALP members and MPs, united behind Wayne Goss, the new SPLP leader.  
Amongst this change the ALP had embraced affirmative action and for the first time 
developed policy specifically for women. Factionalism had proven very divisive since 
intervention, but the best example of the degree of collaboration and cooperation newly 
evident before that 1989 campaign would surely be the (unholy) alliance developed 
between the two most extreme factions — the AWU (extreme right) and the SL (extreme 
left) whose shared and declared goal was to see Labor back in office. Part of their cross-
factional agreement hinged on instilling new blood onto the front bench of the SPLP, and 
the resultant 1989 factional spread of ALP Caucus members shows Fitzgerald and 
Thornton’s concluding comments were not well founded. Their comments about the 
electoral gerrymander/malapportionment remained true and were identified as concerns by 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry. In their assessment regarding the impact of that Inquiry and the 
likely impact of the National Party implosion, Fitzgerald and Thornton underestimated the 
desire for change among many Queenslanders. These two factors added to the electoral 
environment that saw the ALP romp into office on 2 December 1989. 
Bowden, in ‘Modern Labor in Queensland: Its Rise and Failings’591 gives credit to the 
transformation brought about by the 1980 intervention in Queensland Labor, pointing to 
the subsequent decades of successful ALP Government as intervention’s most notable 
result, as does this thesis. Similarly, Bowden and I both portray the reform movement in 
Queensland as paralleling the emergence of ‘modern Labor’ under Gough Whitlam in the 
southern states in the 1970s.592 However, while the focus of Bowden’s work is the 
emergence of ‘modern Labor’ in Queensland, the focus of this thesis is specific to 
the 1980 intervention. This is an important difference because it allows a much more in-
depth analysis of the complex process required to bring about significant change within a 
political party.  
Because he focuses on the years 1978 – 1998, Bowden misses a critical early contributor 
to intervention and the cause of so much subsequent THG angst and mistrust — the 1957 
Queensland ALP split. The atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion generated around the 
split never abated, leaving the THG consistently watchful of new members, and refusing to 
share power. This was spelled out in many of the interviews. Also the longer view I take 
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allows for consideration of party characteristics developed from the early days such as the 
influence of the AWU, the ready acceptance of dominant leaders, the policy focus around 
standard of living rather than social issues. These all impacted through the intervention 
years. 
Writing with the hind-sight of more than thirty years since intervention, Bowden argues that 
power in the ALP moved from blue-collar union leaders to the largely ‘self-serving factions 
and university educated apparatchiks’ but still incorporated links to the old blue collar 
working class.593 A ‘union-controlled party’ had been replaced by ‘a faction-controlled 
party’ in his view.594 He suggests that across all factions the university educated 
apparatchiks (holding positions within unions) took control. However, none of this was 
apparent in 1989. By 2013, when he wrote his article, almost every area of human 
endeavour (outside the ALP) has been penetrated by its share of university graduates, 
including the unions and all the ALP factions. 
The vehicle that made these changes possible, Bowden claims, and I agree, was 
proportional representation. However, whereas Bowden concludes it delivered a ‘faction 
controlled party’ in contrast to the THG oligarchy, I point out that in 1989, reformers saw 
proportional representation as a democratising structural change which facilitated power-
sharing in a party bogged down in a first-past-the post balloting system that had delivered 
power to only one group for decades. In fact, whatever structural arrangements the ALP 
selects, over time, those seeking power will find ways to manipulate them. 
Bowden quotes from Murphy595 that before intervention the THG blue-collar unions had 
oligarchic control of the party, and this thesis has established that their absolute control of 
the party combined with first-past-the-post ballots meant the THG won everything. Whilst 
he is critical of the ‘faction controlled party’ that has developed since 1980, nowhere in his 
article does Bowden actually claim that it delivers oligarchic leadership. The ‘controlling 
factions’ are still led in large measure by unionists but the real change is that those leading 
unionists are now themselves university educated. The factions may control the ALP but 
the unions control the factions. Like Bowden, I demonstrate that since 1989, factions 
played an increasingly dominant role in the ALP (see Appendix 1) but not oligarchical 
control. There are a number of reasons for this: the first is that since 1989 power has very 
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clearly been exercised by some ALP leaders (state and federal) even against the wishes 
of their own factions. In practice and over time, power moves around the various entities 
and combinations of entities in the ALP. Huge upheavals occur from time to time when 
branch members vote for delegates delivering a new factional grouping to Conference 
leadership with a resultant flow-on effect to administrative bodies of the ALP. The second 
reason is that, since intervention, factions consistently need to combine strength with other 
factions or with floating independents to achieve their goal on an issue, a ballot or a vote. 
No faction has continuous control of the party. That the ALP has become a ‘faction 
controlled party’ is a direct outcome of proportional representation but in practice, that is 
more about democracy in action, than oligarchy.  
This thesis is grounded in the testimonies of people who were there at the time — a 
people-focused approach. Using Arrowsmith’s words, I ‘draw on oral testimony of 25 
activists to allow their cohort to articulate their individual intervention experiences.’596 
Remembering and relating their involvement allowed them to expose experiences 
otherwise hidden from history. Where Bowden views the era through a wide screen, my 
thesis focuses more on the people and events around the 1980 intervention. Also, this 
thesis differs from Bowden’s work in considering the style and personalities of individual 
leaders and their associates and the important impacts these had on the years under 
question. No such analysis is offered elsewhere.   
The following issues emerge as a blueprint for the renewal of an ageing political party. 
They are drawn from intervention events and interviewee observations. 
Move with the times: Most of those interviewed for this thesis stressed the need for the 
ALP to ‘move with the times,’ continually refreshing party policies, reforming its practices, 
listening to the community it serves and pulling into its orbit, interest groups of like mind. 
The positive result of the ‘broad church’ is that at elections, a wider group are supporting 
the party. However, in this ‘broad church’ or ‘umbrella’ model, there will always be people 
with a wide spectrum of policy positions, and the negative result of this is the potential for 
internal conflict. To manage that conflict, PR was introduced as part of the intervention 
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package. At that time, Georges believed PR should obviate any further splits (such as 
1957), and to date that has held true.597  
Power sharing is critical: The introduction of PR did deliver power into the hands of the 
factions in 1980. The basis for difference between the 1980 and the more current Bowden 
assessment of factional power reflects the determined commitment expressed both by 
factional598 and individual party599 members in 1989, of putting the interests of the party 
ahead of the interests of the faction. McMullan says that ‘PR was intended to provide 
flexibility but has succumbed to rigidity, a problem the next round of reform must 
address.’600 Perhaps the recent Queensland election result would challenge his comment. 
Identify where power resides: As this thesis shows, within the ALP power moves around 
at all times between the following bodies: the parliamentary leaders, the parliamentary 
Caucus, party administration, the unions, factions and the ALP members. Strong ALP 
leaders tend to control all or most of these various sectors. Who is in control at any 
particular time depends on many factors including if the party is in government or out. 
When out of office the ALP is more idealistic, developing aspirational policies approved by 
members at conferences. When in office the parliamentary wing find themselves much 
more constrained when prioritising matters upon which they legislate. In office, power can 
drift (or be hijacked) to the leadership. Most ALP operators are adept at forging alliances to 
achieve power (for elections or on policy matters) and ‘counting the numbers’ is a highly 
and widely developed skill. 
Leadership: Journalist Greg Sheridan argues that outstanding ALP leaders bring a much 
wider following to the ALP, ‘broadening its base, bringing in new supporters, energising 
community idealism and convincing people who don’t vote Labor that they are leaders for 
the whole community. They modernise Labor.’601 Managing the internal dynamics within 
the party also requires a leader who understands the party and has sufficient backers or 
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allegiances to demand loyalty. Without these skills many ALP leaders come adrift. Former 
New South Wales Liberal leader John Brogden602 has observed: 
Ultimately, the pace of progress is measured in the success or failure of leaders to 
communicate why change is necessary and how it will benefit the community.603  
The failure to communicate effectively to party members and the electorate is often the 
undoing of a party’s chances, as is an undisciplined, disunited party. This was 
demonstrated during the years leading to intervention. 
The major contribution of this thesis responds to the claim ‘there are no major studies of 
Queensland Labor since 1957.’604 It assists in closing that gap and provides a unique 
participant’s view of events, attitudes and outcomes of intervention adding flesh to the 
factual bones of events during intervention. This thesis is grounded on existing primary 
and secondary sources but brings new facts and interpretations to light by using 25 oral 
history interviews with significant, influential ‘insider’ participants in the 1980 intervention to 
add fresh factual information. The thesis uses the interviews as sources but interprets and 
analyses all of the available material to construct the narrative. The interviews deliver a 
testimonial archive of participant experiences contributing to a vital and unexplored 
segment of ALP history in Queensland. No other existing work focuses specifically on 
these events or draws on publicly available participant interviews created specifically for 
the thesis, in this manner.  
Eighteen recordings are accessible on the Queensland Speaks website and the others 
have been archived for accessibility. Readers are able to absorb the text and also listen to 
interviewee accounts which reveal rich details, nuances and individual perceptions 
regarding intervention which do not exist elsewhere. The recordings allow first-hand 
comparisons of how events impacted upon the different participants. While the interviews 
are specific to these intervention events, they include within their scope contributory 
events over the years 1957 – 1989. The complexity and impacts of events and 
relationships is highlighted through the testimonies allowing a deeper level of 
understanding of the topic. 
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Using these oral histories to produce a thesis about the 1980 intervention places value on 
the interviewees’ own accounts. Because of the number of people interviewed these 
testimonies have also been measured against primary sources, where available and 
sometimes differences in both memory and interpretations have been identified. 
The thesis covers the broad sweep of ALP history in Queensland, identifying the factors 
both inside and outside the party that contributed to the 1970s push for reform. It outlines 
the role played by personalities, societal and demographic changes, factions, and broad-
scale environmental influences that all played a part in delivering a renewed ALP. 
Those years were the pivotal period during which an ailing, demoralised party was 
renewed and reinvigorated by an influx of enthusiastic idealistic new members, demanding 
and achieving a reformed ALP by re-inventing core ALP values through a time of electoral 
downturn.  
The most lasting and significant outcome of reform and intervention must be that it 
delivered a renewed, re-invigorated party that went on to govern Queensland for the next 
23 years (less the two years of Coalition Government 1996 – 1998) and has now been re-
elected in late January 2015. Part of this process involved the expansion of its 
membership beyond its traditional union base. Clearly this was for survival, given that 
Queensland union membership has been in steady decline since the 1960s,605 and that it 
was no new thing for the ALP to ‘win the suffrage of other groups.’606 
Historians Dyrenforth (a former regular speech writer for the ALP) and Bongiorno, wrote in 
June 2011 of the party’s long history and its ability to re-invent itself: 
Political parties do come and go, and Labor’s demise has been confidently predicted 
before. But Labor has endured because it has not ignored the transformation of 
Australia. Indeed, at every point in its history, Labor renewed itself by examining, 
restating and sometimes redefining its fundamental goals of democracy, equality and 
social justice. Its ability to survive the next century however will depend on how it 
responds to challenges at least as daunting, and failures as depressing as any faced 
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by the men and women who, during the past 120 years, have made its cause their 
own.607 
On the morning of 3 December 1989, the Queensland Branch of the ALP, left for dead 
after the 1957 split, had been slowly reformed and renewed and had finally won office. The 
reformers had inched their way towards a more democratic party, more modern and more 
inclusive in its outlook. The party could now more effectively appeal to women and white 
collar voters, vital as its traditional blue collar union base — in both urban and agricultural 
industries — continued to decline. Premiers Goss, Beattie and Bligh all benefited from this 
reforming legacy. Whether the ALP in future can re-invent itself against a backdrop of an 
increasingly casualised, non-unionised, technology-driven work force remains to be seen.  
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APPENDIX 1 
FACTIONAL NOMENCLATURE 1970s AND 1980s 
Factions are amorphous groups of people and/or unions who coalesce usually: with 
mutual agreement and collaboration on policy; because of personal friendships or family 
allegiances; or, to ‘get the numbers’ to ensure their people are elected in ballots. 
Individuals and unions change their factional allegiance from time to time. Over time, 
factions may change their positions on policy and other issues and may forge lasting or 
short-term alliances with other factions. The following document provides an overview of 
factional arrangements in the Queensland ALP from about 1970 to about 1986. 
BACKGROUND: (1) THE TRADES HALL GROUP AND (2) THE REFORM GROUP 
After the 1957 Australian Labor Party (ALP) ‘split’ in Queensland, the Australian 
Workers’ Union (AWU) disaffiliated from the party in 1959. Control passed to the left-
leaning ALP Inner Executive referred to here as the Trades Hall Group (THG). In the 
1970s, this group and their followers became known to ALP members as the Old Guard 
but subsequently took the factional name Labor Unity. 
Generational and workforce changes in the 1960s and 1970s had helped drive Whitlam’s 
ascent to government and he embraced change, welcoming a ‘new type’ of member into 
the ALP. However, in Queensland these new members were looked on askance by the 
THG, and rumbles of dissent commenced as the new members developed into an 
amorphous reforming bloc or Reform Group in opposition to the THG by the late 1970s. 
The Reform Group were never really a faction, but the group was actively opposed to the 
Old Guard leaders, particularly at the 1979 ALP Rockhampton State Conference. At that 
conference people recognised there were two elements amongst the Reformers, the 
Socialist Left (SL) and those who later formed a separate faction, the Centre 
Caucus.Together the two groups continued to agitate for reform. This cross-factional 
alliance remained solid until after the 1980 intervention.   
On 1 March 1980, the ALP National Executive intervened into the affairs of the 
Queensland Branch. The THG/Old Guard refused to recognise the intervention, 
maintaining ownership of all party assets. Alternate offices were established to house the 
new administration, set up under the intervention decision and the new administrative body 
(including both SL and Centre Caucus members) became known as the New Guard. 
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Proportional representation (PR) and affirmative action (AA) were conditions of 
intervention.  
In 1981, after unsuccessful court proceedings instigated by the THG/Old Guard against 
the intervention, settlement was achieved. The warring parties (the THG/Old Guard, the 
SL, the Centre Caucus and the AWU which re-affiliated in the settlement deal) all came 
together in the reformed Queensland Branch of the ALP.  
(1) TRADES HALL GROUP/OLD GUARD TOOK THE FACTIONAL NAME LABOR 
UNITY   
Politically: With senior factional leaders almost exclusively drawn from industrially left 
wing unions, through the 1950s and into the 1960s, this faction comprised traditional left 
wing and sometimes communist sympathisers. Through the late 60s, the THG/Old Guard 
took a more centre position on social issues although the unions remained left on industrial 
matters being prepared to take direct action. They had almost exclusive coverage of the 
State Parliamentary Labor Party (SPLP) front bench into the 1980s. 
Policy stance: Left on wages, industrial and living conditions; centre to right on social 
issues. 
Characterise: Older male, blue collar union officials and members who were very anti-
academic.   
Members: Jack Egerton; Harry Hauenschild; Tom Burton; Tom Burns; Ed Casey; Bob 
Henricks; Nick Bos; Neal Kane; Jack Houston; Clem Jones; Jean Davis.. 
Unions: PKIU, ETU; WWF; FSPU; BLF. 
Alliances: The THG/Old Guard were traditionally opposed to the AWU and claimed to 
oppose all right wingers however they had strong support from the AWU’s Edgar Williams 
when opposing intervention. In 1979 they relied on John Ducker (right-wing New South 
Wales ALP President and National Executive member), for support in opposing 
intervention on the National Executive. Many members had Masonic connections. After the 
1981 intervention settlement, this group took on the name Labor Unity and supported the 
AWU’s (unsuccessful) push for the Presidency against Denis Murphy in 1982.  
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Summed up: The THG/Old Guard took the factional name Labor Unity. They were 
originally left but from the 1970s moved to the centre, taking a conservative stance on 
social issues. 
(2) REFORM GROUP/NEW GUARD WAS NOT A FACTION in the current sense, but a 
loose coalition of branch and union members who came together through the 1970s, 
focussed on reforming the ALP to win government, achieve fairer power sharing and more 
progressive policies. They were united in their opposition to the THG/Old Guard. Bill 
Hayden, then the Opposition Leader, had close links to senior reformers and championed 
reform on the ALP National Executive. 
Politically: The Reformers were all progressive but not united on policy. Once they 
achieved intervention, reformers went off to factions suiting their policy stance: either the 
SL or the Centre Caucus. 
Policy stance: Progressive on civil liberties, abortion, street marches, education, women’s 
rights, and industrial issues. 
Characterise: Mix of men and women, blue and white collar unionists, academics. 
Members: Denis Murphy; Peter Beattie; George Georges; Joe Harris; Wilf and Joy Ardill; 
Bill Hayden; Terry Hampson; Ian McLean; Anne Warner; Cath Rafferty; Manfred and 
Barbara Cross; Sue Yarrow; Mike Reynolds; Rob Whiddon; Madeleine McPherson. 
Unions: BWIU, ATEA. 
Summed up: The Reform Group/New Guard was not a faction, but a group of progressive 
party reformers.   
(3) SOCIALIST LEFT FACTION (SL) following the 1978 Bardon RSL reform meetings, a 
group of left aligned unionists met in about July, in the Brisbane Trades Hall to discuss the 
formation of a left faction. By September the first meeting of a wider group including both 
unionists and branch members had taken place. These left leaning reformers had been 
participating in meetings of the Reform Group. At 1979 Rockhampton State Conference, 
the group coagulated around George Georges who led the street-march and civil liberties 
struggles at that time. They wanted better power sharing, to deliver strong left policies in 
the ALP, and were sometimes seen as communist sympathisers. After 1989 the SL 
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continued to ally with other factions from time to time and itself split into ‘Hard Left’ and 
‘Soft Left’ factions during the 1990s. 
Politically: Left on both industrial and on social issues. 
Policy stance: They took a progressive left stance, supporting street marches, civil 
liberties, anti-uranium mining, abortion and environment policies. 
Characterise: SL had a mix of blue and white collar union and branch members, with 
strong support for and from women and included academics and ‘greenies’ all looking for 
strong left policies. 
Members: George Georges; Joe Harris; Wilf and Joy Ardill; Ian McLean; Anne Warner; 
Hamish Linacre; Alice Cavanagh; Sue Yarrow; Terry Hampson; Cath Rafferty; Norma and 
Lindsay Jones 
Unions: ATEA; FMWU; BWIU; AMIEU; AMWU; HEF 
Alliances: The SL allied with Centre Caucus reformers until about 1981. Then had various 
alliances under the PR rules including the ‘Unholy alliance’ with the AWU in mid 1986 to 
win state government, support Goss leadership, achieve government, and secure a more 
representative factional spread on the front bench but this did not include any collaboration 
on policy.  
Summed up: The Socialist Left took a left to hard left position. 
CENTRE CAUCUS FACTION included core instigators of reform. The faction formally 
announced its existence in August 1979. Some members held senior positions of 
leadership in the reformed Queensland branch. Over the years before the 1989 Goss 
government, the Centre Caucus morphed into: a) the Centre Majority when it joined with 
the AWU; then after that split, renamed their faction b) the Centre Left using the same 
name as their associates in the federal Centre faction. Since 1989 the group has 
continued mergers and name changes from time to time. 
Politically: The Centre Caucus took a centre line and was very open to advantageous 
alliances. It was very driven to see power sharing, administrative reform and proportional 
representation. 
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Policy stance: The Centre Caucus was progressive to middle-of-the-road on policy, 
supportive of women and environmental issues, tended towards supporters rather than 
street marchers. 
Characterise: The faction included a mix of men and women, strongly branch oriented 
with limited union affiliation. Centre Caucus included academics. 
Members: Denis Murphy; Peter Beattie; Manfred and Barbara Cross; Rob Whiddon; 
Madeleine McPherson; Gailene Harrison. 
Unions: ARU; Station Officers. 
Alliances: The Centre Caucus allied with SL as the Reform Group until intervention 
delivered proportional representation. In June 1983, an uneasy alliance called the Centre 
Majority formed between the Centre Caucus and the AWU surviving until about 1986 
when Beattie took his troops to form the Centre Left.  
Summed up: The Centre Caucus and their various iterations were always middle of the 
road/centre. 
AUSTRALIAN WORKERS’ UNION FACTION (AWU) is a long-standing power bloc or 
faction in its own right since the earliest origins of the ALP. In the lead-up to intervention 
the AWU was not affiliated to the ALP but individual AWU members continued to play an 
active role. The union has strong infrastructure through regional Queensland. The AWU 
played an instrumental role in settling the intervention stand-off between the Old Guard 
and the New Guard and a part of the settlement deal centred on the 1981 re-affiliation of 
the AWU. The union is traditionally particularly strong in Queensland. 
Politically: In the early 1900s the AWU included many left-wingers but as the century 
progressed the union became more conservative, and was strongly anti-communist and 
right leaning by the 1950s. The AWU remains the most conservative faction eg. favouring 
uranium mining. 
Policy stance: Conservative, traditionally a strong rural focus, opposed to abortion, pro-
uranium mining. 
Characterise: Traditionally the AWU has ‘had the numbers’ in the ALP in Queensland. 
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Members: Edgar Williams; Errol Hodder; John Black; Bill Ludwig; John Hogg; Bob 
Gleeson; Deidre Swan. 
Unions: AWU, SDAEA;  
Alliances: Traditionally in competition with the THG, but the AWU has allied with them 
from time to time. In 1983, the AWU allied with Centre Caucus to form the Centre Majority 
but broke out of that arrangement, retaining the name for a while. In 1986, with the SL it 
formed an ‘unholy alliance’ to win state government and take more front bench seats in 
parliament and secure SL support for Goss as SPLP leader, but there was no policy 
alignment involved. 
Summed up: The AWU faction has always been hard right. 
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APPENDIX 2 
COMPARISON OF INTERVIEWEES IN FACTIONS (1980 – 1989) 
An analysis of interviewees stating: Table A: faction, name, gender, birth year and place, 
father's occupation; mother's occupation; religion; place of residence at time of 
intervention, Table B: faction, name, gender, primary school; high school; university; first 
job; I am included in both lists. 
Table A 
# Name (Gender) Birth Year & 
Location 
Father & 
Mother’s Work 
Religion Residence at 
Intervention 
 SOCIALIST LEFT 
1 ARDILL, 
Lorraine Joy (F) 
1939 
Melbourne 
F: Horticultural 
instructor/Home 
Duties 
M: Home Duties 
Nil Tugun 
2 ARDILL, Wilfred 
Granville (Wilf) 
(M) 
1932 Brisbane F: Farmer 
M: Farmer and 
home duties 
Nil Tugun 
3 HAMPSON, 
Terrence (M) 
1935 
Toowoomba 
F: Fire-fighter, 
carpenter 
M: Home duties 
Nil Bald Hills 
4 JONES, Lindsay 
Gordon Bauer 
(M) 
1939 Blackall F: Shearer 
M: Teacher 
then home 
duties 
Nil Toowoomba 
5 JONES, Norma 
Alice (F) 
1950 
Toowoomba 
F: Optical 
mechanic 
M: Home duties 
Nil Toowoomba 
6 McLEAN, Ian 
(M) 
1934 Sydney F: 
Administration 
Officer 
M: Home duties 
Nil Bracken Ridge 
7 REYNOLDS, 
Michael Francis 
(Mike) (M) 
1946 Manly, 
NSW 
F: Cook, pastry 
chef 
M: Home duties 
Nil Townsville 
8 WARNER, Anne 
Marie (F) 
1945 
Lucknow, India 
F: Journalist 
M: School 
teacher 
Nil West End 
9 YARROW, 
Susan Terrencia 
(Sue) (F) 
1947 Miles F: Grazier 
M: Governess 
then home 
duties 
Nil Oxley 
 CENTRE CAUCUS 
10 BEATTIE, Peter  
(M) 
1952 Sydney Aged 7, he was 
sent to Atherton 
to live with his 
Anglican Milton 
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pensioner 
maternal 
grandmother. 
11 CROSS, 
Barbara (F) 
1931 Dalby F: Stationary 
engine driver 
M: Home duties 
Nil Rainworth 
12 CROSS, 
Manfred 
Douglas (M) 
1929 Brisbane F: Telegraphist 
M: Dress maker 
Anglican Rainworth 
13 FOURAS, 
Demetrious 
(Jim)  (M) 
1939 Patras, 
Greece 
F: Senior public 
servant 
M: Home duties 
Nil Mt Gravatt 
14 HAMILL, David 
John (M) 
1957 Ipswich F: Railways 
worker 
M: Home duties 
Uniting 
Church 
Ipswich 
15 HAYDEN, 
William George 
(Bill) (M) 
1933 Brisbane F: Piano tuner 
M: Home duties 
Nil Ipswich 
16 WHIDDON, 
Robert (M) 
1950 
Auchenflower 
F: Wool Broker 
M: Dress shop 
proprietor 
Anglican Indooroopilly 
 OLD GUARD 
17 BOS, Nico 
(Nick) (M) 
1944 
Amsterdam 
Netherlands  
F: Storeman & 
packer 
M: Drafts-
person, then 
home duties 
Nil Oxley 
18 BRUSASCO, 
Ian (M) 
1928 Ingham F: Butcher then 
pensioner 
M: Home duties 
  Ashgrove 
19 HAUENSCHILD, 
Harry (M) 
1933 Clermont F: Carpenter M: 
Home duties 
Nil Inala 
20 HENRICKS, 
Robert John 
(Bob)  (M) 
1945 Brisbane F: Wharf 
labourer 
M: Pineapple 
Cannery cutter 
Nil Arana Hills 
21 MORAN, 
Gregory 
Stephen (Greg) 
(M) 
1960 Brisbane F: High school 
teacher 
M: Union 
Research 
officer 
Catholic Ashgrove 
 AUSTRALIAN WORKERS UNION 
22 GLEESON, 
Robert John 
(Bob) (M) 
1940 
Longreach 
F: Wool classer 
M: Milliner 
Catholic Longreach 
23 HODDER, Errol 
(M) 
1938 Brisbane F: Fitter & 
turner 
M: Northgate 
Cannery worker 
Presbyterian Charleville to 
1980, then 
Brisbane 
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Table B 
# Name (Gender) Primary 
School 
Secondary 
School 
University First Job 
 SOCIALIST LEFT 
1 ARDILL, 
Lorraine Joy (F) 
Adventist and 
Stanhope (Vic) 
Indooroopilly 
State 
Nil Nil Pharmacy 
assistant 
2 ARDILL, Wilfred 
Granville (Wilf) 
(M) 
Junction Park 
State 
Nil Nil PMG 
Telegram Boy 
3 HAMPSON, 
Terrence (M) 
Toowoomba 
North Primary 
Toowoomba 
Grammar 
Nil Chartered 
accountant's 
clerk 
4 JONES, Lindsay 
Gordon Bauer 
(M) 
Blackall State Rockhampton 
Grammar 
Kelvin Grove 
CAE 
Teacher 
5 JONES, Norma 
Alice (F) 
Toowoomba 
North State 
Harristown High UQ Teacher 
6 McLEAN, Ian 
(M) 
Stanmore 
Primary, NSW 
Leichhardt 
Junior Technical 
and (night-
school) at Fort 
Street Boys 
High  
(Night) at 
North Sydney 
Technical 
College and 
Newcastle 
University 
PMG Trainee 
Technician  
7 REYNOLDS, 
Michael Francis 
(Mike) (M) 
Hermit Park 
State School 
Pimlico State 
High 
James Cook Junior sugar 
chemist, 
Invicta sugar 
Mill  
8 WARNER, Anne 
Marie (F) 
Regina Ceolai, 
Croydon UK; 
St Paul's 
Preschool 
Birmingham 
UK 
St Paul's 
Grammar 
School, 
Birmingham UK 
Nil Clerk, City of 
Guilds, 
London 
9 YARROW, 
Susan Terrencia 
(Sue) (F) 
Miles State Miles High, 
Ipswich Girl's 
Grammar 
UQ Librarian 
 CENTRE CAUCUS 
10 BEATTIE, Peter  
(M) 
Atherton State Atherton High UQ Lawyer 
11 CROSS, 
Barbara (F) 
Bowenville 
and Dalby 
State 
State 
Commercial 
High 
Nil Nurse 
12 CROSS, 
Manfred 
Douglas (M) 
Rainworth and 
other state 
schools 
Brisbane State 
High 
UQ Public servant, 
Customs 
Department 
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13 FOURAS, 
Demetrious 
(Jim)  (M) 
Patras 
Primary, 
Greece then 
The Southport 
School 
The Southport 
School 
UQ Research 
Chemist, 
Department of 
Primary 
Industries 
14 HAMILL, David 
John (M) 
Silkstone 
Primary 
Bremer High UQ and 
Oxford 
University 
tutor/lecturer 
15 HAYDEN, 
William George 
(Bill) (M) 
St Ita's 
Convent and 
State Primary 
at Dutton Park  
Brisbane State 
High and 
Secondary 
Correspondence 
School 
UQ Public service 
clerk then 
Queensland 
Police force 
16 WHIDDON, 
Robert (M) 
 Brisbane Boy's 
College 
Nil MLC 
Assurance 
 OLD GUARD 
17 BOS, Nico 
(Nick) (M) 
Inala State Indooroopilly 
High 
QUT Electrical 
mechanic 
18 BRUSASCO, 
Ian (M) 
Ingham State 
and Ingham 
Convent 
St Joseph's 
College, 
Nudgee 
UQ Pharmacist 
19 HAUENSCHILD, 
Harry (M) 
Yeppoon State 
School 
Rockhampton 
Technical High 
Nil Lad porter 
with 
Queensland 
Rail 
20 HENRICKS, 
Robert John 
(Bob)  (M) 
Milton, 
Ashgrove and 
Inala State 
Indooroopilly 
High 
Nil Apprentice 
electrician 
21 MORAN, 
Gregory 
Stephen (Greg) 
(M) 
Newmarket 
State 
Gregory Terrace Nil Clerk with 
Queensland 
Rail 
 AUSTRALIAN WORKERS UNION 
22 GLEESON, 
Robert John 
(Bob) (M) 
St Joseph's 
Convent, 
Longreach 
St Brendan's 
Christian 
Brothers, 
Yeppoon 
Nil Shearer 
23 HODDER, Errol 
(M) 
Virginia State Australian 
Administrative 
Staff College, 
Victoria (1976) 
Harvard 
Business 
School, 
Boston USA 
(1980) 
Painter's 
apprentice 
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APPENDIX 3 
QUEENSLAND ELECTION RESULTS — STATE AND FEDERAL 1956–1989 
QUEENSLAND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
Seats won by political party 
Election 
Year 
ALP LIB CP/NP IND NQL QLP/DLP 
1956 49 8 16 1 1  
1957 20 18 24 2  11 
1960 25 20 26 3  4 
1963 26 20 26 5  1 
1966 26 20 27 4  1 
1969 31 19 26 1  1 
1972 33 21 26 2   
1974 11 30 39 2   
1977 23 24 35    
1980 25 22 35    
1983 32 8 41 1   
1986 30 10 49    
1989 54 8 27    
 
 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES–QUEENSLAND ELECTORATES 
Seats won by political party 
Election 
Year 
ALP LIB CP/NP IND ADEM QLP/DLP 
1958 3 10 5    
1961 11 3 4    
1963 8 6 4    
1966 6 8 4    
1969 7 7 4    
1972 8 6 4    
1974 6 7 5    
1975 1 9 8    
1977 3 9 7    
1980 5 7 7    
1983 10 3 6    
1984 9 8 7    
1987 13 6 5    
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SENATE–QUEENSLAND 
Seats won by political party 
Election 
Year 
ALP LIB CP/NP IND ADEM QLP/DLP 
1958 2 2 1    
1961 2 2 1    
1964 2 1 1   1 
1967 2 1 1   1 
1970 2 1 1   1 
1974 4 3 3    
1975 4 3 3    
1977 2 2 1    
1980 2 1 1  1  
1983 4 2 3  1  
1984 3 1 2  1  
1987 5 2 4  1  
 
ADEM Australian Democrats 
ALP Australian Labor Party 
CP/NP Country Party changed name to National Party in 1974 
IND Independent 
LIB Liberal Party 
NQL North Queensland Labor 
QLP/DLP Queensland Labor Party later became Democratic Labor Party 
 
Source: Australian Politics and Elections Database-The University of Western Australia — 
http://elections.uwa.edu.au 
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APPENDIX 4 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
NAME PLACE AND DATE  
OF INTERVIEW 
DETAILS 
Ardill, Lorraine 
Joy 
Tugun 
31 May 2012 
Pro-reform, strong branch advocate for 
intervention. Appointed to the Interim 
Administrative Committee by the National 
Executive. Elected as ALP Vice President 
following intervention. Links to interstate 
senior Left members. Senior negotiator for 
the SL. 
Ardill, Wilfred 
Granville (Wilf) 
OAM 
Tugun 
16 May 2011 
Incoming State Secretary of the FMWU from 
1982 having served as President of the 
union since 1974. Supporter of reform and 
one of the founding SL unionists. 
Batt, Hon. Neil 
Leonard Charles 
AO 
North Melbourne 
10 July 22013 
ALP National President 1978 – 1980 at the 
time of intervention and National Executive 
member 1974 - 1980. Deputy Premier and 
Treasurer Tasmania, 1977 – 1980. MHA for 
Denison, Tasmania, 1986 - 1988. 
Beattie, Hon. 
Peter Douglas AC 
Wilston 
30 January 2012 
An early pro-reformer, followed Manfred 
Cross as ALP State Secretary after 
intervention. Elected MLA for Brisbane in 
1989, went on to lead the ALP in state 
government from 1998 – 2007.  
Bos, Nico (Nick) Tweed Heads 
5 March 2013 
Electrical Trades Union member then ALP 
Organiser and State Secretary under the 
THG leader Tom Burton. He opposed 
reform and intervention.  
Brusasco, Ian 
OA, AO 
Ashgrove 
30 July 2012 
Loyally supported THG Old Guard leaders, 
opposing reform and intervention, kept 
talking with reformers. Credited with 
transforming the ALP’s financial status when 
heading Finance Committee. 
Combe, Harvey 
David Matthew 
(David) 
Kelvin Grove 
3 September 2013 
National Secretary of the ALP 1973 – 1981, 
during the Queensland reform years and the 
National Executive’s intervention decision. 
Cross, Barbara Ashgrove 
14 May 2012 
Early pro-reform branch and women’s 
advocate who supported change from the 
beginning, an early member of the Centre 
Caucus. 
Cross, Hon. 
Manfred Douglas 
AM 
Ashgrove 
13 December 2010 
Was ALP MHR for Brisbane 1961 – 1975 
and 1980 – 1990. A leader of the 1970s 
reform, was appointed by the National 
Executive as Interim Queensland Branch 
Secretary upon intervention.  
Fouras, 
Demetrios (Jim) 
(AM) 
Ashgrove 
24 April 2013 
MLA for South Brisbane 1977 - 1986. 
Supported reform in the party, including in 
the SPLP which was very pro the THG/Old 
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Guard. Later MLA for Ashgrove 1989 -2006. 
Gleeson, Robert 
(Bob) (AM) 
Kelvin Grove 
6 June 2012 
AWU member and 1983 Senate candidate 
with strong ties to THG Old Guard leaders 
and holder of cross factional loyalties. 
Hamill, Hon. 
David John AM 
Kelvin Grove 
1 July 2013 
 
1979 Rhodes Scholar, pro-reform leader in 
Young Labor in the early reform years, 
entered parliament 1983 – 2001 as MLA for 
Ipswich. 
Hampson, 
Terence John AM 
Bald Hills 
17 May 2011 
Pro-reform, following intervention worked in 
the Interim Administration in Charlotte 
Street. Followed Beattie as State Secretary 
(1988 – 1991) later a Brisbane City 
Councillor for Marchant (1994 – 2004). 
Close personal friend of Denis Murphy. 
Hauenschild, 
Harry AO 
Inala, Brisbane 
3 April 2011 
Old Guard leader and former boilermaker 
who became a paid official of the AMWU 
and President of the TLC (1976 – 1990), on 
the ALP Inner Executive (1977 – 1981), ALP 
Vice-President during this time.   
Hayden, Hon. 
William George 
AC (Bill)   
Waterfront Place, 
Brisbane  
1 April 2011 
MHR for Oxley. Commenced moves for 
reforms in Queensland as early as March 
1977, continued as FPLP Leader 
(December 1977.) National Executive 
intervened in March 1980. Hawke won 
leadership in 1983. Hayden became 
Australian Governor General    
Henricks, Robert 
(Bob) 
Kelvin Grove 
9 October 2011 
 
ETU member and staunch Old Guard 
advocate. State Secretary of the ETU. 
Strong environmentalist and political activist.  
Hodder, Errol Springwood 
22 April 2013 
State Secretary of the Queensland AWU, 
then AWU Federal President, and Federal 
and State Industrial Relations 
Commissioner. He led the warring parties 
back to reconciliation and negotiated the 
AWU/SL ‘Unholy Alliance’.  
Jones, Lindsay 
Gordon Bauer 
Kelvin Grove 
30 April 2013 
Pro-reform, Toowoomba ALP activist. 
Toowoomba City Councillor who stood for 
state seats in Toowoomba. Later worked in 
the ALP administration.  
Jones, Norma 
Alice 
Kelvin Grove 
13 December 2012 
Pro-reform, outspoken Toowoomba activist 
was appointed to the Interim Administrative 
Committee following intervention. Later an 
ALP organiser and National Executive 
member. 
McLean, Ian Kelvin Grove 
2 July 2011 
25 years State Secretary of the ATEA, early 
unionists reform supporter. Queensland ALP 
President in 1984, federal President 1987 – 
1994. Senior negotiator for the Socialist Left. 
McMullan, Hon. 
Robert Francis 
(Bob) 
Written responses to 
questions from London 
1 September 2013 
State Secretary Western Australia Branch 
1975 – 1981, National ALP Secretary 1981 
– 1988. Senator for ACT 1988 – 1996, MHR 
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for Fraser (formerly Canberra) 1996 – 2010. 
Moran, Gregory 
Stephen (Greg) 
Kelvin Grove 
1 May 2013 
Joined Young Labor in 1977, Party 
Organiser from 1984 – 1991. Worker in the 
Office of Lord Mayor Soorley, Ministerial 
Advisor during the Goss Government. An 
Old Guard member opposing intervention. 
Reynolds, 
Michael Francis 
(AM) 
Kelvin Grove 
1 August  2011 
Townsville Deputy Mayor and Mayor (1976 
– 1989), MLA for Townsville (1998 – 2009), 
led the reform push in North Queensland, 
served as Minister in the Beattie 
government. 
Warner, Hon. 
Anne Marie 
Kelvin Grove 
4 September 2011 
Strong reform advocate and founding SL 
member. MLA for Kurilpa electorate (1983 - 
1986) then South Brisbane (1986 – 1995). 
Minister in the Goss government. 
Whiddon, Robert 
Frank (Rob) 
Kelvin Grove 
11 September 2011 
Worker for Senator George Georges, early 
advocate for reform, foundation member of 
Centre Caucus. Later worked for Bill 
Hayden, then Chief-of-Staff to Premier Peter 
Beattie. 
 
